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Is the Legal Protection for the Foetus Adequate in Clinical Trials? 
Abstract 
In 2009 and 2010, the major drug regulatory bodies, the European Medicines Agency and 
the Food and Drug Administration in the USA, issued requests for the generation of 
information relating to the absorption, distribution, metabolism, excretion, efficacy and 
safety of investigational drugs in pregnant women prior to approval.  In the wake of 
thalidomide, research involving pregnant women other than for obstetric or gynaecologic 
purposes became rare, and studies of investigational drugs practically unknown.  
Consequently, none of the legislation applicable in the UK and few of the guidelines 
introduced in the last 40 years properly addresses the conduct of clinical trials of 
investigational drugs in this population.  This thesis questions whether the legal protection 
for the foetus is adequate in clinical trials.  The answer appears to be a qualified “no”. 
Arguments persist regarding the moral standing of the foetus, particularly regarding 
abortion.  That will not be the intent of such trials, and a moral case is made for the 
conduct of clinical trials in this population by analogy with the neonate, and the pregnant 
woman’s autonomy.  Legally, we already recognise the foetus has ‘interests’ which 
crystallise upon live birth, and that compensation is recoverable for harm inflicted in utero 
manifesting as congenital injury. The essence of research is quite different from medical 
practice, and the extent to which this is understood by trial participants is unclear.  The 
approvals processes contain a number of inadequacies which have the potential to expose 
the foetus to harm and affect the consent of the pregnant woman. The recovery of 
compensation in the event of children born injured following clinical trials during 
pregnancy in many ways may be more complex than other personal injury cases.. 
The conclusions of this thesis are that the existence of a foetus does merit recognition by 
the law in this setting and that morally such studies are justifiable.  However, the present 
legislation and approval processes potentially expose the foetus to avoidable risk and may 
not be appropriate to enable the recovery of compensation, thereby creating potential to 
deter future trial participants. A proposal is made regarding an approach to simplify the 
process for recovery of compensation, and thereby strengthen the approval and consent 
processes. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In the weeks following the “9/11” terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon in 2001, envelopes containing anthrax spores were mailed to news media 
companies and government officials, leading to the first bioterrorism-related cases of 
anthrax in the United States of America.
1
  The following year, the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (ACOG) issued recommendations regarding anthrax 
post-exposure prophylaxis in asymptomatic pregnant and lactating women,
2
 which were 
similar to those contained within the consensus statement from the Working Group on 
Civilian Biodefense.
3
  Both organisations advocated the use of the antibiotic amoxicillin.  
Five years later, in 2007, a study was published which demonstrated that serum levels of 
amoxicillin adequate to prevent anthrax were unattainable during pregnancy.  Due to 
altered renal function in pregnancy, amoxicillin was cleared from the body by excretion in 
urine so rapidly that it did not accumulate in the bloodstream sufficiently to attain the 
concentration necessary to combat anthrax.
4
  The treatment recommendations intended to 
prevent the development of anthrax were therefore both inaccurate and inadequate; the 
treatment could not work, and time to institute alternative treatment lost while waiting for 
the recommended approach to be effective. 
The inaccurate advice from these groups was hardly surprising.  At the time it was issued, 
an evaluation of the pharmacokinetics, i.e., the patterns of absorption, distribution, 
metabolism and excretion (normally abbreviated to ADME) of amoxicillin during 
pregnancy had not been conducted.  Indeed, the same statement was and remains 
applicable to the vast majority of medicines in clinical use.
5
 However, the lack of 
characterisation of medicines in pregnant women is not restricted to pharmacokinetics: it 
applies equally to the assessment of efficacy and safety; for example, at the time of the 
                                                          
1
 Daniel B.; Jernigan, D.B. and the National Anthrax Epidemiologic Investigation Team. (2002). 
Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, United States, 2001: Epidemiol.Findings Emerg. Infect.Dis., 
8, 1019–1028. 
2
 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.  Committee opinion 268, February 2002. 
Management of asymptomatic pregnant or lactating women exposed to anthrax.  Obstet.Gynecol., 99, 366–
368. 
3
 Inglesby, T.V., et al and for the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense. (2002). Anthrax as a biological 
weapon, updated recommendations for management.  J.Am.Med.Ass. 287, 2236–2252. 
4
 Andrew MA, Easterling TR, Carr DB, et al. (2007). Amoxicillin pharmacokinetics in pregnant women: 
modeling and simulations of dosage strategies.  Clin.Pharmacol.Ther., 81, 547-56. 
5
 Anger, G.J., Piquette-Miller, M. (2008). Pharmacokinetic studies in pregnant women.  Clin.Pharmacol. 
Ther., 83,184–87. 
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2009 H1N1 pandemic, no vaccine had undergone sufficient testing to support approval for 
use in pregnancy.
6
 
With the exception of a few medicines intended to treat specific complications in 
pregnancy, almost no medicines are licenced for antenatal prescription.
7
  To put this into 
context, from 1980 to 2007, 660 drugs were under development for cardiovascular disease 
(a high-prevalence indication), 34 for amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, an orphan indication, 
and only 17 drugs were under development for obstetric indications.
8
 
Pregnancy is not a prophylaxis against illness; recent research shows that poor asthma 
control during pregnancy increases the risk of preeclampsia, low birth-weight and 
prematurity;
9
 women with pre-pregnancy diabetes are at significantly increased risk of 
adverse maternal and foetal outcomes, both of which are improved in diabetic women who 
achieve good glycaemic control throughout pregnancy.
10
 Pregnancy itself is associated 
with a range of conditions ranging from the difficult (extreme nausea and vomiting) to 
disabling (sciatic nerve compression) to life-threatening for the woman or her foetus 
(preeclampsia) resulting in a significant additional burden of potentially-avoidable 
conditions.  As a result, most women take a medicine at some point during pregnancy.  A 
recent Scottish study showed that for more than 80% of pregnant women this included at 
least one prescribed medication.
11
  The Scottish figure is consistent with data from other 
OECD countries, including France (93%), Germany (85%)
12
 and the USA (64%).
13
 
                                                          
6
 See www.ClinicalTrials.gov.  Maternal vaccine studies.  
http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/results?term=maternal+vaccine, accessed 9
th
 September, 2015; Saito, S., 
Minakami, H., Nakai, A. et al. (2013). Outcomes of infants exposed to oseltamivir or zanamivir in utero 
during pandemic (H1N1) 2009.  Am.J.Obstet.Gyn., 209, Article No: 130.e1; Lacroix, I.  Beau, A.  B.  
Hurault-Delarue, C. et al. (2013). Safety of neuraminidase inhibitors, oseltamivir and zanamivir, during 
pregnancy: a comparative study in the EFEMERIS database.  Fund.Clin.Pharmacol., 27, Suppl.1, 106 
7
 Buhimschi, C.S., Weiner, C.P. (2009). Medications in Pregnancy and Lactation; Part 1: Teratology.  
Obs.Gyn., 113, 166-188. 
8
 Zajicek, A.; Barrett, J.S. (2013). The grand challenges in obstetric and pediatric pharmacology.  Front. 
Pharmacol., 4, 170. doi: 10.3389/fphar.2013.00170. 
9
 Murphy, V.E., Namazy, J.A., Powell, H., Schatz, M., Chambers, C., Attia, J.  and Gibson, P.G. (2011). A 
meta-analysis of adverse perinatal outcomes in women with asthma.  Br.J.Obs.Gyn., 118, 1314–23. 
10
 Steel, J.M., Johnstone, F.D., Hepburn, D.A., Smith, A.F. (1990). Can pre-pregnancy care of diabetic 
women reduce the risk of abnormal babies? Br.Med.J., 301, 1070–1074.; Kinsley, B. (2007). Achieving 
better outcomes in pregnancies complicated by type 1 and type 2 diabetes mellitus.  Clin.Ther., 29 (Suppl.D), 
S153–60. 
11
 Irvine, L., Flynn, R.W., Libby, G., Crombie, I.K.  and Evans, J.M. (2010). Drugs dispensed in primary care 
during pregnancy: a record-linkage analysis in Tayside, Scotland.  Drug Safety, 33, 593–604. 
12
 Daw, J.R., Hanley, G.E.R., Greyson, D.L., Morgan, S.G. (2011). Prescription drug use during pregnancy in 
developed countries: a systematic review.  Pharmacoepidemiology Drug Safety, 20, 895–902. 
13
 Andrade, S.E., Gurwitz, J.H., Davis, R.L., Chan, K.A. et al. (2004). Prescription drug use in pregnancy.  
Am.J.Obstet.Gynecol., 191, 398–407. 
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The Global Burden of Disease Study estimated that maternal disorders accounted for 1.7% 
and perinatal disorders for 5.9% of Disability Adjusted Life Years.
14
  In the USA alone, 
this results in a substantial economic cost, estimated at over US$15bn annually,
15
 as a 
result of extended in-patient stays for both mother and child, often prior to and post-
delivery, as well as increased medical management costs.  Similar economic data for other 
countries does not appear to have been published, but there seems no a priori reason to 
suspect the USA is unique regarding the need for additional medical care associated with 
the management of illness during pregnancy.  Compelling medical and financial reasons 
therefore exist to use a range of medications in women whilst they are pregnant, yet the 
vast majority of drugs available have not been evaluated in pregnant women, and as the 
amoxicillin example illustrates, physiological changes during pregnancy can significantly 
alter drug disposition.  Recognising this, both the Food and Drugs Agency (FDA) in the 
USA and the European Medicines Agency
16
 (EMA) have requested that data relating to the 
pharmacokinetics of investigational drugs are provided prior to their registration as new 
medicines.
17
 
Thus, from a position of ‘protecting’ the foetus from possible harm by excluding pregnant 
women from clinical trials, we have moved to a situation in which pregnant women have 
become a specifically-targeted population.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, a 
variety of approaches have been employed to evaluate the effects of drugs in this 
population in the wake of thalidomide, but in a pre-approval setting, the normal way in 
which to generate data, and particularly pharmacokinetic data, systematically, is in a 
clinical trial setting, which leads to the central questions  of this thesis: what particular 
issues are raised by clinical trials involving pregnant women, how is the presence of the 
foetus addressed and is the legal protection for the foetus appropriate and adequate? 
                                                          
14
 Lopez, A.D., Mathers, C.D., Ezzati, M., et al. (2006). Global and regional burden of disease and risk 
factors, 2001: systematic analysis of population health data.  Lancet, 367, 1747–1757. 
15
 Gill, K., Pande, R., Malhotra, A. (2007). Women deliver for development.  Lancet, 370, 1347–1357. 
16
 The European Medicines Agency is a decentralised agency of the European Union, responsible for the 
scientific evaluation of medicines developed by pharmaceutical companies for use in the European Union; 
see http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/about_us/general/general_content_000235.jsp, 
accessed 18
th
 September, 2015. 
17
 FDA, Health Organizations to Study Safety of Medications Taken During Pregnancy, FDA News Release 
10 Journal of Biomedicine and Biotechnology 2009, 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2009/ucm195934.htm See also 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DevelopmentResources/Labeling/ucm093310.htm 
both accessed 9
th
 September, 2015; 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2010/03/WC500076321.pdf accessed 9th 
September, 2015. 
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1.2 Historical Perspective 
Almost certainly, no drug has done more than thalidomide to stimulate the strengthening of 
drug regulation, and to raise awareness of the risks to the foetus resulting from women 
taking medicines during pregnancy.  Over 12,000 children – the exact number is unknown 
- were born with various deformities attributable to their mothers having taken the drug 
during pregnancy.
18
  These deformities were usually in the skeletal system, of which 
phocomelia - in which the long bones of the limb (humerus or femur, radius or tibia, ulna 
or fibula) are absent or markedly hypoplastic, with normal or nearly normal hand or foot - 
was the most common.  With the exception of thalidomide-related phocomelia, this 
congenital abnormality is extremely rare.  The largest epidemiological survey yet 
undertaken reported an incidence of 0.62 per 100,000 births.
19
  The incidence of 
abnormalities (including phocomelia as well as a range of other defects) with thalidomide 
was between 20% and 30%,
20
 approximating to a 40,000-fold increase above the 
spontaneous rate, and the abnormalities were distinctive, normally involving multiple 
limbs.
21
  In contrast, approximately 50% of spontaneous cases show an isolated defect.
22
  
As a result, the link between thalidomide and phocomelia was recognised relatively 
quickly. 
Thalidomide had been synthesised by the German pharmaceutical company Grunenthal in 
1953, possibly as an antidote to nerve gas poisoning.
23
  Initially, in many countries, the 
drug was made available without prescription because of its apparent wide margin of 
safety.
24
  The first clinical report describing the now-familiar teratologic signature 
                                                          
18
 Thalidomide was not approved for use in North America because of the courageous stand by Frances 
Kelsey from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA); she gives her perspective in Kelsey, 
F.O. (1967). Events after thalidomide.  J.Dent.Res., 46, 1199-2006.  For a broader review, see Koren, G., 
Pastuszak, A., Ito, S.  Drugs in pregnancy. (1998). N.Engl.J.Med., 338, 1128-37. 
19
 Bermejo-Sanchez, E., Cuevas, L., Amar, E., Bianca, S. et al. (2011). Phocomelia: a worldwide descriptive 
epidemiologic study in a large series of cases from the international clearinghouse for birth defects 
surveillance and research, and overview of the literature.  Am.J.Med.Gen., 157C, 305-320. 
20
 Mitchell, A.A. (2003). Systematic identification of drugs that can cause birth defects—a new opportunity.  
N.Engl.J.Med.,349, 2556–2559; Etwel, F., Hutson, J.R., Madadi, P., et al. (2014). Fetal and perinatal 
exposure to drugs and chemicals: novel biomarkers of risk. Ann.Rev.Pharm.Tox,. 54, 295-315. 
21
 Lenz W. (1980). Genetics and limb deficiencies.  Clin.Orthop.  148, 9–17. 
22
 Bermejo-Sanchez, E., Cuevas, L., Amar, E., Bianca, S. et al. (2011). Phocomelia: a worldwide descriptive 
epidemiologic study in a large series of cases from the international clearinghouse for birth defects 
surveillance and research, and overview of the literature.  Am.J.Med.Gen., 157C, 305-320. 
23
 Lachmann, P.J. (2012). The penumbra of thalidomide, the litigation culture and the licensing of 
pharmaceuticals.  Q.J.Med., 105, 1179–1189.; Foggo, D. (2009). "Thalidomide 'was created by the Nazis'".  
www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/style/living/Health/article148972.ece accessed 9th September, 2015. 
24
 See, for example, De Souza, L.P. (1959). Thalidomide.  Br.Med.J., 2, 635, describing the lack of 
consequence of a 10-fold overdose. 
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appeared in 1961,
25
 and in 1962 the drug was withdrawn in certain countries, although not 
without some protests from the medical community.
26
  It was finally withdrawn in 1969, 
eight years after the initial reports of serious developmental abnormalities.  In each country 
in which the drug had been marketed and which had a reliable reporting system for such 
abnormalities, the number of reported cases of these characteristic limb defects declined 
rapidly following the withdrawal of thalidomide.
27
 
Until maternal rubella infection during pregnancy had been identified as a cause of birth 
defects and developmental disabilities in 1941,
28
 congenital malformations had generally 
been believed to be inherited.
29
 The uterus and placenta were thought to serve as a barrier, 
protecting the foetus from the effects of external factors.
30
 The recognition of maternal 
rubella syndrome only slightly modified this view: the development of the embryo or 
foetus could be influenced by both genetic factors and maternal infection, both of which 
were essentially intrinsic in nature.  Thalidomide provided the first example of a truly 
extrinsic factor which could have such an effect. 
The number of properly-controlled clinical trials of potential new medicines conducted 
around the time of the thalidomide tragedy was small, and the representation of women, 
particularly those of child-bearing potential, in these trials was practically non-existent
31
.  
From the investigators’ and sponsors’ perspectives, this was due to a combination of the 
challenges of assessing drug effect against the changes associated with the menstrual 
cycle
32
, the unknown impact of chemical contraception which was starting to come into 
                                                          
25
 McBride W. (1961). Thalidomide and congenital abnormalities.  Lancet, 2. 1358; Lenz W. (1962). 
Thalidomide and congenital abnormalities.  Lancet, 279, 303–305 (This letter to the Lancet was a sequel to a 
1961 conference presentation describing abnormalities in 52 infants born to mothers taking thalidomide 
during pregnancy following which the author received 115 additional reports of similarly affected infants 
from physicians in Germany, Belgium, Sweden, and England). 
26
 Gosling, P.H. (1961). Withdrawal of Thalidomide (" Distaval "). Br.Med.J. 2, 1644; Warkany, J. (1988). 
Why I doubted that thalidomide was the cause of the epidemic of limb defects of 1959 to 1961.  Teratology, 
38, 217-219. 
27
 Običan, S., Scialli, A.R. (2012). Teratogenic exposures.  Am.J.Med.Genet.C; Semin.Med.Genet., 157, 
150–169. 
28
 Gregg, N.M. (1941). Congenital cataract following German measles in the mother.  Trans.Ophthalmol. 
Soc.Aust., 3, 35–45. 
29
 Webster, W.S. (1998). Teratogen update: Congenital rubella.  Teratology, 58,13–23. 
30
 Fraser, F.C. (2010). Foreward: What is teratology? In: Hales, B., Scialli, A., Tassinari, M.S., eds.  
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widespread use, and probably also because of an instinctive concern around the possibility 
that a woman of child bearing potential (WoCBP) may be, unknown to herself, in the early 
stages of pregnancy.
33
  From the patients’ perspective, there was a reluctance to participate 
in an activity now seen as burdensome, time-consuming, potentially dangerous, and of 
little value to participants.
34
 
1.3 The Formal Exclusion of Women from Clinical Trials 
In the wake of thalidomide, patients and physicians naturally adopted a conservative 
approach to the inclusion of women, and particularly those of child-bearing potential, in 
clinical research.  In the USA, three events occurred in the early 1970’s which eventually 
triggered the legislative change that effectively prohibited the participation of women of 
child-bearing potential (WoCBP) from clinical trials.
35
  The first was the national “war on 
cancer” announced by President Nixon,36 which created the impression that cures would 
soon be found and that the need for participation in clinical trials was likely to decline.  
Secondly, the Tuskegee syphilis experiment became known; this drew attention to the lack 
of safeguards for trial participants in the USA, which further deterred individuals from 
volunteering to participate and to decline when invited to do so by investigating 
physicians.  The third event was the passionate and often heated debate following the Roe v 
Wade
37
 decision which had a chilling effect on all research involving WoCBP and 
foetuses.  As a consequence of these three events, clinical trials in women known to be 
pregnant were simply not instituted in the USA: investigators were reluctant to accept the 
risk to their reputations of participating in a trial of a drug which may prove to be 
teratogenic, and sponsors were deterred by the potential for adverse publicity and costs 
which would arise in such circumstances.  Although these three events arose in the USA, 
elsewhere in the world the same issues of reluctance by sponsors to instigate, by 
investigators to undertake and by WoCBP to participate in such trials resulted in the 
absence of controlled clinical trials of new investigational drugs in this patient population. 
In 1977, the FDA mandated the exclusion of women of WoCBP from early-phase clinical 
trials, i.e., Phases I and II, on the grounds that such trials held no prospect of benefit for the 
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participants, and that, at such an early stage in the development of a new drug, the required 
preclinical teratology studies would be unlikely to be complete;
38
 a specific exemption was 
made for women with life-threatening conditions. 
Clinical trials are research studies which explore whether a medical strategy, treatment, or 
device is safe and effective for humans.  Pharmaceutical clinical trials are designed to 
answer the same questions of safety and efficacy in respect of new drugs, new 
formulations of existing drugs, additional indications for existing drugs, or their effects in 
patient populations not previously studied, such as pregnant women.  The purpose of 
clinical trials is to generate generalisable information in a sample of patients representative 
in various ways of the population which would use the drug were it to be approved, and 
trials follow strict scientific standards to ensure the data generated are fit for this purpose.  
Pharmaceutical clinical trials constitute one of the final stages of the drug development 
process, which normally starts in a laboratory, moves on to involve animal testing, then 
into human volunteers (Phase I studies) and followed by trials in patients with the 
condition the drug is intended to treat.  For safety purposes, clinical trials in patients begin 
with small groups of subjects with the target condition (Phase II studies) to assess the 
safety and tolerability of the drug and to establish the relevant dose-range for efficacy.  In 
later Phase III studies, substantially more subjects with the target condition will be 
studied.
39
 
The national regulatory agencies within Europe did not follow the FDA’s approach of 
introducing a ban, but that made little difference.  The FDA’s position was binding within 
the USA; most pharmaceutical companies were USA-headquartered organisations and 
considered that the FDA position bound them globally.  With the exception of drugs 
developed specifically for conditions unique to pregnancy, there was no requirement in any 
country to conduct trials of investigational drugs in WoCBP, far less pregnant women, in 
order for the drug to be approved for use, and so there was no incentive for pharmaceutical 
companies to incur the perceived risks of such trials.  Thus, many drugs became available 
for use by women, including pregnant women, despite having been studied exclusively in 
males, i.e., no distinction was made between the sexes for licensing purposes. 
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During this period, in the UK the issues relating to foetal research generally had been 
considered in 1972 (the Peel Report
40
) and again in 1989 (the Polkinghorne Report
41
).  The 
Peel Report was the output of an Advisory Group on the Use of F(o)etuses and F(o)etal 
Material for Research created after parliamentary reports of the commercial sale of human 
foetuses for research purposes.  The main conclusions of the Peel Committee were that 
foetal experiments were permissible up to 20 weeks’ gestation, i.e., while the foetus was 
‘pre-viable’, and 300g bodyweight, provided the information could not be obtained in any 
other way, and the intent of the research was not one of ascertaining whether the 
intervention caused foetal harm.  The Polkinghorne Committee, formed in the wake of the 
first operations to transplant foetal tissue into the brains of sufferers from Parkinson's 
Disease, was tasked to examine the UK Code of Practice for foetal research which had 
developed following the Peel Report.  The Polkinghorne Report removed the distinction 
based upon viability and recommended that research on the foetus should be governed by 
principles 'broadly similar' to those applicable to research on children and adults, including 
the conditions that research should entail a minimal risk of harm unless the intervention 
was for the benefit of the foetus, and that trial procedures involving greater than minimal 
risk be considered in a manner 'broadly similar' to that in which they are considered for 
children and adults, i.e., on a group benefit basis.  Thus, the conduct of clinical trials in 
pregnant women would have been acceptable in the UK, but the absence of a commercial 
incentive to do so for potential new medicines remained. 
The exclusion of WoCBP from early-phase clinical trials effectively resulted in the 
exclusion of women from most trials.  At that time, few if any approved drugs had 
different dosing recommendations for men and women, and the assumption seemed to 
carry that there was no advantage of incurring the perceived risks of including WoCBP in 
later-phase trials.  The extent of this exclusion is clear from review of a number of 
substantial clinical trials in which no women were enrolled: 
 the Physicians’ Health Study of the effects of aspirin on cardiovascular disease (22,071 
men);
42
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 the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MRFIT), a randomised trial conducted 
from 1973 to 1982 to evaluate correlations among blood pressure, smoking, 
cholesterol, and coronary heart disease (12,866 men);
43
 
 the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging, extending from 1958 to 1975, which 
initially excluded females despite the fact that women constitute the majority of the 
population over age 65,
44
 although women were latterly included. 
Perhaps the most surprising illustration comes from the first study of the potential role of 
oestrogen in the prevention of heart disease, which also was conducted solely in men.
45
 
1.4 The Impacts of the Exclusion 
By the late 1970s clinical evidence was emerging of sex-related differences in the 
responses to various drugs, which were not amenable to simple pharmacokinetic 
explanation, i.e., greater weights and different body composition in males,
46
 and in only 
some cases had a hormonal basis,
47
 although pre-clinical reports of sex-related differences 
had first emerged in 1932.
48
  The exclusion of women from clinical trials meant that many 
medicines became available for prescription to women without knowledge of any 
differences regarding pharmacokinetics, efficacy or safety compared to data generated in 
males.  Of course, safety data would be generated in time through normal safety reporting 
systems relating to approved drugs, and during the 1990s, of the ten approved drugs 
completely withdrawn from use, one factor in eight of these cases was that adverse event 
reports indicated they posed significantly higher safety risks for women than for men.
49
  
However, no similar process exists to gather the information necessary to answer the 
questions regarding pharmacokinetics and efficacy to guide dosing regimens in women; 
this information would need to come from other sources. 
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The male-female comparison described above makes (at least) one crucial over-
simplification, which is that all women are sufficiently similar to form a homogeneous 
group - yet few non-pathological conditions produce the extent of physiological, endocrine 
and biochemical changes which occur during pregnancy.  As pregnancy progresses, gastric 
emptying is slowed, potentially delaying maximal drug concentrations after ingestion, and 
gastric acidity is reduced, which affects the absorption of certain drugs, with some showing 
increases and others reductions.  Nausea and vomiting, common in early pregnancy, will 
also affect – generally reducing - absorption of ingested medicines.  The increases in total 
body water and fat stores during pregnancy increase the volume of distribution within the 
body of many drugs, thereby lowering the plasma and target organ concentrations.  The 
increased cardiac output associated with pregnancy increases the speed at which drugs are 
distributed throughout the body.  Pregnancy has variable effects on hepatic metabolism, 
with some metabolic pathways induced and others inhibited, again resulting in differences 
of circulating and target organ concentrations of both parent drugs and metabolites.  In the 
kidney, filtration rate and renal secretion increase during pregnancy, thereby enhancing 
clearance from the body of renally excreted drugs (such as amoxicillin) and their 
metabolites.
50
  Thus, many changes occur during pregnancy which are likely to affect the 
absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion of drugs, with consequent impacts upon 
their efficacy and safety.  The majority of the few studies which have been published 
confirm not only significant differences between pregnant and non-pregnant women in the 
pharmacokinetic characteristics for drugs, but also that such differences are not consistent 
throughout pregnancy.
51
  
Convincing medical reasons exist to administer a range of medications to women whilst 
they are pregnant, and due to the physiological changes described above, pregnant women 
may require different dosing regimens to both men and non-pregnant women.
52
  The 
exclusion of WoCBP from clinical trials meant that, for almost all new drugs introduced, 
guidance regarding dose regimens applicable to women and, particularly, pregnant women, 
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was not available.  As a consequence, patients in these groups may be treated sub-
effectively or exposed to excessive doses.  If an approved drug was not studied in pregnant 
subjects, then its use in that population is considered as off-label usage, which engages a 
range of medical and legal issues.
53
  If a licenced drug harms a patient, under the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987, the responsibility lies with the manufacturer. However, 
should an off-licence drug cause harm, the liability, potentially, lies with the prescriber.  In 
theory, a prescriber could face a negligence claim solely for using an off-licence drug if 
harm was caused and if a licenced alternative was available, although a failure to provide 
adequate information upon which a patient could base consent is perhaps a more likely 
cause for litigation.  The situation was clearly unsatisfactory from many perspectives. 
1.5 The Change of Perspective - Towards the Inclusion of Women 
Since the 1980’s, opinion had been growing that the exclusion of women from clinical 
trials was discriminatory, disadvantaging not only the present generation but also 
subsequent ones.
54
  The ethical perspective was changing from the earlier, paternalistic, 
focus on protecting a population perceived as vulnerable to one which increasingly 
recognised the concept of autonomy for would-be participants.
55
  In the USA, in their 
Belmont Report, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research had defined beneficence, justice, and respect for 
persons as the ethical principles that should govern research, and took the view that 
beneficence had both micro- and macro-ethics dimensions, in that while individual subjects 
should be protected against risk of harm, that had to be balanced against the potential loss 
of substantial benefits to society that might accrue from research.
56
 
In 1991, in United Automobile Workers v Johnson Controls,
57
 the Supreme Court of the 
USA ruled that, under the terms of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (1978),
58
 pregnant 
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women could not be excluded from employment solely on the premise that their working 
conditions posed a potential foetal risk.  Although significant differences exist between 
employment rights and participation in clinical trials, the court's decision added fuel to the 
growing debate around the importance of autonomy and consent, and in particular the 
practice of exclusion by gender.
59
  The decision indirectly raised the question of the 
constitutionality of excluding women from government-funded or government-funded 
research.  In 1993, the FDA issued a new Guideline for the Study and Evaluation of 
Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, which called for a “reasonable” 
number of women to be included in new clinical trials.
60
  The Guideline also interpreted 
that the principle of justice enunciated in the Belmont Report was best served when 
research benefited men and women equally.  The following year, the Institute of Medicine 
(IoM) argued that the continued practice of excluding women from clinical trials 
diminished their autonomy, and that justice required all therapeutic interventions (not just 
new medicines) should be adequately tested in the population(s) in which they were 
intended to be used.
61
  The same year, a new National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guideline 
was jointly issued by the Office of Research on Women’s Health and the Office of 
Research on Minority Health, stipulating that women and members of minority groups and 
their subpopulations (sic) were to be included in all human subject research.
62
 
Of course, the same principles which drove the FDA to rescind its 1977 exclusion of 
WoCBP from early-phase clinical trials also apply to pregnant women.  Pregnant women 
constitute a definable population to whom medicines are likely to be administered, and so, 
following the IoM’s argument above, justice also requires that investigational drugs should 
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be adequately tested in this population too.  Similarly, the principle of respect for persons 
requires that pregnant women be accorded the same respect as non-pregnant women.
63
 
After the FDA rescinded its ruling precluding the recruitment of WoCBP into early-phase 
clinical trials, the number of trials including women increased rapidly.  A systematic 
review of the inclusion of women in clinical trials for investigational drugs approved by 
the FDA between 2000 and 2002 showed that 47% of participants were male, and 49% 
were female (the gender of 4% of subjects was not specified).  However, a significant 
under-representation of women in early phase trials remained.
64
  An analysis of marketing 
authorisation applications in Europe submitted between 2000 and 2003 also concluded 
there was no evidence of gender bias.
65
 
Thus, in both Europe and the USA, the practice of excluding women, a large proportion of 
whom would be of child-bearing potential, from clinical trials changed rapidly following 
the reversal of the FDA’s 1977 decision.  However, the conduct of trials involving 
pregnant women was another matter.  The most recent review of clinical trials in pregnant 
women concluded their exclusion from industry-sponsored clinical trials continues to be 
common practice; in a 4-month snapshot, only 1% of industry-sponsored studies were 
designed specifically for pregnant women and 95% of studies of conditions that can affect 
pregnant women excluded pregnant women from participation.
66
  The reasons the authors 
advance are not surprising: the paternalistic attitude regarding a ‘vulnerable’ population is 
probably still more embedded regarding the foetus,
67
 as is the desire to ‘do no harm’, yet 
clinical care during pregnancy often requires the use of medications untested in pregnancy.  
In addition, the FDA classifies pregnant women as a vulnerable population, which deters 
researchers from including pregnant subjects in clinical trials. 
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1.6 The Requests from the Regulatory Agencies for better data 
The lack of information available to guide drug use in pregnant women, together with the 
changing perspective on the inclusion of pregnant women in clinical trials, led the FDA in 
2009 to release its Pregnancy and Lactation Rule,
68
 intended to promote more systematic 
collection of information relating to drug efficacy and pharmacokinetics during pregnancy, 
to achieve a balance between possible harms and benefits to both the mother and foetus.  
The following year, the EMA, of which the UK regulatory authority, the Medicines and 
Healthcare Regulatory Agency (MHRA) is a part, announced “Medicine Use in 
Pregnancy” as one of its priorities for drug safety research, with comparative safety 
(presumably for both pregnant women and foetuses, although this is not explicitly stated) 
of different therapeutic options in pregnancy as one of the key objectives.
69
 
Neither announcement makes reference to trials of medicines intended to benefit the 
foetus; they do not seem to be intended to provide a framework for or promote trials in 
which the foetus is the potential beneficiary.  Rather, they seem to be part of the Agencies’ 
desire to stimulate properly conducted clinical trials of investigational drugs in the 
pregnant population, with the objective of encouraging the collection of data which will 
provide a dosing regimen and guide the use of the drug, once approved, should it be 
prescribed to a patient known to be pregnant. 
The ethical arguments in support of conducting controlled clinical trials in this population 
seem to be well-founded from utilitarian, deontological, and consequentialist perspectives.  
Pregnant women do and will continue to suffer from a range of conditions amenable to 
medical management with drugs when they occur in males and non-pregnant females, and 
the reality is that drugs will be prescribed to pregnant women, either innocently (neither 
the prescriber nor the woman is aware of the pregnancy) or off-label.  From the individual 
pregnant woman’s viewpoint, the fact that a drug which she is prescribed has been 
assessed in other pregnant women, and so the efficacy, safety and dose regimen have all 
been established, may alleviate some concerns, although one might imagine those concerns 
would be more likely focussed on the impact on the foetus than the condition for which the 
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drug is being given.  For pregnant women as a group, assurance that many - ideally, all, but 
that seems unlikely - of the medicines they might be administered have been assessed in 
pregnant women should do much to reduce worries regarding the use of medically-
prescribed drugs during pregnancy. 
The deliberate, systematic conduct of trials of investigational drugs in pregnant women 
will inevitably raise concerns regarding ‘another thalidomide’, but the Agencies’ requests 
specifically do not make reference to the detection of possible teratogenesis.  This is hardly 
surprising, for three reasons.  The first of these is a matter of statistics: assuming a baseline 
malformation rate of 3%, detecting a twofold increased risk for malformations would 
require a study involving 800 exposed subjects and 800 unexposed controls,
70
 far beyond 
the size (and cost) of study necessary to provide pharmacokinetic information.  As an 
illustration, a recent study demonstrating that antidepressant use (so, all antidepressant 
agents, rather than a single drug) during pregnancy was associated with the development of 
autism in the exposed children included 4,429 cases of autism spectrum disorder and 
compared them to 43,277 matched controls, concluding that antidepressant use was 
associated with more than a 3-fold increased risk of autism in the children.
71
  Trials of such 
size and cost are neither practicable nor financially viable in this population prior to drug 
approval.  The second reason is a matter of ethics: an objective of conducting trials 
specifically to detect a potential teratogenic effect would probably be held to be unethical.  
Finally, the time course for the emergence of such injury is too variable to be detected in 
this way.  Injury may be immediately obvious, as was the case with thalidomide, it may be 
latent, as reported for the antidepressants,
72
 or it may be intergenerational, with 
diethystilboestrol (DES)
73
 as the leading illustration.  Evidence is now emerging that 
abnormalities may also occur in the grandchildren of women who took DES in 
pregnancy.
74
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In the wake of thalidomide, a range of approaches was developed to try to enable early 
detection of possible teratogenesis.  Opportunistic case reports of children born with a birth 
defect are collated; case series, comparing the outcome of pregnancies in one group to that 
in another, matched, group, has detected foetal alcohol syndrome
75
 and the embryopathies 
associated with the rubella virus,
76
 thalidomide
77
 and isotretinoin;
78
 the small numbers of 
female participants who do become pregnant during clinical trials are (usually) excluded 
from further participation then rigorously followed up.  Pregnancy registries, involving 
women who have become pregnant while taking an approved medicine, are retrospectively 
opportunistic, rather than prospective and planned, and in the absence of an appropriate 
control group, comparisons are often made to ‘expected’ rates of congenital anomalies 
obtained from dedicated birth defects registries to assess whether the medicine expresses 
teratogenic effect.
79
 However, none of these approaches can, or is intended to, capture 
systematically information relating to drug efficacy and pharmacokinetics during 
pregnancy.  The Agencies’ requests for such information prior to the approval of new 
drugs are therefore best satisfied by the conduct of formal controlled trials.
80
 
Thus, the intent behind the Agencies’ requests seems not to be that of “avoiding another 
thalidomide”, as such studies simply cannot detect such effects.  The reference by the 
EMA to “comparative safety of different therapeutic options in pregnancy” seems to 
denote a desire for a holistic evaluation of safety for both pregnant women and foetuses. 
The requests from the Authorities for data prior to receiving applications to consider drugs 
for approval are likely to result in an increased volume of clinical research in the pregnant 
population.  Given the 2-3% underlying incidence of spontaneous congenital abnormalities 
(1 in 45 live births in England and Wales
81
; the figure for Scotland is comparable,
82
 and the 
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UK is in line with figure for Europe
83
), inevitably, as the number of trials in this population 
increases, a foetus with a congenital anomaly will be born to a woman who participated in 
a clinical trial, and in an unknowable proportion of cases, the anomaly will have been 
caused by the investigational product. 
1.7 The Legal and Ethical Issues of Clinical Trials in Pregnant Women 
The requirements regarding the proper conduct of clinical trials of investigational 
medicinal products (IMP) in the UK are specified in the EU Clinical Trials Directive 
(CTD) and codified in the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004.
84
  
Under the regulations, ‘conducting a clinical trial’ comprises, inter alia, carrying out any 
test or analysis with the intent: 
(i) to discover or verify the clinical, pharmacological or other pharmacodynamic effects of 
the investigational medicinal products administered in the course of the trial, 
(ii) to identify any adverse reactions to those products, or 
(iii) to study absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion of those products.  
These intentions seem to accord well with the requests from the Agencies regarding the 
generation of information relating to drug disposition, efficacy and safety in the pregnant 
population.  Clinical trials in pregnant women generally will entail administering the 
investigational drug (or placebo or comparator agent) to each subject, and knowing that the 
foetus may also be exposed to the drug, or to the consequences of its actions in pregnant 
women, the sequelae will be monitored in both the pregnant woman and the foetus.  The 
embargo on clinical trials in this population for so many years means that we lack a body 
of relevant experience upon which to rely regarding the acceptability of such trials.  As a 
consequence of the embargo, the pathways to recovery of compensation in the event of 
injury are less well-trodden than for trials in other populations, and given the stage of 
development at which the foetus may be exposed to an investigational drug, any harm may 
not become apparent for a considerable period.  The ramifications of clinical trials in 
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pregnancy are both so insidious and extensive that from both deontological and 
consequentialist perspectives, trials involving the foetus require special consideration.  The 
requests from the EMA and FDA will require a range of legal and ethical matters to be 
addressed which, until now, have been avoidable by the practices of not conducting 
clinical trials of investigational drugs in pregnant women, and withdrawing from trials 
female participants who become pregnant during the course of the trial. 
A key aspect is the extent to which the law already recognises and protects the foetus, and 
its future ‘interests’, in particular its interest in being born uninjured.  As will be discussed 
in the next chapter, the foetus lacks legal personality, but a range of societal constraints 
have been generated which provide increasing protection to the foetus as the pregnancy 
proceeds.  How applicable are these mechanisms to the clinical trial setting?  Chapter 3 
will address these questions, and conclude that there is little relevant precedent from which 
to draw conclusions. 
Another fundamental question is whether, ethically, the foetus ‘deserves’ protection, and, 
if it does, by what right do we ‘experiment’ on an entity which lacks legal personality?  
Vivisection is subject to more extensive legislation than clinical trials in pregnant women, 
whilst others who cannot consent, minors and the incapax, enjoy all of the protections 
arising from the possession of legal personality.  Does - should - the decision to participate 
rest with the pregnant woman alone, and if so, is that authority unfettered?  Chapter 4 will 
explore the moral standing of the foetus, and the main models which have been used to 
describe its status, concluding that one particular model probably represents the best 
balance between the future interests of the foetus as perhaps most commentators see them 
and the pregnant woman’s autonomy. 
Our clinical trial approval processes were not developed with trials involving pregnant 
women in mind and so the adequacy of the existing processes may be open to question.  
The current and future processes for approval of clinical trials in pregnant women will be 
reviewed in Chapter 6, examining in particular the extent to which foetal risk is already 
controlled and reduced, and might be further decreased.  Consent, the bedrock upon which 
clinical trials are founded, both legally and ethically, will be explored to assess whether 
pregnant women - or foetuses - constitute a ‘vulnerable population’, the extent to which the 
consent and trial approval processes take account of that, and whether the foetus should be 
considered as an ‘indirect’ trial subject.  The understanding trial subjects have of the legal 
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relationship they have with investigators, and the consequence that has in the event of 
injury, will be assessed, leading to the conclusion that this is a topic which is poorly 
understood by most participants.  Lastly, the future regulations for the conduct of clinical 
trials which suggest a different maternal-foetal balance and impart a greater moral standing 
to the foetus than the conclusions in Chapter 4 suggested was best, will be considered. 
Clinical research is inherently uncertain; if we knew how the body would respond to 
investigational drugs, trials would be unnecessary, but we do not.  Inevitably, that means 
trial subjects are exposed to risk and, despite the proper execution of the approval 
processes, those risks will, on occasion, be realised.  Trial participants are all volunteers, 
and many engage these risks, at least in part, altruistically - but in the event of injury, are 
our compensatory mechanisms adequate?  The review in Chapter 7 of the processes and 
instruments available will find that their adequacy is at best questionable, and that trial 
participants are unlikely to be aware of such deficiencies until the need arises to seek 
compensation on behalf of a child born injured. 
The argument for the conduct of clinical trials in pregnant women is compelling, to ensure 
that conditions which may be harmful to the woman’s health and that of the foetus she is 
carrying, are optimally-managed, and that new medicines can be deployed safely and 
effectively.  However, the existing processes intended to protect the foetus and compensate 
children born injured as a result of their mothers’ participation in clinical trials are unclear, 
and arguably do not reflect the moral debt which we as a society owe to those who ‘go 
first’ for the benefit of others.  Many commentators have advocated the introduction of 
various ‘no fault’ mechanisms to compensate those injured in clinical practice and clinical 
research.  A more radical approach which will create an enduring obligation that will in 
turn raise wider questions regarding the reasons special provision is required for this 
population of ‘indirect’ trial subjects is described in Chapter 8. 
1.8 Conclusions 
Over 50 years have passed between thalidomide and the regulators’ reactions to it which 
conspired to exclude women of child-bearing potential from clinical trials with 
investigational drugs, and the volte-face which has led to the request to study 
investigational drugs in women who are pregnant.  During that time, those who developed 
new regulations and legislation to control the conduct of clinical trials, understandably, did 
not have this population in their contemplation as evidenced inter alia by the absence of 
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the word “pregnant” from these regulations, although a future regulation (Regulation 536, 
discussed in Chapter 6) explicitly addresses this population.  As a result, we lack a legal 
framework within which to conduct such studies: one which takes account of the particular 
issues which arise regarding the involvement of the foetus.  This thesis seeks to address 
these challenges and to begin to develop such a framework. 
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Chapter 2 Protection of the Foetus from Destruction 
2.1 Introduction 
In considering whether the current clinical trial processes afford adequate legal recognition 
of the foetus, one must first consider the legal recognition already given to the foetus, 
whether that recognition is qualified in any way, and what the consequences of existing 
recognition and any qualifications may be in a clinical trial setting.  Legal recognition 
might be considered from two perspectives: in relation to the foetus in utero per se, and in 
relation to the child subsequently born, i.e., events that affected the foetus before birth, the 
consequences of which manifest postnatally.  As will be discussed later in this chapter,
85
 
the foetus lacks legal capacity, and so issues relating to its protection and compensation in 
the event of injury sustained in utero become actionable only upon live birth.  However, 
provision for protection and compensation involve consideration of the existence and 
future interests of the foetus.  This chapter will briefly explore the development of 
approaches within Canon and criminal law to recognise and protect the foetus, both of 
which were largely concerned with preventing intentional abortion and the killing of 
newborn children, and will illustrate that the legal protection for the foetus in that regard 
has become less extensive over the last 50 years.  However, as described in Chapter 1, 
given that the intent of conducting clinical trials in pregnant women would not be that of 
procuring abortion, the relevance of this to the topic at hand is that of establishing the legal 
status of the foetus. 
Chapter 3 will trace the application of Criminal and Common law in England and Wales to 
the child born injured as a consequence of harm inflicted in utero, illustrating how the legal 
approaches in this regard have changed, and the notion of ‘trans-natal’ action has 
developed;
86
 where relevant, comparisons will be made to Scotland, Ireland, the USA and 
the European Community.  Clearly, this is a quite unintended potential consequence of the 
conduct of clinical trials in pregnant women, and the points addressed in this chapter will 
put context around such injuries when sustained in a non-trial setting.  This will be relevant 
to the question of whether the protection for the foetus in clinical trials is adequate. 
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Foetal ‘rights’, interests and protection are amongst the more contentious topics in medical 
law.  In the last 50 years alone, the 1967 Abortion Act in the UK, the 1973 judgment in 
Roe v Wade in the USA,
87
 the birth in 1978 of Louise Brown, the world’s first ‘test-tube’ 
baby,
88
 and the 1984 Warnock report
89
 on in vitro fertilisation, amongst other events, all 
provoked intense, heated and emotional debate.
90
  One of the golden threads which ran 
though these debates was that of ‘protecting’ the foetus from intentional or careless 
destruction; the foetus might not be considered as a ‘person’, but nevertheless deserved 
protection by the law, precisely the same consideration which applies in the clinical trial 
setting.  The issue is not a new one, of course - it has been with us almost since the 
beginnings of civilisation. 
2.2 The Early Legal and Religious Views of Foetal Status  
The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi and ancient Hebrew, Assyrian and Hittite laws all 
contained evidence of two concepts which persist in much present-day jurisprudence: that 
the preservation of pregnant woman’s life took precedence over that of the foetus and that 
the foetus became more worthy of recognition and protection as it developed.
91
  Early 
Christian writings also adopted the latter concept, endowing the foetus with the description 
of ‘human’, mostly based on physical appearance.92  In the late 16th Century, the Roman 
Catholic Church declared the foetus worthy of the full protection of the church (and hence 
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the law, in many countries) from the point at which its existence was known,
93
 the 
intention of this declaration being to deter or prevent deliberate abortion.  The Catholic 
Church’s declaration also recognised the concept now termed ‘double effect’,94 permitting 
the use of medication or other intervention to save the pregnant woman’s life but which, as 
an unintended consequence, resulted in miscarriage. 
This probably marks a turning point in thinking between injury to the foetus arising as a 
consequence of an accident or malicious intent towards the pregnant woman alone, and 
action deliberately taken in the knowledge, and possibly with the intent, that it could harm 
the foetus.  Conceptually, this is similar to the situations which obtain in both medical 
practice and medical research involving pregnant women: drugs are administered in the 
knowledge, although not with the intent, that despite best efforts being made, harm to the 
foetus may occur. 
By this time advances in medicine and surgery were making targeted abortion both more 
possible and safer, and the incidence of abortion rose.
95
  This led to a Papal Bull in 1869 
declaring that all those, including pregnant women, who procured abortion would 
henceforth be excommunicate,
96
 although the Bull preserved the ‘double effect’ exception.  
This remains the position of the Roman Catholic Church.
97
 
2.3 Early English Legal Approaches to the Protection of the Foetus 
The common law, broadly, reflected Canon law and focussed on the matter of foetal 
destruction.  One of the earliest legal opinions on this comes from De Bracton, in his 
                                                          
93
 Pope Sixtus v  Effraenatum.  October 29
th
, 1588. 
94
 John de Lugo, S.J.  Responsa Moralia.  1651. 
95
 See, for example, McLaren, A. (1978). Abortion in France: women and the regulation of family size 1800–
1914.  French Historical Studies, 10, 461–484; Brodie, J.F.  Contraception and Abortion in Nineteenth-
Century America. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997.; Beahen, W. (1986). Abortion and 
infanticide in Western Canada 1874 to 1916: a criminal case study.  Historical Studies (The Canadian 
Catholic Historical Association) 53, 53–70.; Rentoul RR: The Causes and Treatment of Abortion.  London, 
Pentland, 1889, cited in Potts, M., Campbell, M. (2002)  History of Contraception, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030701162741/http://big.berkeley.edu/ifplp.history.pdf accessed 5
th
 
September, 2015. 
96
 Pope Pius IX.  Apostolicae sedis.  October 12
th
 1869. 
97
 Catholic News Agency: The Catholic Church and Abortion, available at 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/resources/abortion/catholic-teaching/the-catholic-church-and-abortion/, 
accessed 5
th
 September, 2015. 
Chapter 2  Protection of the Foetus from Destruction 
24 
 
treatise On the Laws and Customs of England, in which he declared that an action which 
led to the miscarriage of an “animated” foetus constituted homicide.98 
Later commentators, including Staunforde, Lambarde, Horne, Coke, Hale, and Blackstone 
(initially), all held some variety of the doctrine that while causing the death of a child in 
utero might support a criminal charge, it would not be one of homicide.
99
 These opinions 
make an interesting comparison with R v Tait
100
 and the Attorney-General's Reference (No. 
3 of 1994), a century later,
101
 in which the House of Lords concluded that postnatal death 
resulting from injury inflicted in utero constituted manslaughter, but not murder.
102
 
At the same time, the beginnings of the uncertainties and contradictions which pervade the 
debates around foetal status to this day were becoming apparent.  In Wallis v Hodson, in 
1740, the child en ventre sa mere at the time of her benefactor’s death was held by the 
Lord Chancellor to be in rerum natura, only four years after Coke’s insistence to the 
contrary
103
 - an early example of ‘trans-natal’ legal thinking.  Perhaps in part attempting to 
fill the vacuum resulting from the reduced standing of the Ecclesiastical Courts following 
the Reformation, the law had taken the step of attempting to deter the immediate killing of 
newborn children in the form of the Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of 
Bastard Children 1624.
104
  Infanticide had been considered by some to be a practical 
resolution to the problem of an unwanted child where abortion had either not been 
attempted or had failed.  The lack of clarity regarding the distinction between abortion and 
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infanticide was to arise again some 300 years later,
105
 when it led to the passing of the 
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.
106
 
The law recognised the existence of the foetus, and sought to protect it, in other contexts.  
For example, in 1387, the Winchester Assize condemned a gentlewoman to death for 
aiding in the murder of her husband, but her execution was postponed because of her 
pregnancy, her foetus being held to have been animated.
107
  Even in the 18
th
 Century, the 
notion of quickening (detectable foetal movement) as a determining point for some 
purposes remained in the common law.  In his Commentaries, Blackstone wrote that “life 
begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb”.  
He also agreed with Coke, who, nearly a Century earlier, had stated his view that “to be 
saved from the gallows a woman must be quick with child - for barely with child, unless he 
be alive in the womb, is not sufficient.”108  Thus, the state took the view that whilst a 
pregnant woman should be punished according to the standards of the time, the foetus she 
carried was an innocent party and, having shown some evidence of ‘life’, should be given 
the opportunity to be born.  The law was, in effect, protecting the foetus from the 
destruction which would inevitably follow the pregnant woman’s execution. 
2.4 19th Century Legislation affecting the Foetus 
Before the 19th Century, the Common law position on penalties for harming a child in 
utero or causing it to miscarry were unclear, and references to prosecutions for procuring 
abortions were rare,
109
 yet deliberate attempts to procure miscarriage obviously occurred, 
otherwise no stimulus would have existed to introduce the legislation intended to bring an 
end to the practice.  Sections 1 and 2 of Lord Ellenborough’s Act of 1803 constituted the 
first attempt to put the offence of abortion on a statutory basis in England and Wales,
110
 
The offences created by the 1803 Act were replaced by section 13 of Lord Lansdowne’s 
Offences Against the Person Act of 1828,
111
 which, like its predecessor, did not extend to 
Scotland or Ireland.  Under section 1 of the 1803 Act and the first offence created by 
section 13 of the 1828 Act, abortion post-quickening was punishable by the death penalty 
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or transportation for life.  Under section 2 of the 1803 Act and the second offence created 
by section 13 of the 1828 Act (attempting to procure miscarriage before quickening) the 
penalty was transportation for 14 years.  Thus, the law sought to prevent intentional 
abortion by creating harsh penalties for those convicted, and also attached relevance to the 
stage of foetal development.  The criminalisation of intentional abortion was continued by 
section 6 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1837,
112
 which replaced section 13 of the 
1828 Act and removed the death penalty as a possible punishment.  The 1837 Act made no 
distinction based on quickening, thereby effectively outlawing all abortion, although it did 
recognise the ‘double effect’ provision.  Thus, these three items of legislation signalled that 
the law recognised the foetus and was set upon deterring its deliberate termination. 
The possibility that violence resulting in postnatal harm following live birth could give rise 
to criminal liability was addressed by the Fourth Report of the Commissioners on Criminal 
Law (1839),
113
 and the Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and 
Consolidating Criminal Law (1846).
114
  The notion was rapidly extended to the situation in 
which the assault caused the death of the child after live birth, not as a result of direct 
injury, but arising as a consequence of the injury causing the child to be born prematurely 
(R v West
115
 1848). 
The 1837 Act was replaced by the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,
116
 applicable in 
England and Wales, and to varying extents Ireland (now Northern Ireland), but not to 
Scotland.  Like the 1837 Act, it did not discriminate between stages of foetal development.  
The offence of procuring abortion is addressed in sections 58-59 and “may be committed at 
any time before the natural birth of the child, whether it is in the embryonic or foetal stage 
of development”;117 the penalties originally included life imprisonment, so the harsh 
regime of the earlier legislation was continued.  The 1861 Act does not contain a ‘double 
effect’ provision.  Section 58 specifically addresses the issue of a pregnant woman seeking 
to procure her own abortion.
118
  It has been suggested that the rationale behind sections 58-
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59 of the 1861 Act was a combination of a Victorian puritanical response to an increase in 
the incidence of abortion and infanticide as a means of controlling family size
119
 and a 
desire of the medical profession to eliminate the threat to their power from midwives.
120
  
These statutory provisions remain the basis for the criminal offence of abortion in England 
and Wales, and contravention is likely to result in imprisonment.
121
 
Thus, within the relatively short period of 60 years, Parliament had created four statutes 
imposing a variety of penalties relating to abortion, two Commissioners Reports 
recognising postnatal injury resulting from injury sustained in utero as creating criminal 
liability, and the criminal courts had extended these constructions to death resulting from 
injury-related premature birth.  Parliament seemed intent on preventing foetal destruction. 
That said, the lawful conduct of abortion by appropriately qualified medical practitioners 
for the purpose of saving the pregnant woman’s life was accepted by the courts following 
both the 1837 Act (see R v Wilhelm
122
) and the 1861 Act (see R v Collins
123
). Both cases 
concerned acute interventions intended to avert immediate maternal life-threatening 
situations, and in both cases the courts held that the appropriate intervention by a physician 
necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman, but which resulted in the loss of the foetus, 
was not illegal, a position consistent with the ‘double effect’ doctrine of the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
2.5 20th Century British Legislation and Reduced Protection for the Foetus  
The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, applicable in England, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland, but not in Scotland, introduced the new crime of child destruction, closing a 
lacuna which had existed since the repeal of the 1624 Act, and allowed infants to be killed 
during the birth process.  This was not an offence under section 58 of the 1861 Act because 
it could not be said to be procuring a miscarriage, nor did it constitute homicide since the 
child would not yet have an existence independent of its mother, a prerequisite for a 
homicide charge.
124
  Presciently, a specific point in gestational development became 
                                                          
119
 For a review, see Robinson, W.C. (2002). Population policy in early Victorian England.  Eur.J.Population 
18, 153–173 
120
 Feminist.com.  A history of Abortion, available at  
http://www.feminist.com/resources/ourbodies/abortion.html, accessed 8
th
 September, 2015 
121
 See, for example, R. v Catt (Sarah Louise) [2013] EWCA Crim 1187 [2014] Cr App R (S) 35. 
122
 R v Wilhelm [1858] Medical Times Gazette 658. 
123
 R v Collins [1898] 2 Br.Med.J., 122-130. 
124
 Hansard.  Child Destruction Bill, House of Lords,12
th
 July, 1928, available at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1928/jul/12/child-destruction-bill-hl  accessed 10
th
 September, 
Chapter 2  Protection of the Foetus from Destruction 
28 
 
central to the new crime: the foetus had to have reached a stage of development sufficient 
to be capable of being born alive,
125
 with the threshold for presumption of such capacity 
being set at 28 weeks gestation.  This distinction is now termed viability, and is influenced 
by multiple factors, of which gestational age is but one.
126
  Although the basis of the 
distinction varied from earlier approaches, the law was again creating a deterrent to the 
destruction of more developed foetuses.  The pregnant woman herself was not exempted 
from liability under this Act.  The second paragraph of section 1(1) of the 1929 Act 
introduced a defence of acting in good faith to save the life of the woman
127
 - the 
equivalent to the ‘double effect’ exception in the Papal Bull of 1869.  Thus, the law once 
again recognised the primacy of the pregnant woman over the foetus, should such a 
decision need to be made. 
The meaning of the phrase ‘capable of being born alive’ has been the subject of much 
debate, mostly around the potential distinction between ‘life’, however evanescent, and 
viability.
128
  In law, ‘born’ is defined as expulsion of the whole body,129 but ‘alive’ is more 
contentious.  The interpretation was finally settled nearly 60 years later, in C v S (Foetus: 
Unmarried Father);
130
 the scope of the Act is restricted to the protection of a foetus which 
has the capacity to survive, whether naturally or by reasonable artificial means, the Court 
holding that a foetus of between 18 and 21 weeks’ gestation was not "a child capable of 
being born alive" as it could not breathe naturally or with the aid of a ventilator and that 
termination of a pregnancy of that length was not an offence under section 1 of the Infant 
Life (Preservation) Act 1929.
131
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In 1938, the landmark case of R v Bourne,
132
 in which a surgeon performed an abortion on 
a 14 year old girl pregnant as the result of rape, extended this exception for the 
preservation of maternal life to the preservation of the future mental health of a pregnant 
woman, in effect, introducing the concept of therapeutic abortion.  In his charge to the jury, 
Macnaghten J said (at 693-694): 
“the law does not require the doctor to wait until the unfortunate woman is in peril 
of immediate death….  If the doctor is of the opinion …. that the probable 
consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a 
physical or mental wreck …. the doctor is operating for the purpose of preserving 
the life of the mother.” 
In effect, Macnaghten J was highlighting to the jury that the use of the term ‘unlawful’ in 
section 58 of the 1861 Act implied that lawful reasons might also exist for the procurement 
of a miscarriage.  The jury acquitted Bourne.  In two later cases brought under the 1861 
Act, the courts further clarified the scope for therapeutic abortion.  In R v Bergmann and 
Ferguson
133
 in 1948, Morris J rejected Macnaghten J’s view in Bourne that the physician’s 
belief regarding the impact of continued pregnancy should be ‘reasonable’ and, instead, 
directed the jury to focus on the “honesty” of the physician’s belief, pointing out that the 
jury was not concerned with whether the doctor had made a mistake.  In R v Newton and 
Stungo
134
 in 1958, Ashworth J stated that abortions could be lawfully performed “...  in 
good faith for the purpose of preserving the life or health of the woman …. when I say 
health I mean not only her physical health, but her mental health.” 
Thus, the courts were perpetuating the doctrine of the primacy of the pregnant woman’s 
life over that of her foetus, and were now extending that consideration beyond the acute 
preservation of the life per se, and sanctioning therapeutic abortion to protect the quality of 
that life. 
The law regarding abortion throughout the UK was transformed by the Abortion Act 
1967,
135
 applicable to England, Wales and Scotland.  This Act was intended inter alia to 
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bring to an end the practice of “back street abortion” and to provide a specific defence 
against the “missing exception” of the 1861 Act, that of performing an abortion to protect 
the pregnant woman’s life or health.  As originally passed, the 1967 Act did not limit the 
duration of pregnancy up to which an abortion could lawfully be performed, but did 
stipulate in section 5(1) that nothing in the 1967 Act would affect the provisions of the 
1929 Act.  Thus, in England and Wales the upper time limit for a termination was 
effectively set at 28 weeks.  The Act therefore maintained a greater degree of protection for 
the more developed foetus.  Consistent with the 1929 Act, this presumption relieved the 
prosecution of the burden of proving viability at 28 weeks, but did not prevent proof that a 
particular foetus was viable at an earlier stage of its development, in which case 
termination would have been unlawful. 
The criteria to be satisfied to allow an abortion were perpetuated in section 37 of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA 1990), applicable in Scotland, 
England and Wales.  The structure of the defences was revised to separate some of the 
accepted reasons, giving four grounds under section 1 rather than the two grounds in the 
original Act.  It also made a number of other revisions, including the time limit, section 
37(1)(a) stipulating an upper limit of 24 weeks for termination of a pregnancy under the 
new section 1(1)(a) of the Abortion Act 1967, perhaps reflecting the impact of advances in 
medical sciences upon the viability threshold defined some 60 years earlier.  The 
amendments made by the 1990 Act overrule the foetal viability clause in the 1929 Act and 
permit abortion for foetal handicap up until birth.  Accordingly, the 1929 Act has lost 
significance regarding abortion in English law.  There are no time limits for the other two 
grounds under section 1 (necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the pregnant 
woman’s physical or mental health (S.1(b)); that the continuance of the pregnancy would 
involve a risk to the pregnant woman’s life greater than if the pregnancy were terminated 
(S.1(c)). 
Section 1(1)(a) of the 1967 Act permitted the termination of a pregnancy on the grounds 
that its continuance would involve a greater risk to life or of injury to the pregnant 
woman’s physical or mental health than if the pregnancy were terminated.  However, 
present-day medical techniques may make abortion performed in early pregnancy safer 
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than giving birth,
136
 a situation not foreseen when the 1967 Act was passed, and so, 
statistically, abortion can always be justified.  That said, the 1967 Act requires the 
physician to make an individualised decision so a particular woman’s medical condition 
may mean that the risk of termination in a specific case is greater than the statistical risk of 
morbidity during pregnancy, when the data are adjusted for relevant risk factors. 
The 1967 Act also extended the grounds for a lawful termination of pregnancy to 
consideration of the physical or mental health of any existing children within the family, 
presumably contemplating circumstances in which the pregnant woman’s future health 
and/or that of the child she would produce could be compromised, either by the 
introduction of “another mouth to feed” in an already large family, or a housing standard 
which was already inadequate.  In essence, statutory law was now codifying and extending 
the therapeutic abortion construction developed in common law, allowing consideration of 
other factors to mitigate against prevention of acts harmful to the foetus. 
The ‘foetal abnormality’ ground in section 1(1)(d) was the first explicit recognition that an 
abortion could be justified on such a premise, and was made possible largely through the 
development of better foetal visualisation and biochemical testing technologies than had 
been available previously.
137
 
At least three senior judges have commented that the 1967 Act liberalised abortion in 
England and Wales significantly.  In 1978, Sir Roger Ormrod, then a judge of the Court of 
Appeal and a qualified physician himself, wrote “Abortion has become generally available, 
if not yet quite on demand, but subject only to the attitude of the surgeon concerned or of 
the clinic to which the woman is referred”.138  Similarly, Lord Denning MR observed in a 
1981 case that the 1967 Act “...  has been interpreted by some medical practitioners so 
loosely that abortion has become obtainable virtually on demand.  Whenever a woman has 
an unwanted pregnancy, there are doctors who will say it involves a risk to her mental 
health”.139  In Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees, Sir Stephen Brown P 
commented “...it would be quite impossible for the courts….to supervise the operation of 
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the Abortion Act 1967.  The great social responsibility is firmly placed upon the shoulders 
of the medical profession…”.140 
Thus, the 1967 Act, in addition to removing the near-absolute protection for the foetus 
from termination, had also succeeded in transferring the responsibility for ‘policing’ the 
law to the medical profession. 
2.6 The Foetus (and Embryo) Lacks Legal Personality 
The legalisation of abortion, albeit with certain restrictions, brought a number of cases 
before the courts which would not have arisen prior to the 1967 Act.  Many of these 
concerned the potential applicability of European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter referred to as the Convention), which the UK 
had ratified in 1951, to the foetus.  Most cases have been brought under Articles 2 (right to 
life) or 3 (prohibition of inhumane or degrading treatment) and the majority under Article 8 
(right to respect for family life). 
One of the central issues to emerge in this area is that the law in England, Wales and 
Scotland does not accord legal personality to the foetus until it is born alive,
141
 whereupon 
the newborn child immediately acquires full legal personality.  The delivery of the foetal 
body together with the existence of circulation or the taking of breath post-partum are 
sufficient for a finding that the foetus was born alive, however evanescent that life may be, 
thereby maintaining the distinction between ‘life’ and ‘viability’.142 
The attractions of the position taken by the courts in the UK regarding the point at which 
legal capacity and thus rights come into being - live birth - are those of consistency and 
certainty: the blastocyst / embryo / foetus has no legal standing (consistency) until born 
alive (certainty), notwithstanding the debates around that phrase mentioned earlier, 
whereupon it enjoys full legal standing.  These attractions are rarely present in the 
arguments advanced to establish legal rights for the same organisms prior to birth.  An 
exception to this generality is the position held by the Roman Catholic Church, which 
accords the same moral status to the blastocyst / embryo / foetus, thereby being 
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consistent.
143
  Of course, women will rarely know they are pregnant immediately upon 
conception, and so the point at which a moral obligation is recognised, as opposed to 
exists, is more variable and so less certain than the point at which legal status is 
recognised. 
Although live birth had been recognised as the requirement for legal personality for many 
centuries, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the modern landmark case in the UK is 
Paton,
144
 in which the claimant sought to prevent his wife undergoing an abortion.  Having 
failed to establish his case in the UK, he appealed to the European Commission, basing his 
argument on Articles 2 and 8.  The Commission did not explicitly decide whether the term 
‘everyone’ in Article 2 embraced the unborn child, but adduced that since the four 
situations in which Article 2 rights could be taken away (judicial execution, self-defence, 
effecting a lawful arrest or detention, suppression of riot or insurrection) were applicable 
only to those who had been born, they could not be applied to an unborn child, and so the 
foetus did not come within the purview of Article 2.  His claim under Article 8 was also 
dismissed, the Commission holding that Paton’s rights were limited by his wife’s rights as 
a pregnant woman carrying the foetus; interference with his convention rights was justified 
“as being necessary for the protection of the rights of another person”, i.e., the pregnant 
woman.  The Commission emphasised that their judgment was limited to the 
circumstances of the case: the 'right to life' of a non-viable foetus.  The Commission also 
made clear that it was not concerned with balancing the rights of a mature foetus with 
those of the mother, so the application of Article 2 to a potentially viable foetus remained 
unanswered.  Thus, the autonomous right of pregnant women to seek a termination of 
pregnancy where this was permitted by a member state was confirmed in European law in 
the context on a pre-viable foetus only. 
The European Court of Human Rights came to the same conclusion in the tragic case of Vo 
v France
145
 in 2004, in which a gynaecologist’s errors resulted in an unwanted therapeutic 
abortion.  Having exhausted the national procedures, Mrs. Vo appealed to the European 
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Court of Human Rights.  The Grand Chamber
146
 held there had been no violation of Article 
2 because the foetus could not be considered as a ‘person’ directly protected by Article 2.  
However, if the foetus did have a ‘right’ to ‘life’, it was limited by the mother's rights and 
interests, as defined in Article 8.  Therefore, it was not necessary to answer the question of 
whether the unborn child was a ‘person’ for the purposes of Article 2; the relevant question 
was whether the legal protection afforded to the applicant by the French government 
regarding the loss of the foetus satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Article 2, 
and the Grand Chamber considered that it did.  Vo has been widely considered a lost 
opportunity for the European Court of Human Rights to clarify the law in this regard, by 
leaving open the question of whether the more-developed foetus falls within the scope of 
Article 2.
147
 
Despite having found it unnecessary to decide whether the foetus was protected by Article 
2, the majority of the Chamber then opined that the term ‘everyone’ in several Articles of 
the convention could not ordinarily apply antenatally, but in rare (unspecified) cases the 
applicability of Article 2,
148
 could not be excluded.
149
  This raised the issue that abortion is 
not one of the specified exceptions to Article 2, and would therefore be unlawful if Article 
2 applied to the foetus.  The Commission’s response was that abortion is compatible with 
Article 2 in the interests of protecting the mother’s life and health because this provision – 
assuming the applicability of Article 2 at the initial stage of the pregnancy - contains an 
implied limitation on the foetus’s right to life, to protect the life and health of the woman at 
that stage.
150
  The Commission excluded an absolute right to life for the foetus on the 
premise that to do so would mean the life of the foetus was regarded as being of a higher 
value than the life of the pregnant woman.
151
  
The European Court has been careful to avoid taking a clear stance on the balance between 
foetal interests and women’s rights or to dictate national policy in this culturally-sensitive 
area.  Women have no right of access to an abortion under the Convention, nor has the 
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Court recognised the foetus as capable of possessing Convention rights,
152
 although it has 
accepted those which may be accorded in national legislation.  Termination of a pregnancy 
engages the sphere of the private life of the mother as well as the father of the foetus under 
Article 8, but the ECHR has ruled that the pregnant woman’s interests must prevail;153 
termination of the pregnancy may justify an interference of rights under Article 8 if it is to 
protect the life of another.  Article 8 has also been invoked when national law has failed to 
provide an effective mechanism to determine whether the conditions for a lawful abortion 
had been met,
154
 to clearly outline how that right can be accessed,
155
and to enable 
compliance with national legislation.
156
 
Given the stated position regarding the foetus, the matter of the legal status of the embryo 
could perhaps be inferred.  The Warnock Committee Report, published in 1984, confirmed 
that the “human embryo (defined as the developing pregnancy from the time of 
fertilization until the end of the eighth week of gestation) per se has no legal status. It is 
not, under law in the UK, accorded the same status as a child or an adult, and the law does 
not treat the human embryo as having a right to life”.157 Nearly 20 years later, in Evans v 
Amicus Healthcare Ltd,
158
 the applicability of Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to 
frozen embryos was explored.  Grubb, a decade earlier, had suggested that as frozen 
embryos could not be classified as persons, then the only option was to consider them as 
chattels, and therefore subject to property law.
159
  Evans raised a number of profound 
issues, and was, as Baroness Warnock commented in a brief note, “… the sort of case 
where the lines between law and morality become blurred.”160 In his judgment, Lord 
Donaldson stated “no convention jurisprudence extends the right (to life under Article 2) to 
an embryo, much less to one which at the material point of time is non-viable”,161 in a 
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sense reflecting the possible qualification he had expressed in in re T a decade earlier.
162
  
Arden LJ raised a similar point regarding viability:  
“….neither convention jurisprudence nor English law provides a clear cut answer to 
the question: at what point does human life attain the right to protection by law?  
For many purposes, the viability of a foetus is taken as the benchmark for 
determining the legal status of a child.”163 
The latter sentence in Arden LJ’s point is somewhat perplexing; a foetus lacks legal status 
until it is born, whereupon it becomes a child endowed with legal personhood.  Viability is 
a question of fact and medical judgement, 
164
 and is a highly variable condition.  The 
information which led to the reduction of the abortion limit under the HFEA 1990 
indicated that, even at 24 weeks’ gestation, survival varied from 13% to 33%,165 due to the 
combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factors as they existed for that foetus at that time.  
Medical advances have made the viability of a foetus a shifting standard
166
 which seems an 
unsatisfactory basis upon which to accord legal status.  The matter of foetal viability has 
been considered in a number of cases,
167
 and the gist of these deliberations seems to be that 
whilst the law will not intervene to protect a non-viable entity, there may be (undefined) 
circumstances in which intervention to protect a potentially-viable foetus might be 
justified, a notion consistent with the greater recognition of the more developed foetus 
which has long been a feature of the law. 
Nevertheless, the position within the UK is consistent: neither the foetus nor the embryo 
has legal personality.  The foetus’ lack of legal personality provides the basis upon which 
termination of a pregnancy does not constitute murder.  That said, the offences defined in 
the 1861 Act acknowledge that, although not a person, the foetus is an entity of value.  
This appreciation of the foetus is continued in the 1967 and 1990 Acts.  So, whilst not 
enjoying legal personality, the foetus is clearly not considered worthless. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
Over nearly 6,000 years, numerous civilisations have introduced a range of provisions with 
the common aims of preventing the destruction of the foetus and punishing those whose 
acts resulted in foetal ‘death’, although the driving philosophy behind these provisions has 
generally not been one of foetal benefit.  Arguably, the 1929 Act is the only one which has 
its origins in a desire to protect the foetus per se. 
The basis upon which such ‘protection’ has been created is elusive.  The foetus has no 
legal personality.  Until it is born, it cannot be killed, yet the termination of pregnancy is a 
controlled activity, subject to criminal law.  From 24 weeks' gestation until term, the foetus 
is not a person, but there is nonetheless no general right to seek a termination.  If, as the 
law currently holds, late-term foetuses are not persons, the justification for the current 
statutory restriction of abortion is unclear.  Yet the reality remains that the foetus is 
generally considered to merit ‘protection’ from destruction, and the law applicable in all 
the constituent jurisdictions of the UK reflects this. 
Generally, criminal law is applicable to persons, property and ideas, but the foetus is not a 
person and having physical substance, it is not an idea, so is it property?
168
  This was the 
way in which frozen embryos, ex utero, were considered in Evans, but the foetus (and 
embryo) in utero appear not to be considered in this way.  However, a list of criteria which 
defines property does not exist, nor does agreement exist regarding what property really 
is.
169
  Certainly, the foetus cannot be bought or sold, like most property.  Even in a 
surrogacy arrangement, the foetus is not considered as ‘property’.170  Provided she has 
capacity, a pregnant woman may elect to undergo all manner of medical and surgical 
procedures by reaching agreement with a physician or surgeon and giving her consent, but 
to terminate a pregnancy she requires the agreement of two physicians - she cannot 
‘dispose of’ the foetus as though it was her own property.  The notion of the foetus, in 
utero, as property does not sit comfortably nor does it reflect the applicable constraints 
Over time, the balance between protecting the foetus and respecting the mother has 
changed.  From abortion being illegal in England and Wales under (almost) any 
circumstances under the 1861 Act, within just over a century it had become permissible for 
                                                          
168
 Ford, M. (2005)  A property model of pregnancy.  Int.J.Law Con., 1, 261-293. 
169
 Underkuffler, L.S.  The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power . Oxford: OUP, 2003. 
170
 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. 
Chapter 2  Protection of the Foetus from Destruction 
38 
 
the purpose of protecting the future health and well-being, including economic 
considerations, of the pregnant woman and her existing family, and in the case of foetal 
abnormalities which might become a serious handicap.  Although the legislation 
perpetuated both the pregnant woman’s primacy and a greater degree of protection to the 
more developed foetus, the previous, near-absolute protection of the foetus in this regard is 
now extensively qualified. 
Advances in medical technology continue to create situations in which the law is unclear, 
and the foetus is no exception.  Surgery can now be performed on the foetus in utero 
(which must entail surgery on the pregnant woman), and the prospect of maintaining an 
otherwise pre-viable foetus in an ectogenic environment is coming ever closer, raising a 
host of questions, the answers to which may significantly change our current perspective 
regarding foetal status.
171
  With the arrival of gene therapies, the possibility of conducting 
clinical trials in such a setting raises even more complications. 
Arguably, participating in a clinical trial is a potentially risky procedure, although as 
explained in Chapter 1, given the dearth of information regarding the way in which 
pregnant women metabolise and excrete drugs, doing so may be safer than the normal 
medical practice of prescribing drugs in an uncontrolled environment. The fact that the 
foetus is considered as being of value indicates that additional care needs to be taken 
regarding it in a clinical trial setting. Given the intent will not be that of procuring an 
abortion, there seems no reason not to proceed with such trials based on the considerations 
arising from the criminal law described in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Postnatal manifestation of antenatal injury 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter described the recognition and protection the law offers to the foetus 
in utero to prevent its intentional destruction.  However, circumstances arising during 
pregnancy may affect the foetus, such that the child is born injured or harmed.  These may 
lead to complex trans-natal issues arising from the distinction between the time before 
birth, when the foetus is not regarded as being a person in the eyes of the law, and its 
acquiring legal personhood at birth, when it may be affected by prior circumstances.  This 
chapter will examine the ways in which the law has sought to address the issue of a duty of 
care being owed to an entity which at the time the injury is inflicted lacks legal status, and 
the approaches which have been taken regarding compensation.  As described in the 
Introduction to this thesis, this was precisely the situation which arose with thalidomide.  
The chapter will start by considering the topic of succession because this is the area of the 
law which has long considered trans-natal issues, and provision for a child who may be 
born disadvantaged, although not through injury. 
3.2 The Law Relating to Inheritance and the Foetus 
The law has long recognised that a child born after the death of its father may inherit upon 
live birth.  A widely-cited case from the 16
th
 Century is that of the Earl of Bedford,
172
 
whose brother and his children were beneficiaries of the Earl’s will.  The brother died, at 
which time his wife was pregnant and later she gave birth to a daughter.  The court held 
that the child, though posthumous, should benefit under terms of the Earl’s will, Chief 
Justice Eyre remarking that an infant in ventre matris, upon birth clearly came within the 
description of children living at the time of his father’s death.  Some two hundred years 
later, in Thelluson v Woodford,
173
 the claim that a child en ventre sa mère was a non-entity 
was rejected by the Court.  In Wallis,
174
 the Lord Chancellor considered that “the plaintiff 
was en ventre sa mere at the time of her brother’s death, and consequently a person in 
rerum natura, so that both by the rules of the Common and Civil Law she was to all intents 
and purposes a child as much as if born in the father’s life-time”.  The Scottish Courts have 
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a similarly long-standing construction which also can be traced back to the 16
th
 century.
175
  
Both are illustrations of a trans-natal approach. 
These are examples of the application of the nasciturus principle, a fiction developed in 
Civil Law jurisdictions based upon Roman law,
176
 and which “concedes a benefit to which 
in strict law the child is not entitled”.177  The essence of the principle is that a child in 
utero, if subsequently born alive,
178
 is deemed as already born in respect of legal issues 
that arose due to events that occurred during the pregnancy if that would be to the child’s 
advantage. The rationale behind this is to ensure that the presumed intent of a deceased 
parent or other benefactor was effected, or at the least to avoid prejudicing an unborn child 
by denying it rights that would accrue to existing siblings.
179
 
Thus, the law relating to inheritance, from an early stage, sought to protect the future 
interests of the foetus, assuming a live birth.  Even if the intent behind these constructions 
was primarily that of giving effect to the wishes of the parent or other benefactor, through 
this approach the law recognised foetal existence, and took steps to ensure that live born 
children’s interests were not denied by failing to take into account circumstances arising 
before birth - trans-natal thinking.  The importance of this construction to the clinical trial 
setting is clear.  The foetus lacks legal personality, and so, in theory, neither the mother nor 
those responsible for approving or conducting a clinical trial involving a pregnant woman 
need to have the foetus in their contemplation.  However, adopting such an approach risks 
prejudicing the subsequent child, not just in the financial sense illustrated by the cases 
above (disabled people generally earn less and have higher living costs than non-disabled 
people
180
), but also in the sense of physical and/or mental injury.  This construction 
featured in the deliberations regarding one of the cases which proved a turning point in the 
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law relating to postnatal compensation for antenatal injury: Montreal Tramways v 
Léveillé, discussed in the next section. 
3.3 Antenatal Conduct resulting in Postnatal Death  
An illustration of the distinction between the time of the act or threat and the time at which 
the harm was or would be manifest arose in R v Shephard.
181
  The defendant had written to 
a pregnant woman, soliciting her to kill her child when it was born, and was charged under 
section 4 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which relates to incitement or 
conspiracy to murder.  The court held that for the purposes of section 4, the person whose 
murder was solicited did not need to be in existence at the time of the incitement; it was 
sufficient if he were in existence at the time when the act of murder was to be committed - 
another illustration of trans-natal thinking.  A foetus could not be a subject of murder, but 
once the child was born alive, the ante-mortem incitement to murder constituted an 
incitement to murder a ‘person’ within the meaning of section 4 of the 1861 Act. 
Section 16 of the 1861 Act imposes criminal liability for threatening to kill another person.  
In R v Tait,
182
 the defendant had threatened to kill a foetus in utero, the Court of Appeal 
specifically excluded the application of this section to threats to a foetus on the grounds 
that the foetus was not a separate entity from the mother and therefore could not, without 
straining the language of the section, be the ‘person’ contemplated by the statute; the 
proposed ‘victim’ would not be in existence at the time at which the deed was intended to 
be carried out. 
Both of these situations exemplify threats being made to the life of the foetus; the position 
regarding sanction for injury to the foetus resulting in postnatal death was addressed by the 
Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 1994).
183
  The case involved a pregnant woman 
who was stabbed and who later gave birth to a premature child which died some four 
months later.  Although the foetus had been wounded in the stabbing, it could not be 
proved that the wound contributed to the death.  The assailant was acquitted after it was 
held that, in such circumstances, he could not in law be convicted of murder or 
manslaughter, even if causation was proved.  The Attorney General referred the case to the 
House of Lords under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 for a ruling on whether 
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(1) murder or manslaughter could be committed where unlawful injury was deliberately 
inflicted on a mother carrying a child in utero, where the child was born alive but 
subsequently died and the injuries inflicted caused or contributed to death, and (2) liability 
for murder or manslaughter could be negated where death was caused solely as a result of 
injury to the mother, as opposed to direct injury to the foetus. 
The House of Lords concluded that such an assailant could be convicted of manslaughter 
but not of murder; an intention to harm the mother could not be regarded as equivalent to 
intent to harm the foetus, since they were two distinct organisms albeit living 
symbiotically.  Given the absence of intention to injure the foetus, although the defendant 
was aware that the woman was pregnant, there was no basis for extending the doctrine of 
transferred malice, and the mens rea for murder was not present.
184
 However, the attacker 
could be held guilty of manslaughter resulting from an unlawful and dangerous act, for 
which it was unnecessary for that act to have been directed against the person who died, 
i.e., the child who died as a result of injuries caused to it while it was in utero.  All that was 
required was proof that the assailant intentionally stabbed the mother, that the act caused 
the later death of the child and that reasonable people would have appreciated the risk that 
some harm to the foetus would result.  In a case involving the actus reus of one offence 
(assaulting the mother) and the mens rea of a different offence (harming the foetus - which 
becomes an offence only if it results in injury following live birth), the principle of 
transferred malice may still apply as long as the actus reus and mens rea are of the same 
type (as they were in this case), and mens rea may be transferred from one offence to a 
lesser crime of the same kind
185
 and so the defendant's intention may therefore be 
transferred from the mother to the baby.  In fact, manslaughter could not be established in 
the this case due to the inability to prove that the attack caused the child’s death, although 
it was suspected to be due to premature birth resulting from attack.  However, on the point 
of legal principle, although the foetus was not a legal person at the time of the attack, it 
was not unreasonable on grounds of public policy to regard the foetus, when she became a 
legal person at live birth, as having been within the scope of the attacker’s mens rea when 
he stabbed her mother since he was aware of the pregnancy, and the actus reus for 
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manslaughter was completed when the child died.  As will be discussed later, this 
construction was similar to one evolving in the civil courts, but this case again confirmed 
that, prior to birth, the foetus lacks legal personality, and so cannot be the subject of crimes 
or other wrongs which attach to ‘live’ victims.  However, the constructions here are further 
examples of the trans-natal approach of considering the consequences for the child of acts 
committed before the child was in being. 
3.4 Antenatal Incident manifesting as Postnatal Injury 
The first reported case in the UK of a child seeking compensation for an injury sustained in 
utero was Walker v Great Northern Railway Company of Ireland,
186
 (Ireland at that time 
was part of the UK) in which the claim for damages against the railway company for 
injuries inflicted in a railway accident was rejected.  O’Brien CJ disallowed the claim on 
the grounds that no contract existed between the railway company and the plaintiff, and 
that the railway company did not have a duty towards the plaintiff merely from the fact that 
her mother was pregnant when she travelled as a passenger.  He considered the child had 
no a right of action on the basis that at the time the injury was sustained the plaintiff had no 
legal existence; no authority or principle showed that a legal duty arose towards that which 
had only a fictitious existence in law, such that a negligent act breached that duty.  The 
broader issue, that of the legal right of an unborn child to personal security, was discussed 
at some length, and the views of the Judges was against the recognition of the right; the 
Chief Justice, however, expressly stated that he would leave the question open, and based 
his judgment on the single ground that there were no facts set out in the statement of claim 
which resulted in the defendants bearing liability for breach of duty as carriers of 
passengers. The nasciturus principle does not appear to have been considered in this case, 
perhaps on the basis that this was not an Ecclesiastical or Admiralty matter, where the 
doctrine was more established, although the trans-natal aspect of the case was clearly 
considered.  It seems highly likely that the case, if heard today, would result in a different 
verdict. 
Nearly forty years later, broadly similar facts arose in Canada in Montreal Tramways v 
Léveillé,
187
 a child having been born with club feet said to have been the result of her 
mother’s involvement in a tramcar accident.  The court rapidly dismissed the lack of a 
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contract between Montreal Tramways and the injured child as a defence.  Three of the five 
judges were willing to apply the nasciturus doctrine to Article 1053 of the Quebec Civil 
Code which read: “Every person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsible for 
the damage caused by his fault to another…..”, and considered that the foetus fell within 
the definition of ‘another’.  Although the doctrine was a fiction of the civil law which had 
been adopted in England by the Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Courts, and to some extent by 
the Court of Chancery, the common law courts had never recognised the fiction as 
applying such as to permit a child to obtain damages for antenatal injuries, which may 
explain this approach apparently not having been considered in Walker.  The court noted 
Hardwicke LC’s comments in Burnet v Mann188 ("The general rule is, that they (unborn 
children) are considered in esse for their benefit, not for their prejudice”), and in Wallis 189 
cited previously. 
However, Canon J, the fourth judge, while agreeing with the decision of these three fellow 
judges (the other judge dissenting), founded his ratio not on the fictional attribution of 
beneficial existence to the unborn child but on another, seemingly novel, construction: that 
it was unnecessary to consider the rights, if any, of the child at the time that the wrongful 
act occurred (before birth) but only from the day she suffered damage so a plaintiff could 
not make a claim until he or she suffered injury.  Based upon this construction, the 
plaintiff’s right to compensation came into existence only when she was born with the 
disability from which she suffered.  Before that time, when in utero, she suffered no injury, 
inconvenience or damage.  In effect, her rights were born together with her, the injury 
‘crystallising’ upon live birth.  This was not a right to compensation the child had since 
being conceived, but one which commenced when she was born.  The wrongful act in 
question should therefore be examined in relation to the cause of the injury to the child, 
and to that extent the foetus’ existence in relation to the mode of injury was recognised by 
the law. 
This trial is widely considered as a turning-point in the civil law relating to foetal injury, 
conferring upon a child a right to seek compensation at birth for injuries inflicted during 
pregnancy.  In reaching their decision, the Canadian judges had disregarded a slew of cases 
over the previous 30 years in the USA, although these were not binding upon them, which 
had consistently ruled that antenatal injury afforded no foundation for an action for 
                                                          
188
 Burnet v Mann, 1 Ves. Sen. 156, 27 E.R. 953. 
189
 Wallis vs Hodson.  27 E.R. 642. 
Chapter 3  Post-natal manifestation of ante-natal injury 
45 
 
damages on the part of the child.
190
  The construction offered by Canon J neatly avoided 
the need to resolve a range of questions relating to foetal status whilst providing a 
transportable rationale which was not dependent upon a particular interpretation of a local 
code. 
Over the next 60 years, both approaches in Montreal Tramways were used in Scotland.  In 
Cohen v Shaw [1991],
191
 concerning a child whose father had been killed in a road traffic 
accident before the birth of the child, the court held that there was no reason in principle 
why the fiction that a child injured before birth could be deemed to be a person should not 
apply to a reparation claim by a posthumous child arising out of the death of his parent, 
and that the word “child” in the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976 included a child who was in 
utero at the time of the negligent act but who was later born alive, and the child therefore 
had title to sue.  In Hamilton v Fife Health Board [1993]
192
, concerning a child who died 
three days after birth due to injuries sustained in utero caused by negligent acts of the 
doctors attending the child's mother, the court held that once the child was born and 
became a person the necessary concurrence of damnum and injuria was established and the 
child acquired the right to sue the person whose breach of duty resulted in its injury.  The 
extension of the nasciturus approach to the concept of foetal ‘future interests’ became 
prevalent only following an increased application of its use in property law via the doctrine 
of stare decisis.
193
 
In contrast, other jurisdictions more commonly adopted the tort construction, e.g., England 
(Burton v Islington HA [1993]; De Martell v Merton And Sutton HA (No.1) [1995]
194
), 
Canada (Duval v Seguin [1972]
195
) and Australia (Watt v Rama [1972]
196
).  A possible 
reason for the move away from the nasciturus approach is that there is no inherent concept 
of injury within the nasciturus doctrine; no ‘wrong’ needs to have occurred, and the child 
may suffer no physical injury.  If nasciturus really does “concede a benefit to which in 
strict law the child is not entitled”197 then its application to cases in which the child is born 
with an injury sustained in utero would seem likely to be seen as inconsistent, generating 
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uncertainty regarding the doctrine’s applicability to a range of circumstances.  By adopting 
the tortious approach, the courts seem to be distinguishing unfortunate but isolated 
situations, such as the untimely death of a relative, due to which children would otherwise 
be deprived of a benefit, from those circumstances in which the child is born injured as a 
result of a potentially culpable act. In doing so the process generates precedent as part of 
the development of tort/delict; the long list of cases commonly cited, starting with 
Montreal Tramways, is witness to that.  In most of the cases above, the relevant act was 
held to constitute negligence, the damnum and injuria coming together upon live birth.  
The nasciturus doctrine remains available as an approach to cases involving intractable 
moral or policy problems, or where technical issues or an anomaly in the law would result 
in the refusal of a remedy which would create an injustice.  Tort, of course, relies upon the 
concept of a duty of care, and the challenge remains that before birth the foetus, lacking 
legal personality, is not a person to whom a duty of care can be owed.  
Thus, in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth jurisdictions, the legal position 
seems clear and consistent: a child, born alive, with a disadvantage resulting from an event 
which occurred whilst the child was in utero, has potential routes to recovery of damages.  
The law had now taken a new course: whilst there could be no liability until both damnun 
and injuria concurred, live birth resulted in such a concurrence, giving the newly born 
person, who now enjoyed legal personality, a right to sue the person whose beach of duty 
of care before birth caused the child's loss or injury. 
Prior to clarification of the common law position, the perceived hiatus in the civil law 
approaches in England and Wales in the wake of thalidomide led the Law Commission
198
 
to recommend a legislative approach to permit the recovery of damages by a child born 
injured.  Two years later, the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 (CDCLA 
1976) came into force in England and Wales.  The Act imposes liability for antenatal 
injury when a child is born alive and suffering from a disability caused by a wrongful act 
(S.1(1)) affecting either parent in his or her ability to have a healthy child (S.1(2)(a)), or 
affecting the mother in her pregnancy, or the mother or the child in the course of birth 
(S.1(2)(b)).  The challenge that, before birth, the foetus is not a person to whom a duty of 
care can be owed was overcome by the construction in the CDCLA 1976 that the duty is 
derivative from a duty owed to the parents. Liability to the child is derivative, usually from 
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the mother, for example if a physician negligently administered a teratogenic drug to a 
pregnant woman.  The scope of the Act is sufficiently wide to embrace a claim derivative 
from a wrong done to the father too, e.g., damage to his sperm as a result of negligent 
exposure to toxic substances that resulted in fetal abnormality.
199
  For the present, it is 
sufficient to note that legislative provision had now been created which was intended to 
enable children damaged in utero to seek compensation upon being born injured. 
The legislative approach seems attractive for a variety of reasons, not least that it avoids 
the need to resolve the apparent contradiction of a duty of care being owed to a foetus 
which lacks legal personality, and indeed to a foetus whose existence may be unknown at 
the time the injury is suffered, e.g., during the first trimester when the foetus, technically at 
that stage an embryo, is at its most biologically vulnerable, growing from one cell to 
billions in a short period of time and the beginning of organogenesis.
200
  Although Burton 
and DeMartell were settled after the introduction of the CDCLA 1976, the injuries were 
sustained prior to the enactment of the legislation, and so the courts founded their decisions 
on the common law, relying upon “all relevant authorities including decisions, so far as 
helpful, of other Commonwealth jurisdictions”,201 and particularly Watt and Duval. 
3.5 The Maternal Exemption from Liability for Foetal Harm 
In none of the cases so far considered was the harm to the foetus the result of the pregnant 
woman’s act or omission.  Although a pregnant woman can open herself to criminal 
prosecution if she intentionally ends the life of her foetus other than by means of a legal 
abortion, pregnant women may - and do - undertake without fear of legal sanction many 
activities which have the potential to harm the foetus, varying from everyday actions such 
as driving a car to more extreme but still perfectly legal ones such as weightlifting.
202
  
Even activities which have clearly been shown to have detrimental consequences for foetal 
development and which become manifest at birth, such as smoking tobacco
203
 or 
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excessively consuming alcohol,
204
 are not legally proscribed or punishable in the UK. The 
UK is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the preamble to which 
states (emphasis added) “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs 
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after 
birth”,205 yet in Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v First-tier Tribunal (Social 
Entitlement Chamber),
206
 Lord Dyson MR expressed obiter, and without citing authority, 
the view that in English law a woman owed no duty in tort to her unborn child.  The 
reasons behind this maternal exemption from liability are not immediately clear. 
The original philosophy behind the maternal exemption given for such decisions in earlier 
cases in the USA
207
 may have been that if a child could sue his or her mother for injuries 
inflicted upon the child during gestation, this would disrupt family harmony and create an 
adversarial atmosphere between the two.  The CDCLA 1976 contains an important 
qualification in section 1(1), excluding from liability the child’s own mother, unless (S.2) 
the injuries caused to the child are caused as a result of her negligent driving of a motor 
vehicle while pregnant; the reason for this exception to the qualification is that in such 
cases the claim would be met from insurance compensation, rather from the mother 
herself.  The Law Commission’s 1979 report on injuries to unborn children highlighted the 
dilemma of balancing ethical and moral arguments against policy considerations and the 
application of the law, stating: 
“We recognise that logic and principle dictate that if a mother’s negligent act or 
omission during or before pregnancy causes injury to a foetus, she should be liable 
to her child when born for the wrong done. But we have no doubt at all that in any 
system of law there are areas in which logic and principle ought to yield to social 
acceptability and natural sentiment and that this particular liability lies in such an 
area.”208 
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Interestingly, family harmony is not so protected by the CDCLA 1976 that the father is 
similarly immune from liability.
209
  In addition, children may sue parents for postnatal 
injury, yet one might anticipate this would be just as disruptive to family harmony. 
One alternative rationale for the maternal exclusion is that, but for such an exclusion, the 
pregnant woman’s autonomy would be significantly impaired.  As the unborn child has no 
legal personality, then considerations of maternal autonomy almost invariably take 
precedence in a legal sense, as many of the cases reviewed in the next section will 
illustrate.  To do otherwise would be to create maternal-foetal conflict.
210
  Imposing 
liability for antenatal negligence (which would depend upon the pregnant woman owing a 
duty of care to her foetus) would, in effect, create a unique gender-based tort.  Conversely, 
the current position creates a gender-based immunity, as fathers may be held liable for 
injuries inflicted in utero.  However, this situation is consistent with the now-established 
construction of respect for the pregnant woman’s autonomy over foetal ‘needs’, which will 
be addressed further in the next section, although its complexion is rather different. 
Another rationale for the maternal exemption may be that the threat of suit could 
encourage a pregnant woman to avoid liability completely by undergoing an (otherwise 
unnecessary) abortion.  This argument seems less than compelling in a legal system in 
which there is no ‘right’ to an abortion, although termination, particularly in the early 
stages of pregnancy, is hardly rare in England and Wales.
211
  A stronger argument, 
perhaps, is that if the state becomes coercive in its treatment of pregnant women, it will 
discourage those who need help from seeking it for fear of the consequences if they do not 
conform to ‘expected’ norms - exactly the situation which now obtains in the USA,212 
some cases having been decided on the basis that the state has a responsibility to intervene 
to protect a viable foetus,
213
 if necessary at the expense of the autonomy,
214
 possibly 
liberty
215
 and, in an extreme case, the life of the woman carrying it.
216
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The maternal exemption does not apply to criminal behaviour which results in foetal 
‘death’, and women may prosecuted under both the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861
217
 and the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929, although prosecutions under the latter 
are rare; procuring a miscarriage so as to kill a child capable of being born alive may 
contravene both the 1861 and 1929 Acts.  However, the maternal exemption does apply to 
behaviour which results in foetal injury.  Although calls continue to be made to change the 
interpretation of the law, such that women who drink alcohol during pregnancy sufficiently 
to result in their children being born with foetal alcohol syndrome should be regarded as 
having committed a criminal offence,
218
 a recent case
219
 held that excessive alcohol 
consumption by a pregnant woman in the knowledge that it would harm her unborn child 
did not amount to the criminal offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm by administering 
a noxious substance to any other person contrary to section 23 of the 1861 Act.  The actus 
reus required the poison to be administered to another person; an unborn child does not 
constitute ‘any other person’ within section 23, (an interesting contrast with the majority 
ratio in Montreal Tramways) and hence the actus reus of this crime could not be 
committed by its mother. 
This construction is consistent with the Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 1994).220  
Given an absence of intention to injure the foetus, the pregnant woman lacks the mens rea 
for murder.  If she is drinking alcohol to excess with the intent of terminating her 
pregnancy, then she could, arguably, be charged under section 58 of the 1861 Act.  
However, her excessive drinking is not criminal per se and so does not constitute an action 
which would support a manslaughter charge.  However, should the pregnant woman’s 
consumption of alcohol harm the foetus, and should that harm become apparent 
postnatally, then, conceptually, it seems no different from, for example, Burton or 
DeMartell, other than the fact that the pregnant woman has inflicted the harm.  Under the 
CDCLA 1976, which would now be the conventional route to seek compensation for 
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congenital injury, liability to the child is derivative from the duty owed to the parents, 
commonly the mother, but if the (formerly) pregnant woman is the defendant, then there 
would appear to be no basis upon which to bring the case.  Prior to the CDCLA 1976, 
under the common law, there would seem to have been no barrier in such circumstances to 
an injured child seeking reparation from the mother, other than for reasons of public 
policy, although no such cases appear to have been reported.  With the passing of the 
CDCLA 1976, that possibility has been removed, and the pregnant woman is indeed 
immune from civil liability in such circumstances. 
The logic of the maternal exclusion has been challenged by Brazier
221
 and Norrie,
222
 but it 
remains the law in England and Wales.  The CDCLA 1976 does not apply in Scotland, but 
the Scottish Law Commission Report on Antenatal Injury,
223
 noting the decision in Young 
v Rankin,
224
 concluded that “such actions are not excluded by any rule or doctrine in the 
law of Scotland”.  This exemption also applies in Canada,225 and the matter is unresolved 
in Australia,
226
 and New Zealand, although in the latter matters are further complicated by 
the ‘no-fault’ system of compensation for injury. As will be discussed in the next section, 
in the UK, a pregnant woman is under no legal obligation to take any measures to protect 
the ‘health’ or ‘welfare’ of her foetus during pregnancy, although this alone would not 
exclude the possibility of being liable for damages if harm in fact arose. 
One manoeuvre to control the behaviour of a pregnant woman considered as being 
potentially injurious to her foetus - that of making the foetus a ward of court - was 
explored in in re F. 
227
 The court held that it lacked the jurisdiction to make a foetus a ward 
of court.  Citing Paton, since a foetus has no existence independent of its mother regardless 
of its stage of development, the court could not exercise the rights, powers and duties of a 
parent over the foetus without controlling the mother's actions.  Accordingly, the court 
could not extend its wardship jurisdiction over minors to a jurisdiction over a pregnant 
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woman for the protection of an unborn child, which had no legal rights or existence.  Thus, 
the courts in the UK set a clear distinction between a course of action which could be 
followed after live birth, such as immediately taking a newborn child into care, and one 
which was not applicable in an antenatal setting. 
The position in the USA has followed a somewhat different path to that in the UK and the 
European Union regarding the pregnant woman’s primacy.  In the USA, the activities of 
pregnant women have been said to have been increasingly restricted with the professed 
intent of ‘protecting’ the foetus.228  Legislation in many states now seems to permit the 
imprisonment of women to prevent their undertaking activities which are considered to 
pose a risk to the foetus, and the majority of states in the USA have now enacted 
legislation which render as criminal activities which could endanger foetal survival or 
development.
229
 Clearly, in such circumstances, the autonomy of a pregnant woman may 
be significantly compromised, and effectively subordinated to the foetus which she 
carries.
230
 Children born injured as a result of pregnant women’s acts or omissions have 
successfully sued their mothers,
231
 but the right to do so varies across states and with the 
circumstances.
232
 A recent review identified hundreds of cases in which foetuses had been 
made wards of court (in contrast to the position in the UK described above), newly-born 
children had been removed from parental care, and pregnant women had been subjected to 
court-ordered Caesarean surgery or blood transfusions.
233
  In some cases, these actions had 
been taken long before the foetus had attained viability.  In many cases in which the 
authors could identify the underlying legal basis for these actions, it was similar to that 
promoted by the proponents of foetal personhood; the fertilized egg, embryo, or foetus 
should be treated as if it was legally separate from the pregnant woman.  Legal authority 
for their actions came directly or indirectly from foeticide statutes which considered the 
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unborn as legally separate from pregnant women, from state abortion laws that included 
language similar to personhood measures, the uncritical application of legislation and 
procedures originally intended to be applied to children post-birth, and a misrepresentation 
of the judgment in Roe v Wade that, once the foetus attained viability, the foetus and the 
pregnant woman could be treated as separate persons.
234
  However, these initial decisions 
were often overturned in appellate courts, illustrating that the legal basis for the decision 
was at best debatable, and in many cases amounted to unlawful interventions in the 
constitutional and other legal rights of the woman.  The survey highlighted some worrying 
disparities: 71% of the pregnant women involved were sufficiently poor to qualify for 
indigent defence and nearly 60% were women whose ethnic origin was not Caucasian.  
The American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists had long concluded that the 
potential for arrest and punishment deterred many women from seeking care and from 
speaking openly with their doctors,
235
 precisely the concern raised earlier in this section.  
Paltrow’s survey suggests the risk is still real in the USA 20 years after these medical 
bodies raised concerns, perhaps supporting the reason advanced earlier for the maternal 
exemption under the CDCLA 1976. 
Obviously, in a clinical trial setting, the risk of injury to the foetus is present, and the 
pregnant woman’s consent to participate in the trial would unavoidably commit the foetus 
to the same trial.  This raises issues regarding the extent to which that consent might affect 
the rights of a child born injured to seek compensation.  Moreover, the public policy 
implications of permitting children to sue their mothers for injuries arising in such trials 
would be considerable.
236
 The potential implications of the maternal exclusion in a clinical 
trial setting will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
Notwithstanding the developments of the last 150 years and the clear concern of the courts 
to acknowledge, recognise and, in certain circumstances, protect the developed, possibly-
viable, foetus, the fact remains that, under the law in the UK, the foetus lacks legal 
personality, has no ‘rights’ which can be asserted on its behalf until it is born alive, and as 
a result enjoys relatively little legal ‘protection’ from harm before birth.  The results of 
cases considered by the European Commission for Human Rights suggest this position is 
unlikely to be successfully challenged using human rights law.  Nonetheless, the law does 
‘protect the foetus’ by recognising future interests in the event of live birth following 
injury in utero. 
Future foetal ‘interests’ (or the antenatal interests of the child) have become increasingly 
protected.  The situation in inheritance law is well-established, and the position regarding 
compensation for injury inflicted in utero manifesting upon live birth has been 
progressively developed though the nasciturus doctrine, criminal, civil and common law.  
Taken together, these developments place a child born injured in a much better position to 
recover compensation than his counterpart of only 50 years ago. 
However, gaps and contradictions remain.  For example, a foetus which suffers avoidable 
injuries which are ‘fatal’ before birth enjoys no ‘rights’; as the case of Vo illustrated, the 
perpetrator may be answerable in civil law to the woman who was carrying the foetus, but 
the foetus itself is not recognised as having been a person who has been unlawfully killed, 
and the same appears to be the case under common law in the UK.  In contrast, the 
perpetrator of an act causing injury in utero or precipitating premature labour, which 
results in the death of a child following live birth, may be pursued by the law in respect of 
the death caused.  The outcome is, effectively, the same, yet the liability differs.  Under the 
common law approach adopted in Montreal Tramways and subsequently, the foetus is 
considered as ‘another’, however under the criminal law, and specifically section 23 of the 
Offences against the Person Act 1861, that is not the case. 
A pregnant woman is entitled to refuse treatment in utero for her unborn child but, once 
delivered, that child can receive treatment in the face of parental opposition should a court 
sanction it,
237
 although antenatal treatment may be necessary to ensure a safe delivery or 
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even a live birth.  From a legal perspective, it is therefore to a child’s advantage to be born 
prematurely rather than at term, since from that moment the child’s life and rights are 
protected by law, whereas the foetus in utero has no ‘rights’ that can be exercised on its 
behalf, other than the qualified and indirect protection offered by restrictions on abortion.  
Yet it is rarely in the child’s best medical interests to be born prematurely.  The 
contradiction from the perspective of foetal protection is clear. 
The courts cannot exercise wardship over a foetus (in Re F), and a pregnant woman can act 
as she pleases (other than attempting to procure a miscarriage) with scant regard for the 
risks to foetal survival and development. However, once born, the courts may intervene if 
the pregnant woman’s behaviour constitutes a risk to the survival or development of the 
child, but by then the damage may have been done. 
Within a clinical trial setting (see Chapter 6), the risk, however small, is always present 
that the investigational drug will injure the foetus, or it may induce premature labour.  It 
seems highly unlikely that participation in a properly-approved clinical trial would be 
considered as behaviour likely to induce the courts to issue a protection order for the 
resulting child.  A pregnant woman not enrolled in a clinical trial may similarly make a 
decision not to accept foetal treatment in utero.  There seems no basis upon which to 
believe the response of the courts would be different in these two settings, and there is no 
precedent in the UK for a refusal to accept foetal treatment in utero to be grounds for the 
issuance of a protection order on behalf of the foetus. 
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Chapter 4 Foetal Moral Status and Maternal-Foetal Models 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the extent to which UK law has sought to recognise the 
foetus and its future interests, and the relevance of that to the clinical trial setting.  The 
debates and discussions which preceded the creation of legislation and common law were 
often founded upon a range of perspectives regarding moral considerations relating to the 
foetus, the common theme being that of safeguarding the foetus in utero, and the future 
interests of the child it would become.  In conventional medicine, treatment is administered 
because it is necessary for the health of the patient, and so the benefit:risk ratio is held to 
be acceptably high.  That is not the case in medical research, as explained earlier,
238
 and so 
engaging people in research involves the making of a decision regarding taking an 
avoidable risk.  It therefore is appropriate to consider the foetus’ moral standing with 
respect to clinical research, and in particular to clinical trials in which the foetus is not the 
anticipated beneficiary. 
In the wake of a number of scandals, a plethora of guidelines has been constructed 
regarding the ethical conduct of clinical trials in humans,
239
 none of which has explicitly 
considered pregnant women as a target population, nor the foetus.  This is not surprising, 
given the historical background described in Chapter 1.  Whilst deliberation regarding the 
foetus’ moral standing has continued for millenia, the discussion relating to the foetus in a 
clinical trial setting is a little over 20 years old, following the lifting of the FDA 
embargo
240
 described previously.  These discussions raised many questions, one of which 
was: should the foetus be regarded as a research subject?  This chapter will address this 
question, beginning with a description of the main models which have been developed to 
describe the relationship between the pregnant woman and the foetus. 
4.2 The Autonomy of Pregnant Women 
In the USA, from the 1980s, some authors detected the apparent personalisation of the 
foetus.  When the pregnancy was intended to go to term, the foetus became increasingly 
viewed as a patient in its own right, and when conflicts developed between the pregnant 
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woman’s medical needs and those of the foetus, foetal needs were sometimes prioritised by 
the physician;
241
 this was perhaps more marked in the USA than the UK.  The 
Polkinghorne Report, published in 1989, stipulated that: “The written consent of the 
mother must be obtained before any research or therapy involving the foetus or foetal 
tissue takes place”, thereby affirming that decision-making responsibility remained 
exclusively with the pregnant woman.
242
 
In 1992, in re S,
243
 Sir Stephen Brown P held, without giving explanation or justification, 
that in a situation where the lives of both mother and child would be at risk unless an 
operation was performed, the court could make a declaration that it could be performed 
despite the mother's refusal of consent.  Earlier in the same year, in re T (adult: refusal of 
treatment),
244
 a hospital had been authorised to administer a transfusion with the intention 
of saving the life of a pregnant woman injured in a road traffic accident who had refused a 
blood transfusion, Ward J considering that the circumstances constituted an emergency 
situation in which the woman could not express a competent view and that it would be 
proper for the doctors to treat her as they felt was in her best interests and in accordance 
with appropriate professional practice.  The Court of Appeal in upholding the decision 
raised one possible exception to the right of a competent individual to refuse treatment: 
“the only possible qualification is a case in which the choice may lead to the death of a 
viable foetus.…and, if and when it arises, the courts will be faced with a novel problem of 
considerable legal and ethical complexity.”.245  This was precisely the situation which had 
arisen in re S, the key distinction between the cases being that Mrs S’s competence was not 
in question.  Re S remains the only UK case in which the decision to authorise treatment of 
a pregnant woman against her wishes has not rested upon the court’s assessment that the 
patient lacked the competence to validly refuse treatment.  
In the 1990s, judicial opinion in the UK seemed to be moving toward a more formal 
recognition of foetal status.  In 1993, in Hamilton v Fife Health Board,
246
 Lord Mccluskey 
commented “it is perfectly common in ordinary speech to refer to the child in the womb as 
“him” or “her”….  It was this child who sustained injuries to his person and who died in 
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consequence of injuries sustained by him”.  Thus, the courts seemed to be placing an 
increasing weight on the notion of viability: if the foetus was viable, preventing its ‘death’ 
(accepting that legally it was not alive, in that it had not been born) might suggest a 
justification for instigating treatment despite the pregnant woman’s dissent.  The outcome 
the following year of Attorney-General’s Reference (No.3 of 1994), discussed in the 
previous chapter, the House of Lords considering that injury to a foetus inflicted in utero 
by a third party which resulted in postnatal death could attract criminal liability, was 
perhaps another manifestation of this change in thinking. 
However, in 1997, in re MB (medical treatment),
247
 the Court of Appeal developed 
guidelines for future cases of court involvement in emergency Caesarean surgery cases, 
Butler-Sloss LJ, referring to re S in her judgment as “a decision, the correctness of which, 
we must now call in doubt”.248  In 1998, in St George’s Healthcare N.H.S.  Trust v S.,249 
the Court of Appeal commented that “… a 36-week old foetus is not nothing; if viable it is 
not lifeless and it is certainly human”.  However, the Court of Appeal held that the 
emergency Caesarean surgery which had been performed upon the competent Mrs. S. 
against her will constituted a trespass.  Thus, the higher courts ‘drew a line in the sand’; the 
foetal ‘interests’ – however these might be construed – did not override the autonomy of 
the competent pregnant woman.  However, as the following section will illustrate, the legal 
position in the UK is not universally-held. 
4.3 Maternal-Foetal Models 
For many decades, physicians were trained to assess the foetus indirectly by examination 
of the pregnant woman and to treat suspected foetal conditions by managing the maternal 
environment.  Unable to interact with the foetus directly, physicians viewed the maternal-
foetal ‘dyad’ as one complex patient, the gravid female, of which the foetus was an integral 
part, physically and morally.
250
  During the 1970s and 1980s obstetric medicine was 
transformed by the development of high-resolution ultrasound techniques which enabled 
progressively clearer foetal visualisation in utero.
251
  Routine scans are now often 
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perceived as an opportunity for the pregnant woman and her partner to ‘see’ the future 
baby and to obtain a first image for the family album.
252
  The increasing clarity of such 
images has led to a growing ‘personification’ of the foetus by both pregnant women and 
physicians 
253
 to the point that they now are the cause of some ethical challenges when 
seeking to balance maternal and foetal health interests.
254
  This has resulted in a significant 
re-conceptualisation of the foetus as part of a ‘two-patient’ obstetric model,255 with the 
foetus being accorded a variable degree of moral standing of its own.
256
 
Conceptually, of course, a ‘one-patient’ model may also exist, which takes no account of 
the foetus or the effects which illness and its treatment have on the foetus, provided it has 
no impact on the pregnant woman’s health.257  Under this model, the foetus is morally (and 
physically) indistinct from any other part of the pregnant woman.  This model was 
originally advanced as a response to the perceived threats to the liberty and autonomy of 
pregnant women, following a number of court-ordered obstetric interventions in the 
USA,
258
 and rapidly was criticised as being too inflexible for clinical purposes,
259
 but has 
largely fallen out of favour now. 
Thus, broadly, the maternal-foetal relationship may be described by three models, and the 
following terminology will be used throughout this thesis: 
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 the ‘single-patient’ model, in which no account is taken of the existence of the foetus, 
or its ‘welfare’, with medical treatment being considered as it would be for any adult 
female; 
 the maternal-foetal ‘dyad’, in which the pregnant woman and the foetus are considered 
holistically; 
 the ‘two-patient’ model, in which the pregnant woman and the foetus are considered as 
separate entities. 
In the UK, as discussed in Chapter 3, provided she is legally competent, the pregnant 
woman’s autonomy is such that the decision-making prerogative lies with her alone.  That 
said, in either the ‘dyad’ or ‘one-patient’ model, should the pregnant woman’s response to 
an investigational drug result in potential harm to the foetus, then the resulting net burden 
to the pregnant woman may become excessive, and so it seems likely that the foetus would 
still be in the contemplation of a clinical investigator who was a proponent of either the 
‘dyad’ or ‘one-patient’ model. 
Clearly, although the foetus and pregnant woman may be considered philosophically as 
two separate patients, they are not separate in fact: they are intimately linked, with one, the 
foetus, dependent upon the other either through necessity (prior to viability) or choice 
(after viability), although whose choice this is may vary on a case-by-case basis.
260
  In the 
UK, we have adopted the legal position that the life, health and liberty of a pregnant 
woman prevail over foetal interests, unless the pregnant woman herself decides otherwise.  
She may elect to risk or even sacrifice her life, health or liberty by exercising an 
autonomous choice to embark upon a course of action which will benefit the foetus or the 
child it will become, but she is not legally required to do so, although the publicity 
surrounding a recent foetal alcohol syndrome disorder case suggests that the legal position 
may not entirely reflect the moral view within the UK.
261
 
In reality, in most cases, the ‘dyad’model probably most closely approximates to everyday 
situations.  Most women take account of their pregnancy, and elect to modify behaviours to 
an extent they decide for themselves based upon their own holistic assessments of what 
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matters to them.  Effectively, this is a form of ‘relational autonomy’, the pregnant woman 
entering into an evolving relationship with her foetus.
262
 
The intention of medical research in pregnant women of the type the Agencies are 
requesting is to gain more information on the pharmacokinetics of and response to drugs in 
pregnant women.  The intention is not to benefit the foetus, but the conduct of medical 
research on pregnant women unavoidably carries the risk of foetal harm.  Is the moral 
standing of the foetus such that these risks can justifiably be engaged in a research setting?  
The following section will explore a range of arguments regarding this, and will then seek 
to relate the moral standing of the foetus in a research setting. 
4.4 The Moral Justification for Research in Pregnant Women 
Some authors, basing their arguments on a platform of fairness and distributive justice, 
contend that the risks and burdens of participating in research should be borne by all in 
society, or by that part of society which will benefit from research.
263
  Given the almost 
complete absence of information relating to the appropriate use of drugs in pregnant 
women, the section of society which will benefit most from this type of research will be 
pregnant women and, consequently, the foetuses they carry.  Interestingly, none of the 
commentators advancing this view appear to have contemplated this population, although 
the information the Agencies are seeking will fall squarely into the category of research 
which will benefit others.  In the absence of acceptable alternatives - and continuing as we 
are now is arguably not acceptable - the demands of fairness within society and distributive 
justice are best satisfied by the conduct of carefully-controlled clinical trials in pregnant 
women which will in future benefit the same two populations. 
Conversely, others have argued that if doing so does not generate a high personal cost, the 
pregnant woman has the duty to prevent harm to the foetus.
264
  In opposition, proponents 
of maternal autonomy argue that no one but the pregnant woman can make such intimate 
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decisions.
265
  If we adhere to the notion of consent, which is entirely voluntary in nature, 
then the duty argument must fail; doing something because others perceive it as a duty 
surely vitiates the essence of consent. 
A consequentialist approach - that a morally right act is one that will produce a good 
outcome or consequence - also seems applicable in this setting; there would seem to be no 
reasonable doubt that being able to provide better treatment to pregnant women and 
thereby protect or minimise harm to the foetus is a good thing, although the extreme 
manifestation of this approach - that the ends justify the means - is unlikely to be 
acceptable to all, or possibly even a majority, in the UK.  To an extent, the utilitarian views 
of Bentham
266
 and Mill
267
 are relevant here too.  In the absence of relevant information in 
this population, we will continue to provide potentially sub-optimal treatment to pregnant 
women, and in the process increase the risks to the foetus of both the disease condition and 
unnecessary exposure to drugs.  However, utilitarianism permits the causing of harm to 
innocent victims if doing so would be likely to deliver benefits to others greater than the 
harm to the victims, and this would not be ethically acceptable in the conduct of clinical 
trials. 
The more fundamental question of whether a moral duty can be owed to an entity without 
independent moral status - the foetus - has been addressed by a number of authors.  For 
example, Campbell and McKay,
268
 Harris
269
 and Feinberg
270
 all conclude that a moral duty 
can be owed to a foetus which lacks independent moral status, and that duty can be 
breached if the pregnant woman takes actions which result in the birth of an injured child.  
This is the same premise upon which common law allows compensation for in utero injury 
manifesting postnatally,
271
 demonstrating that an expectation exists that the foetus should 
have been in the contemplation of those whose actions and decisions affected it, accepting 
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the maternal exemption described in Chapter 3.5 and which will be addressed further in 
Chapter 7.  It seems clear that any duty to/concerning the foetus is qualified in both a 
temporal sense (the duty becoming legally actionable only upon live birth) and a relative 
sense, in that the duty to each individual may be subordinated to the duty to others, if that 
dictates a course of action which leads to a ‘least detrimental option’, as was taken in In Re 
A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation).
272
 
4.4.1 The Steinbock-Robertson-Gillon Proposition 
Following the revision of the FDA’s prohibition of the inclusion of women in clinical trials 
described in Chapter 1, the academic and medical communities began to consider the 
conduct of research in pregnant women, with the echoes of thalidomide and 
diethylstilboestrol still ringing.  In 1993, a workshop convened by the Institute of Medicine 
in the USA considered the potential issues arising from the inclusion of pregnant women in 
research.  Two American speakers, John Robertson and Bonnie Steinbock, addressed the 
ethics of conducting such research.  Without stating clear reasons, Robertson held that a 
pregnant woman was “not free to sacrifice the interests of expected offspring by her 
interests in serving the needs of science or of other women”, predicated upon the 
assumption that the foetus would be carried to term.
273
  Steinbock considered that ethical 
issues of conducting such research did not arise when the intention was to terminate the 
pregnancy, but concurred regarding a lack of entitlement to expose a foetus intended to be 
carried to term to risks associated with non-therapeutic research, i.e., research which did 
not have the potential to confer benefit to participants.
274
  Neither Robertson nor Steinbock 
described the foetus as a ‘participant’ in a clinical trial, and both seemed to assume 
maternal consent was acceptable.  Following the publication of the Polkinghorne Report, 
the question was raised whether a pregnant woman who has elected for an abortion, and 
gave proxy consent for foetal research, could still be considered as having the ‘child’s’ 
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(foetus’) bests interests at heart,275 but if the pregnant woman’s consent is inappropriate, 
then the alternative is not obvious. 
Steinbock proposed prohibiting pregnant women entering trials which did not have the 
potential to benefit foetuses as a class - precisely the type of research described previously 
which led to the discovery that one of the recommendations regarding the treatment of 
anthrax in pregnant women was valueless.
276
  She also agreed with Thomson
277
 that a 
pregnant woman was not morally required to sacrifice her own life or health to sustain the 
life of the foetus, and refusal of treatment which might harm the foetus was not morally 
required.  However, she did not express a view on the morality of a pregnant woman 
seeking experimental treatment for herself if the progression of her condition would 
foreseeably harm the foetus.  Thus both of these (American) authors shared the view that 
the foetus intended to be carried to term enjoyed a moral status such as to restrict, in this 
respect, the pregnant woman’s freedom to participate in a perfectly lawful activity - at best 
the ‘dyad model’ but .perhaps closer to the ‘two-patient’ one. 
These constructions of the moral status of the foetus were similar to that previously 
proposed by Gillon, who suggested that foetuses have an attenuated moral status compared 
to persons - so attenuated that it is permissible to kill them when doing so benefits 
persons,
278
 i.e., not only to save the pregnant woman’s life or protect the health, but also 
when the termination results in an advantage to the pregnant woman, and so potentially 
consistent with Kamm’s ‘Principle of Permissible Harm’ theory.279  The crux of Gillon’s 
argument is that a human person is someone who has been born, that human persons 
constitute a subset of human lives, the latter encompassing those humans who do not, or 
are not allowed to, develop sufficiently to become human persons, and that our moral and 
ethical obligations are to human persons.  On this premise, once a decision is made to 
terminate a pregnancy, the choice is also made that the life of the foetus will be completed 
at the point of termination; it will not become a human person, and so it is not owed a 
moral or ethical obligation.  Should the decision be made to continue the pregnancy, since 
all human persons occupy the same biological spatio-temporal continuance that they did as 
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embryos and as foetuses, then – Gillon’s argument goes – it follows that we have a moral 
obligation not to harm those embryos and foetuses destined to become persons, a 
construction similar to those described by Campbell, Harris and Feinberg above.  In 
essence, this is the same position proposed by Steinbock and Robertson, and conveys a 
utilitarian dimension: once the decision is made that a foetus is to be terminated, then it 
becomes a candidate for research it has no independent moral standing as a result of the 
woman’s decision to terminate the pregnancy.  However, Gillon’s position is not quite 
asexclusionary as his American counterparts; if the foetus intended for survival has the 
same moral status as a person, then surely the possibility must exist of conducting clinical 
trials involving the foetus which are governed in the same way as trials in human persons. 
Much of Steinbock’s and Robertson’s argument on the moral status of the foetus seems to 
reflect their location (the USA) where there has been a steady progression of foetal 
protection legislation, such that 38 of the 50 states now have some form of legislative 
provision regarding ‘foetal homicide’.280  In contrast, in the UK, the courts and Parliament 
continue to draw a ‘bright line’ between the legal recognition of the foetus and those who 
have actually been born, as described in Chapter 2.
281
 
With the progressive lowering of the legal gestation limit for abortion, the constructions of 
Steinbock, Robertson and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Gillon would potentially undermine 
the intent of the EMA and FDA by restricting ethical non-therapeutic clinical research to 
pregnant women who have elected to pursue a termination.  The most recent published 
data for England and Wales (2013) show that 91% of terminations were carried out before 
13 weeks’ gestation,282 with similar figures reported for Scotland283 and the USA.284  At 
this early stage of pregnancy, the impact of the foetus on the pregnant woman’s 
biochemistry and physiology is relatively minor,
285
 and the relevance of results from 
clinical trials in this group is uncertain for women who are closer to term.  The foetus is 
certainly vulnerable to the teratogenic effects of drugs during both the first and second 
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trimesters, but pre-approval studies are unlikely to be able to investigate this,
286
 so 
consideration of teratogenesis is a moot point.  The proposed restriction that pregnant 
women who intend to carry a foetus to term cannot morally participate in research which is 
non-therapeutic for the foetus would significantly reduce the potential value of the 
information generated as well as the freedom of choice of pregnant women to participate in 
such studies - precisely the same criticisms of the FDA’s earlier decision to exclude all 
women from clinical trials.
287
 
4.4.2 The ‘Waiver Theory’ 
Earlier American authors had formulated the ‘waiver theory’: if a woman had waived the 
opportunity of a legal abortion, she was thereafter duty bound to do whatever was required 
to protect and promote the foetus’ best interests,288 even at the expense of her own 
rights.
289
  The basis for this position derives from the moral status of the human person the 
embryo is intended to become and the belief that the duty of care a mother has towards her 
child can be extended into the antenatal setting, although most authors restrict its 
application to injuries which are reasonably foreseeable.
290
  One of the drivers for this 
theory was the potential impact of uncontrolled behaviours, such as substance abuse, on 
the foetus.
291
  This approach seems the apogee of the ‘two-patient’ model, the foetus 
exerting dominion over its ‘carrier’ and relying on ‘life support’ until it is capable of being 
supported by others in a post-delivery setting, and surely represents the surrender of 
autonomy.
292
  The ‘waiver theory’ relies on the extension to an antenatal setting of the 
duty of care owed by a mother to her child which seems a particularly American 
construction, consistent with the progressive erosion in the USA of parental immunity 
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from prosecution,
293
 and specifically rebutted in a legal sense in the UK.
294
  The intention 
of clinical trials of the types the Agencies are requesting is not to harm the foetus (or 
indeed the pregnant woman), far less terminate the pregnancy.  Arguably, the foetus’ best 
interests may be served by participation in carefully controlled clinical trials, carried out in 
specially-selected medical institutions under the oversight of physicians, rather than 
leaving untreated conditions which may impact the foetus, or managing them by using 
drugs which have not been studied in the pregnant population.  Accordingly, the relevance 
of the waiver theory and of issues relating to pregnancy termination to clinical trials is at 
best limited.  
4.4.3 The Chervenak-McCullough Model 
Over the past 20 years, Americans Frank Chervenak, a Professor of Obstetrics, and 
Laurence McCullough, a medical ethicist, have progressively developed a ‘two-entity’ 
model under which physicians incur beneficence-based obligations to the foetus when they 
consider the foetus to be a patient and contemplate treating the foetus as a patient in its 
own right,
295
 rather than endowing the foetus with an intrinsic moral standing based on 
other criteria.  Like most other authors, their approach is based upon protecting the child 
which the foetus will become, rather than ascribing a moral status to the foetus per se. 
The concept of the foetal patient had been advanced earlier,
296
 reflecting the reality that the 
foetus was becoming progressively more treatable directly, although access, of course, was 
possible only via the pregnant woman.
297
 
Their model would apply to situations in which a physician considered instituting some 
form of direct foetal therapy, or treatment for the pregnant woman with the primary 
purpose of benefitting the foetus, and where the foetus was expected subsequently to 
achieve independent moral status by becoming a child.  This combination of 
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circumstances, they argued, created a dependent moral status of the foetus - dependent 
upon the pregnant woman’s intent to deliver a child.  Chervenak and McCullough went 
further: “The physician will sometimes have beneficence-based obligations to the fetal 
patient that will require recommendations of clinical management that puts the pregnant 
woman’s health at risk”.298  Despite repeated assertions regarding the autonomy of the 
pregnant patient, they also comment that “conflict between the physician's 
recommendation and a pregnant woman's autonomous decision to the contrary…...  is best 
managed preventively through informed consent as an ongoing dialogue throughout the 
pregnancy, augmented as necessary by negotiation and respectful persuasion”.299  The last 
phrase is reminiscent of the ‘waiver theory’ and carries an undertone of ‘doctor knows 
best’ in its wording, perhaps reflecting an earlier article by the same authors.300  Therefore, 
in this model, the foetus becomes the primary consideration, possibly at the pregnant 
woman’s expense - another construction of Kamm’s theory.  Chervenak and McCullough 
have not attempted to apply their model to a planned abortion setting; presumably, the 
foetus in such cases would not be the intended beneficiary of any medical intervention. 
The original model was constructed to apply to the practice of medicine.  Subsequently, 
they developed the model,
301
 defining additional criteria applicable to clinical trials of 
potential new drugs during pregnancy, which, when satisfied, would not violate the 
beneficence-based obligations they had proposed were owed to the foetal patient.  These 
criteria were: 
a) That the investigational drug was reliably predicted to alter the course of the condition 
for which the pregnant woman sought treatment. 
b) That previous animal or human studies did not report “documented death or 
documented serious, far-reaching, and irreversible injury of any major organ system”. 
c) The third set out the same requirement as b) for the foetus. 
                                                          
298
 McCullough, L. B., Chervenak, F.A. (2008). Response to commentaries on “A critical analysis of the 
concept and discourse of ‘unborn child.’“ Am.J.Bioethics, 8, W4-W6. 
299
 Chervenak, F.A., McCullough, L.B. (1995)  What is obstetric ethics?  J.Perinat.Med., 23, 331-341 at 
p335. 
300
 Chervenak, F.A., McCullough, L.B. (1991)  Legal intervention during pregnancy.  J.Am.Med.Ass., 265, 
1953-1953. 
301
 McCullough, L.B.  Coverdale, J.H.  Chervenak, F.A. (2005)  A comprehensive ethical framework for 
responsibly designing and conducting pharmacologic research that involves pregnant women.  
Am.J.Obs.Gyn., 193, 901–907. 
Chapter 4  Foetal Moral Status and Maternal-Foetal Models 
69 
 
d) That previous animal and/or human studies reported no or very low documented risk of 
less serious injury to the foetal patient. 
Whilst appearing to be a reasonable, cautious approach which seeks to set standards of 
protection for the foetus - which the last three criteria will in part achieve - the extension of 
the model to clinical trials is open to a number of criticisms. 
The first criterion in the model is at variance with the requirement for clinical equipoise 
inherent in all clinical trials; if a drug can reliably change a condition, then the trial is not 
required, and so is ethically unjustifiable.  This criterion also precludes one of the types of 
studies which will generate the information the EMA and FDA are seeking - non-
therapeutic pharmacokinetic studies - which will provide the societal benefit which 
ethically justifies their conduct.  Whilst the drug may reliably change the condition for 
which the pregnant woman sought treatment in non-pregnant adults, including women, the 
research question is whether it also does so in pregnant women despite the pregnancy-
related changes in renal, hepatic and other functions.  A second question, regardless of the 
answer to the first but which cannot be disconnected from it, relates to the impact of the 
drug on the foetus.  The first criterion is, therefore, not attainable. 
Although ostensibly attractive, the reliance of the other three criteria on animal studies may 
be misleading.  Whilst, with one exception, every drug since thalidomide which has been 
found to be teratogenic in humans has caused similar teratogenic effects in animals, the 
converse is not true.  The literature contains many examples of drugs which express 
teratogenic effects in animals exposed to high doses but which are not teratogenic at 
clinically-relevant doses in humans, or in animals exposed to doses producing plasma 
concentrations which are therapeutic in humans.
302
  The criteria disregard the impact of 
untreated disease morbidity on maternal and, critically here, foetal safety.
303
  Viewing the 
first three criteria, but considering the disease rather than the investigational drug, the 
underlying disease may be known to alter the course of a pregnant woman’s condition to 
the detriment of the foetus, previous animal or human studies of the disease may have 
reported “documented death or documented serious, far-reaching, and irreversible injury of 
any major organ system to the pregnant woman”, or, indeed, the foetus, and the disease 
may be foetotoxic.  If the risks to pregnant woman and foetus associated with the disease 
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are minimal, then perhaps the ethical arguments for exposing the foetus to an 
investigational drug need to be more compelling than those associated with an illness 
which may have catastrophic consequences for either.  The model makes no allowance for 
such considerations. 
The reference to human safety data may also be deceptive.  Congenital defects may occur 
in 5% of all births, and defects attributable to drug therapy represent about 1% of 
congenital defects of known aetiology.
304
  Based on these figures, a drug-related congenital 
abnormality will arise in 1 in 2,000 births.  Thus, if a drug has been taken by a large 
number of pregnant women, a small number of reports of abnormalities may reflect the 
spontaneous occurrence of malformations in the general population, whereas if a drug has 
been taken by a small number of women, a low-incidence teratogenic effect may not have 
been recognised.  Given the Agencies’ requests for such data prior to first approval, it 
seems unlikely that sufficient information can be accrued clinically to satisfy this criterion. 
4.4.4 Criticisms of the ‘two-patient’ Models 
The ‘two-patient’ models seem to increase foetal protection by according a level of moral 
standing which may equal or exceed that of the woman carrying it.
305
  The proponents of 
these models appear to believe that the maximisation of the prospect of healthy children 
being born is achieved when the primary responsibility for foetal care is removed from 
pregnant women and replaced by appropriate medical and legal interventions.  No doubt, 
in some cases, this will be correct. 
However, all ‘two-patient’ models are open to criticism.  The most obvious are that the 
foetus is not an independent patient in practice since the foetus cannot be treated without 
the pregnant woman’s body being affected,306 and that the model fails to recognise the 
autonomy-based freedom she has to decide upon alternative courses of treatment based on 
her own values and beliefs.
307
  Annas has commented that ‘two-patient’ models risk 
treating the pregnant woman as a “fetal container, a nonperson without rights to bodily 
                                                          
304
 De Santis, M., Straface, G., Carducci, B., et al(2004). Risk of drug-induced congenital defects.  
Eur.J.Obs.Gyn.Repro.Biol., 117,10–19. 
305
 Lyerly, A. D., Little, M.O., Faden, R. (2008)  A critique of the foetus as patient.  Am.J.Bioethics 8, 42–44. 
306
 Dickens, B.M., Cook, R.J. (2003). Ethical and legal approaches to ‘the fetal patient’.  Int.J.Gyn.Obs., 83, 
85–91. 
307
 Oduncu, F.S., Kimmig, R., Hepp, H., et al. (2003). Cancer in pregnancy: maternal-fetal conflict.  J.Cancer 
Res.Clin.Oncol., 129, 133-146. 
Chapter 4  Foetal Moral Status and Maternal-Foetal Models 
71 
 
integrity”.308  Strong,309 citing Warren,310 argues that while role-related obligations that 
physicians have toward their patients are special obligations, this does not require the 
ascription of moral status to the foetus; actions that would unjustifiably harm a future child 
should be avoided on the basis of the ethical obligations owed to the future child - a 
position which aligns with Gillon’s arguments 25 years earlier.  Whilst the majority of the 
proponents of ‘two patient’ models have been American, the American medical 
community takes a different view: the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists has advocated the development of a “framework that instead defines the 
professional ethical obligations with a deep sensitivity to relationships of interdependency 
(which) may help to avoid the distorting influence of the ‘two-patient’ model as 
traditionally understood”,311 but has yet to propose such a framework. 
The reliance upon access via the woman’s body where she has decided not to seek a 
termination of pregnancy is surely a reflection of the foetus’ dependent status; if its 
continued survival depends on treatment, the foetus remains dependent upon the pregnant 
woman granting such access.  The logical consequence of viewing the foetus as an 
independent ‘patient’ is a reduction, possibly a complete loss, of the pregnant woman’s 
autonomy, the same point raised by Annas.  In addition, all of these authors overlook the 
morally and legally important distinction between patients and research participants, to 
whom practitioners and researchers have different obligations; this will be discussed more 
extensively in Chapter 5. 
Wild has suggested that the concept of a maternal-foetal ‘double unit’, i.e., ‘dyad’, as 
proposed by Mattingley and others, means it is inappropriate to individualise the foetus, as 
that focusses on potential foetal harm whilst neglecting the harmful consequences the 
intervention, or lack thereof, may have for the pregnant woman.
312
 She invokes 
MacKenzie’s argument that, having elected to assume parental responsibility for the 
foetus’s future well-being by not aborting it, the foetus thereby gains moral significance by 
virtue of its relationship with the pregnant woman and that it is the researchers’ duty to 
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respect this and to care for the foetus’s well-being.313  Wild proposes that investigators in 
trials involving pregnant women must consider them in this way, i.e., neither only as a 
woman nor only as a foetus, nor as two separate units, as an adverse impact of the trial on 
one party will, inevitably, have an adverse impact, albeit possibly of a different type, on 
the other.  Based upon this approach, arguably, the act of participating in clinical research 
results in an expanded medical obligation to care for the foetus. 
4.5 The Limited Relevance of the Abortion Debate 
Much of the debate regarding the legislation and in the literature regarding the moral 
standing of the foetus is, of course, linked to the issue of abortion, and the moral basis, if 
any, upon which a foetus (or an embryo) can be ‘killed’.314  Despite the continually-
expanding theological and philosophical literature on this subject, that debate is now 
deadlocked and seems likely to remain so; resolution would require an agreement on 
spiritual and philosophical values acceptable to all, which seems highly unlikely.  As a 
simple illustration, even in those countries which have relatively conservative laws 
regarding abortion, most - but not all - make an exception in the case of pregnancy arising 
from rape or incest.
315
  However, the foetus’ ‘right’ to life  is arguably independent of the 
circumstances in which it was conceived.  Kaposy contends that the protagonists on both 
sides of the debate base their arguments on intuitions and analogies; as the latter rely on a 
shared standard of measurement for moral views which can be employed to develop 
consensus, an agreement, or even a compromise, seems highly unlikely because the 
different intuitions which lie behind any shared standards still exist.  As a consequence, the 
extent of genuinely shared values in the abortion debate may be overstated.
316
  Those who 
hold strong views seem likely to find challenging an impartial consideration of arguments 
relating to abortion, since such views are commonly connected to a range of other, central 
beliefs, and a contrary view, in a sense, threatens that wider base.
317
  As Tooley captures 
                                                          
313
 Mackenzie, C. (1992). Abortion and embodiment. Aust.J.Phil. 70, 136-155. 
314
 See, for example, Tooley, M. (2013). Philosophy, critical thinking and ‘after-birth abortion: why should 
the baby live?  J.Med.Ethics, 39, 266-272; Harris J.  The Value of Life.  London: Routledge, 1985; Cox, 
D.R.A. (2014). The problems with utilitarian conceptions of personhood in the abortion debate.  J.Med. 
Ethics, 37, 318-320. 
315
 Center for Reproductive Rights Factsheet  The World’s Abortion Laws Map 2013 Update, available at 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/AbortionMap_Factsheet_2013.p
df accessed 14
th
 September, 2015. 
316
 Kaposy, C. (2012)  Two stalemates in the philosophical debate about abortion and why they cannot be 
resolved using analogical arguments.  Bioethics, 26, 84-92. 
317
 Tooley, M. (2013). Philosophy, critical thinking and ‘after-birth’ abortion: why should the baby live?’  
J.Med.Ethics, 39, 266-272. 
Chapter 4  Foetal Moral Status and Maternal-Foetal Models 
73 
 
the situation: if the moral standing of the foetus is such that abortion is wrong, but society 
considers that it is not, the result will be the unjustified killing of many innocent potential 
persons; conversely, if the moral standing of the foetus is such that abortion is not morally 
wrong, but society believes that it is and legislates accordingly, the result will be 
considerable suffering, and the deaths of many women.  Thus, the potential impact of 
following a mistaken belief to its logical conclusion is high, which makes finding  
agreement across society even more challenging.  Accordingly, whether foetuses have a 
moral standing which entitles them to protection in the sense of security from abortion has 
been neither convincingly established nor refuted.  As a consequence, the debate regarding 
the morality of abortion is of limited relevance to the debate regarding the moral status of 
the foetus in other settings, although one might take the position that the apparent 
acceptance by many of the morality of abortion would suggest that the morality of 
involving pregnant women in clinical trials is less contentious. 
The distinction in context is, however, a relevant one: there is a significant moral and legal 
difference between embarking upon a course of action with the intent of taking a life, such 
as deliberately driving a car at an individual, and taking action which results in taking life 
but without intending to  do so, such as accidentally hitting an individual with a car as he 
steps from between parked vehicles.  For some who hold ‘pro-life’ views, the former might 
be analogous to abortion, whereas the latter, perhaps, is more comparable to a clinical trial, 
in that an individual freely follows a course of action which creates a risk of causing death 
or injury, but where this is not the intention.  The actions in the latter situation may be 
regarded as more or less morally (and legally) culpable depending on a number of factors 
such as the degree of avoidability of the injury, the utility of the activity causing injury and 
the rights and interests of others.  So, in an attempt to ‘benchmark’ the moral status of the 
foetus in a clinical trial setting, a foetus at an early stage of gestation destined for abortion 
is not the most relevant selection, as the intent in such trials would be to avoid such a 
situation. 
4.6 The Foetus and the Neonate as a Moral Continuum 
By analogy with the normal development paradigm for new medicines in children (initial 
trials in adolescents, progressing to pre-teenage children, then to infants and lastly to 
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neonates, following a path from least to greatest risk),
318
 it would seem likely that such 
trials might involve, initially, women in the third trimester of pregnancy - the same 
gestational age for the vast majority of premature neonates,
319
 and so, broadly, of 
comparable viability, and, some will argue, of similar moral standing.  A number of 
concepts, parameters and considerations have been explored or proposed as criteria upon 
which to establish the relative moral standing of the foetus and the neonate.  The neonate 
certainly enjoys legal personality and few would contest it has significant moral standing.  
Clinical trials involving neonates are considered morally acceptable, and so a comparison 
of the moral standing of the neonate and, initially, the late-stage foetus is relevant. 
Strong and Anderson
320
 have argued that the near-term foetus should be regarded as having 
the same moral status as persons, on the premise that the foetus and the neonate constitute 
a continuum, especially during the third trimester.  At this stage of development the foetus 
is in most cases ‘viable’, i.e., capable of being supported technologically to the point of 
physiological independence (as defined in C vS
321
), just like many newborn, particularly 
premature, infants.
322
: “The infant…has the same characteristics…as a foetus shortly 
before birth; the same size, shape, internal constitution, species membership, capacities, 
level of consciousness and so forth”.323.  However, if the (late-stage) foetus and the 
neonate represent a continuum, then the same is arguably true for the late-stage and the 
early-stage foetus:
324
 the same entity in the same location, and dependent for nourishment 
upon, and can be accessed for medical purposes only via, the pregnant woman.  If viability 
is the key element underlying the claim for moral equivalence, the survival, albeit 
exceptionally, of a 22-week neonate
325
 surely suggests that the non-late-stage foetus may 
also be able to lay claim to the moral status of ‘person’. 
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Jensen,
326
 arguing that viability is the relevant criterion upon which to bestow moral status 
to the foetus, dismisses the fact of birth as relatively arbitrary, and contends that the extent 
of social responsiveness (one aspect of ‘personhood’) is so minimal as to lack sufficient 
moral relevance to distinguish the foetus from a newborn, suggesting that these two entities 
should enjoy the same moral status.  Inevitably, a number of authors have contrasting 
views.  Bermudez,
327
 for example, cites studies showing that, in contrast to foetuses, 
newborns possess primitive forms of self-awareness and self-knowledge sufficient to 
create a moral distinction; this he describes as his ‘Principle of Derived Moral 
Significance’, under which if a particular characteristic is a basis upon which to confer 
moral significance to a life, then a primitive form of that same characteristic also confers 
moral significance.  Neonates obviously display features characteristic of basic 
consciousness but still need considerable maturation to reach the level of infant 
cognizance.
328
  Levy
329
 argues that newborns are capable of interacting with carers shortly 
after birth, a capacity not shared by the foetus.  Perhaps the behavioural continuum 
between an infant and a neonate does, in fact, extend back into the womb, but we have yet 
to develop the techniques to detect it, although developing evidence suggests the foetus is 
able to show responses indicative of its capacity to experience pleasure and pain from 
around 18 weeks’ gestational age.330  In essence, these authors disagree upon the level of 
relevance which should be attached to the extent of interaction which a newborn can 
display, rather than attributing an intrinsic worth or value to it. 
Gillon
331
 criticises viability as a differentiator on the basis that it is reliant upon the skills 
and resources of others, contrasting foetal viability in a Third World village with that in a 
First World neonatal intensive care unit, and so cannot constitute a characteristic upon 
which to base the intrinsic moral status of the foetus; similar comments might be made 
regarding the actual time of birth as a differentiator.  The vagaries of medical practice are 
also relevant here.  As Gross captures the situation: “The same moderately malformed 25 
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week old foetus might be aborted in Israel, delivered but not necessarily resuscitated in 
Denmark, resuscitated but not always treated aggressively in the UK and treated 
aggressively in the USA.”332 
The descriptions of neonatal behaviours by Jensen, Bermudez and Levy lead to the concept 
of personhood, commonly associated with notions such as soul, mind, spirit or physical 
body
333
 and generally considered to require a variety of capacities together with a moral or 
normative status dependent on those capacities.
334
 It also includes the attributes of self-
awareness, recognition and belief, i.e., the manner in which someone is treated by others is 
part of their being a person.
335
  This recognition can be both external and internal and can 
arise in a variety of ways, such as discourse, performance, context or relationships with 
other persons.
336
  Essentially, personhood entails how I am to myself, how I am to 
you/them/it and how you/them/it are to me - it is a description of multi-level interaction 
and recognition which entails sensory experience.
337
  If an individual has the moral status 
of personhood, then all moral agents have a prima facie obligation not to cause harm to 
that individual,
338
 although there are some clear legal exceptions to this.
339
  From a moral 
perspective, if the foetus is held to lack personhood, then its termination or injury in a 
clinical trial or otherwise cannot normally be described in terms of self-defence.
340
 
Is the fact of birth itself morally relevant?  Warren holds that birth is morally significant in 
that it marks the end of the totally-dependent relationship the foetus has upon the pregnant 
woman carrying it.
341
  Technically, of course, she is correct that the newborn child is 
dependent for survival upon the assistance of others in a way which cannot be replicated 
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whilst the foetus is in utero; witness the tragic case in Ireland in 2014, in which, despite all 
efforts to sustain the physiological functions of a brain-dead pregnant woman, the foetus 
could not be maintained to the point of viability.
342
  However, some remarkable contrasting 
cases have been reported.
343
  Like Gillon, Warren’s view seems to rely upon a technical, 
practical distinction rather than a moral one, which will vary according to the resources 
and skills available.  However, she does, indirectly identify a break in the foetal-newborn 
continuum.  Should a foetus sustain an injury, including within a clinical trial setting, then 
it can recover damages only upon live birth, when it becomes a neonate; legally, there is a 
break in the continuum at the point of live birth. 
In one way, the seeming lack of a morally-relevant difference between neonates and the 
late-stage foetus is already accepted in the UK.  The law recognises that, exceptionally, it 
is not in the best interests of a severely handicapped neonate to receive futile or 
burdensome treatment, and so treatment may be withdrawn or withheld, and the neonate 
allowed to die ‘naturally’,344 a situation somewhat analogous to the legally-permissable 
abortion of a late-stage foetus if there is a substantial risk that the resulting child would be 
seriously handicapped.  Recent articles and newspaper coverage report the practice of not 
feeding severely disabled neonates.
345
  Once again, a certain moral equivalence is being 
created between a late-stage foetus and a neonate, although there is a significant legal 
difference between such a neonate being ‘allowed to die’  and a termination actively being 
conducted.  Some will argue, following Bland,
346
 that such cases involve an omission – the 
omission to continue (i.e., withdrawal of) life-sustaining action, rather than an act – and so 
are distinguishable.  This distinction is firmly embedded in the laws of the UK.  As a 
generality, an act which causes the death of a person in being, and with the requisite intent, 
will constitute murder, whereas an omission to act will not,
347
 although this depends upon 
whether there is a duty to act.  However, it is unlikely that clinical trials would be 
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considered ethically acceptable in severely handicapped neonates or in pregnant women 
known to be carrying foetuses at such risk.  The fundamental principle of research, that of 
generating generalisable knowledge, seems unlikely to be realised in entities with an 
almost unlimited range of such conditions. 
The existence of a universally-accepted moral distinction between the foetus and the 
neonate sufficient to influence the decision on the ethical standing of the foetus in clinical 
trials in pregnant women therefore remains elusive.  The diversity of clinical practice and 
the variety of factors, including birth, held to be definitive by various authors means that, 
as is the case with abortion, attempts to define the moral standing of the foetus in relation 
to the neonate cannot be cogently defended or refuted to the satisfaction of all, and so seem 
of little help when seeking to establish a position regarding the acceptability of such trials. 
However, none of these authors has argued that the moral status of the foetus is in any way 
greater than that of the neonate.  The regulation of clinical trials will be discussed more 
extensively in Chapters 6 and 7, but for the present purpose it seems appropriate to touch 
on the topic here.  Non-therapeutic trials in neonates are permissable if, using the language 
of the MHU Regulations 2004, the class of patients represented by the participant - other 
neonates - would be expected to derive benefit from the knowledge gained,
348
 i.e., a 
utilitarian approach, and it is not the intent of trials in pregnant women to confer a direct 
benefit to the foetus.  Therefore, as far as the foetus is concerned, all of these trials should 
be regarded as non-therapeutic in nature and the question becomes one of whether foetuses 
as a class would benefit from the information generated.  As mentioned earlier, improved 
control of maternal conditions can confer benefit to the foetus, and the anthrax example 
also resulted in the generation of information with the same potential.  Provided the 
purpose of the trial in pregnant women is to generate generalisable knowledge which will 
benefit other foetuses, then subject to the usual safeguards and provisons for injury, there 
seems no reason not to consider such trials as being equally morally-acceptable in foetuses 
and neonates.. 
Despite our attempts to find a basis upon which to make a distinction, the words of the 
judge in an otherwise unremarkable case from New Zealand echo loud when he said 
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“[T]he rule according legal rights at birth is in modern times one founded on convenience. 
It does not rest on medical or moral principle”.349 
4.7 The Foetus as a ‘Concomitant Condition’ 
In the studies of the types the Agencies have requested, the foetus is not the ‘subject’; the 
intent of the trial is not to assess the efficacy, safety or pharmacokinetics of the 
investigational drug for treatment or prevention of a condition affecting foetuses.  The 
pregnant woman is the trial subject - the primary generator of the data sought - and the 
information generated is intended to be applicable to the treatment of the same conditions 
in other pregnant women in the future.  Conceptually, such studies are similar to those 
carried out in patients with other co-existing conditions which may affect the properties of 
the investigational drug, such as those with renal or hepatic impairment; the investigational 
drug will not treat the condition, and the point of the study is to establish how the condition 
affects the properties of the drug.  In other words, pregnancy may be regarded as a 
concomitant condition with the potential to affect the way in which the drug works upon 
the trial subject.  To adopt a different level of risk acceptance in pregnant women as 
opposed to other adults based upon the existence of the foetus, not because it is an 
additional factor that might affect the action of the drug in pregnant women, but based 
upon its possible effects upon the foetus, would reflect the ‘two-patient’ model discussed 
previously.  This is discussed further in Chapter 6.3.5. 
That said, the review conducted by the REC should ensure that the risks of any trial are 
acceptable in the proposed target population, and the RECs would be failing in their 
responsibilities were they to approve a trial in pregnant women involving a drug believed 
to have foetotoxic or teratogenic effect - just as they would were they to approve a trial in 
neonates of a drug believed to carry a particular risk to that subject population.
350
 
4.8 An Enduring Obligation to the Foetus in Research? 
If the foetus is a ‘participant’, when do the resulting moral obligations cease?  Some 
contend that researchers have an enduring duty to anticipate and prepare for emerging 
disclosure obligations to the mature person that the foetus is likely to become, for example, 
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emerging evidence that in utero exposure is associated with the development of a condition 
many years in the future (the diethylstilboestrol scenario) or, in these days of genetic 
testing, that later analyses of retained biological samples uncover the presence of a 
potentially fatal abnormality.  In conventional medicine, approaches have been developed 
for dealing with such sensitive matters, and it would seem reasonable for the investigators’ 
responsibilities to endure regarding the pregnant woman.  After all, but for her autonomous 
decision to enter a clinical trial for which she received no payment, the trial sponsors 
would not have gained information which was potentially useful to them.  However, the 
various maternal-foetal models and regulations are silent on this matter,
351
 and the question 
of whether an individual can employ Freedom of Information legislation to recover 
information gathered when he was in utero has yet to come before the courts. 
4.9 Conclusions 
Most academic writers hold that the foetus per se has no intrinsic moral status - its moral 
status derives from the child, the person, it will become - but that we have moral duties 
concerning the foetus.  These duties include a moral requirement not to harm the foetus 
intended for survival to term, hence the limitations of the applications of utilitarianism, 
consequentialism and Kamm’s ‘Principle of Permissible Harm’352 to the conduct of clinical 
trials in pregnant women.  Those same duties, in the views of most writers, do not extend 
to the foetus destined for abortion, and so the pregnant woman’s autonomy to make such a 
decision is preserved.  Even the proponents of the waiver theory restrict its application to 
the foetus intended for survival. 
The strength of the claim by the foetus, and particularly the late-stage foetus, to enjoy 
‘moral standing’ is, in many ways, as compelling as that of the neonate.  With gestation 
periods extending from 153
353
 to over 300 days
354
 that leaves a period of approximately six 
months during which a potentially-viable foetus may remain in utero.  While, of course, 
each case must be judged individually, it seems difficult to argue that two entities of 
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precisely the same gestational age should be considered to be morally, as opposed to 
legally, different because one is delivered and the other is not, if the reason for that 
difference is not intrinsic, e.g., related to foetal maturation, but extrinsic, e.g., related to the 
level and availability of technical support at one hospital compared to the other. 
The factors which influence the thinking of pregnant women, like everyone else, are many 
and varied.  As a consequence, two pregnant women in ostensibly similar situations may 
make diametrically-opposed decisions upon whether to grant a foetus of a given gestational 
age a particular moral status.  The moral status of the foetus is, therefore, not a constant, 
but has become an uncontrolled, and possibly uncontrollable, variable.  However, if the 
pregnant woman is not to be the arbiter of moral status for her own foetus, and thus assume 
moral responsibility for its welfare, then who will be? 
Although they may be unable to demonstrate the notions and concepts of personhood in 
ways we can understand and recognise, we can ‘bestow’ personhood upon foetuses or 
neonates by the way in which we interact with them, in much the same way that a pregnant 
woman bestows moral value to a foetus by her decision to continue, rather than terminate, 
her pregnancy.  Accepting that a foetus has personhood would mean that its ‘rights’ and 
interests merit protection, and it could therefore be suggested that the pregnant woman’s 
autonomy regarding medical intervention must be “subject to the interests of others (i.e., 
the foetus) whose needs those decisions directly impinge upon?”.355  The exercise of 
autonomy is not unfettered; under the neighbour principle laid down in Donoghue v 
Stevenson,
356
 we can all be held liable for the consequences of negligent acts or omissions 
which adversely affect those whom we ought to have in our contemplation, and as 
explained above, those conducting clinical research (or medical treatment) in pregnant 
women ought to have the foetus in contemplation. This does not, however, mean that the 
‘needs’ of the foetus outweigh those of the pregnant woman. 
Medical research often involves risk which is undertaken for the benefit of others and 
clinical trials in pregnant women not intended to benefit the foetus will be categorised as 
non-therapeutic for the foetus.  Under the MHU Regulations 2004, non-therapeutic clinical 
trials are acceptable in incompetent adults and minors as a carefully-controlled, risk-
minimised method to accrue information which will help others in the future, provided the 
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same information cannot be acquired from different populations and the trial will produce 
some benefit for the populations represented by the incompetent adult or minor.
357
  Proxy 
consent is acceptable in these circumstances.  So, if the foetus was to be considered 
morally, rather than legally, as incapax or an extreme minor, given these same conditions, 
with the pregnant woman giving proxy permission, that would not be different to the 
current positions regarding the incapax and minors, assuming the appropriate prior 
deliberations of the REC.  The information gained in these trials will be used to better 
manage maternal illnesses, some of which have the potential to harm the foetus.  Defining 
an alternative study population from which the data would be as applicable is extremely 
chsllenging, as pregnancy is a unique condition. 
Based on the arguments above, the conduct of clinical studies in pregnant women has 
many parallels to the conduct of studies in neonates, and, subject to the appropriate 
approvals, the latter is already considered morally acceptable.  It seems difficult to identify 
a basis upon which to construct an argument that, morally, a pregnant woman cannot 
participate in a clinical trial, but a mother may give her permission for her newly-born 
child to do so.  The majority of the medicines used in neonates, like pregnant women, have 
never formally been assessed in that population, and are employed ‘off-label’, i.e., at doses 
and for indications for which formal approval is lacking, and may never have been 
sought.
358
 Thus, non-therapeutic studies, to assess the pharmacokinetics of investigational 
drugs in pregnant women would be morally-justifiable, knowing that these parameters are 
often affected by the pregnant state. 
Conceptually, the ‘one-patient’, ‘dyad’ and ‘two-patient’ models can all be contemplated 
within a clinical trial setting.  Advocates of the ‘waiver theory’ would seem unlikely to 
volunteer for clinical trials; why would they subject the foetus to the unavoidable risk, 
unless they interpret the theory at a population level, i.e., the obligation is to avoid risk to 
the population of foetuses, rather than the specific foetus being carried? Similarly, 
proponents of the ‘two-patient’ model may be less likely to participate in the absence of 
assurance regarding benefit, or at best the absence of harm, to the foetus, which a properly-
conducted consent process should manage.  The decision and legal authority to participate 
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in a trial rests entirely with the pregnant woman and her assessment of the risk:benefit ratio 
for herself and the foetus, which in turn is influenced by the degree of moral standing she 
imparts to the foetus.  The assessment of the moral considerations regarding the trial per se 
will already have been undertaken by the REC, and the REC approval constitutes 
permission for the Investigator to ask potential subjects to apply their own judgement, 
including a moral assessment, to the trial in question.  The Investigator, whilst not acting as 
a physician, remains under an obligation to minimise harm to trial subjects.
359
  One might 
reasonably construe that foetal harm would result in distress and anxiety for the pregnant 
woman, and so it seems likely that the Investigator would have the foetus in contemplation 
when considering the trial.  The REC would presumably take into account any particular 
risks associated with gestational age in their conditional approval of the trial.  One might 
speculate, for example, that a lower risk might be tolerated for a trial enrolling subjects in 
the first or second trimesters, as various drugs have demonstrated teratogenic activity in 
humans during these periods.  However, identifying subsets of the target population at 
particular risk in this setting is no different to the deliberations of the REC for all trials, and 
the same is true of the Investigator’s obligation. 
Should a clinical trial proceed uneventfully, then, in effect, maternal-foetal model becomes 
a moot point; by consenting, the pregnant woman has made her decision for both herself 
and her foetus, and no reason has arisen to question that decision.  In the event that an 
investigational drug elicited a response which put the foetus at risk, it seems likely that the 
‘stopping rules’ included in all protocols would be invoked; trial subjects cannot insist 
upon continuing in a trial in violation of the protocol and/or contrary to the Investigator’s 
medical judgment.  If the trial subject is a proponent of the ‘one-patient’ model, having 
given her consent to the study, she may, of course, decline treatment to manage the 
emerging situation.  Trial subjects whose beliefs are consistent with the ‘dyad’ model are 
in the same position, although it seems unlikely they would attempt to insist upon the trial 
continuing.  Supporters of the ‘two-patient’ model may be more inclined towards foetal 
preference should an adverse event arise, but should have anticipated the situation as part 
of the consent process. 
It seems unlikely that any form of clinical research involving pregnant women which 
disregarded the existence of the foetus would be considered as ethically-acceptable: a strict 
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‘one-patient’ model is too far from current medical and ethical thinking, effectively 
categorising the foetus as ‘expendable’.  Given the legal decisions reached after many 
decades regarding the ‘interests’ of the foetus and the child it will become, all of which 
were based on ethical considerations, such a model would not be morally-acceptable.  So 
far as clinical trials of the types the Agencies have requested are concerned, given the 
intent is not to harm the foetus, it is implicit the foetus will be in the contemplation of all 
those involved. 
The ‘two-patient’ model, taken to the point of two patients viewed as independent and 
equal also seems a poor model.  The two patients clearly are not independent, nor are they 
‘equal’, in the sense that, unless she is legally-incompetent, the pregnant woman’s 
permission is always required for any intervention to herself and her foetus, and no 
permission is required from the foetus.  If the decision-maker is not to be the pregnant 
woman, then who would that be, and on what basis could another party make such 
decisions?  Before consent can be sought, the REC and the regulatory authority, will 
already have approved the research protocol.  Given the requirement for ‘special expertise’ 
within the REC specified in the new EU Regulation 536, approval means that specific 
consideration will already have been given to this population.
360
  Such approval allows 
Investigators, who cannot be compelled to conduct research with which they do not agree, 
to approach potential subjects to explore whether they wish to participate.  Thus, four 
separate agreements (REC, regulatory authority, Investigator, subject) are already required 
before a pregnant woman may enrol into any form of medical research.  Short of adopting 
a position that all research involving pregnant women is unethical and therefore not 
permissible, i.e., a return to the pre-1993 situation, it is not clear how a greater level of 
protection could be accorded to the foetus within the ‘two-patient’ model.  While the latter 
position may protect an individual foetus from potential harm related to the research, the 
loss of the data such research would yield increases the risk to every foetus of harm 
resulting from inadequate treatment of the condition in pregnant women. 
For medical research in general, including clinical trials of the types under consideration, 
the maternal-foetal ‘dyad’ - the one complex gravid female patient - seems the most 
appropriate model from a moral perspective at present.  In this model, a balance is struck 
between the pregnant woman’s needs and interests (which could legitimately include 
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considerations in addition to the foetus) and those of the foetus, with the fully-informed 
pregnant woman making the final choice.  As explained above, the four agreements which 
need to be reached prior to enrolment of a pregnant woman into any clinical trial provide 
safeguards for the foetus which match those for any other trial participant.  The consent 
process, discussed extensively in Chapter 6.4, allows the pregnant woman to decide 
whether to engage the degree of risk the REC, the regulatory authority and the Investigator 
have already considered as being acceptable, having taken into account the trial subjects 
being pregnant women.  Should an adverse event occur, the Investigator would be obliged 
to seek the pregnant woman’s permission before making an intervention directed at 
protecting the foetus, just as would be the case in conventional medical practice; unless the 
participant had given her permission prior to the trial, the Investigator may be restricted 
regarding the actions necessary to protect the foetus, regardless of the consequences for the 
pregnant woman. 
Thus, the moral standing of the foetus is not compromised by the involvement of pregnant 
women in clinical trials, but quite the reverse: it is the moral status we have accorded to the 
foetus which requires us to conduct the appropriate clinical trials to ensure better treatment 
for both pregnant women and the foetus in the future. 
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Chapter 5 The Investigator-Subject Relationship 
5.1 Introduction 
In most clinical trials in the UK, with the exception of Phase I studies in healthy 
volunteers, the Investigator often is also the physician who is treating the patient for 
whichever condition she has that requires treatment.  That means that the Investigator is 
using information he gained whilst acting as a physician to assess whether the patient is a 
candidate to become a clinical trial subject.  If that assessment is positive, then he will 
approach the patient, most likely in a ‘Doctor-Patient’ setting, to discuss the trial.  If the 
patient agrees to participate, he will then take her consent in an ‘Investigator-Subject’ 
setting.  This suggests that the Doctor-Investigator status, like that of Patient-Subject, is a 
continuum; specific acts may fall within the purview of one part of the continuum, but are 
based upon information and circumstances drawn from across the whole continuum.
361
  
From this type of transaction, it is not clear whether the patient recognises that her status 
will change, as will that of the ‘doctor’, nor is it clear that the patient is told, or 
understands, the consequences of the changed relationship.  The purpose of this chapter is 
to explore the nature of the Investigator-Subject relationship, as a prelude to discussing its 
significance for the prevention of harm (Chapter 6) or the recovery of compensation by the 
child in the event of congenital injury (Chapter 7). 
5.2 A Contractual Relationship? 
In the UK, it would be unusual for a formal contract to exist between trial subjects and the 
sponsor or Investigator, although this may in theory arise if the participant is a private 
patient of the Investigator.  However, in a recent Scottish case - a rare example of a legal 
matter relating to a clinical trial being addressed in open court and reported - the court held 
that the Investigator-subject relationship may be contractual.
362
  The patient information 
sheet constituted an offer, the signed consent form was the acceptance, and both parties 
enjoyed capacity to contract.  The consent form described obligations to which the 
Investigator and the trial subject were each prepared to be bound, which taken together, 
amounted to sufficient certainty of terms (given that research is an inherently uncertain 
undertaking) and constituted consideration.  The court appears not to have considered 
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whether the parties intended to create a contractual relationship, nor the fact that the 
consent form will have contained a withdrawal clause, mandated by the MHU Regulations 
2004, under which the subject was freely able to withdraw from the study at any time and 
without penalty, in effect making this a unilateral contract.  As a lower-court case, this 
decision is not binding on any other courts, and may prove to be of historical interest only. 
The term ‘contract’ was widely employed in clinical research until the development of the 
doctrine of ‘informed consent’.  The concept of the document we now know as the 
‘consent form’ was until then captured by the terms contracts, releases or waivers, perhaps 
indicating that such documents were intended more to protect the researchers than to 
protect or inform the participants.  Capron has speculated that the term ‘contract’ may have 
served to relieve the researcher of liability when proceeding with what might have become 
unjustified research.
363
  With present-day trial approval processes, one would think that 
unjustified research would no longer be possible, at least in the UK.  The legal status of the 
consent documents has been reviewed recently from a predominantly UK perspective, the 
conclusion being that consent is better seen as a continuing relational process rather than a 
contractual one.
364
  Thus, it would appear that subjects enrolled to clinical trials do not 
enjoy the protection of a formal contract, and, of course, the foetus lacks the capacity to 
enter into a contract. 
5.3 A Fiduciary Relationship? 
In the UK, the physician-patient relationship was long-held to be fiduciary: 
 “… according to the textbook writers, the physician-patient relationship remained 
an epitome of the fiduciary relationship well into this century.”365 
This seems obvious: the physician has superior knowledge upon which the patient is 
dependent, and by attending appointments and accepting treatment, prescribed with the 
intent of alleviating illness in that particular patient, the patient is expressing confidence 
and trust in the physician.  However, Lord Scarman’s comment in Sidaway indicates 
otherwise:  
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“… there is no comparison to be made between the relationship of physician and 
patient with that of solicitor and client, trustee and cestui qui trust or other 
relationships treated in equity as of a fiduciary character.”366 
Others have challenged this view.  Brazier, for example, has questioned whether equity is 
too rigid to expand to fill the gaps resulting from the inflexibility of tort in the common 
law.
367
  In the absence of a fiduciary relationship, a subject inadequately informed 
regarding a clinical procedure but suffering no injury has (almost) no grounds for any form 
of recovery.  Bartlett notes that physicians already owe their patients certain obligations of 
a quasi-fiduciary nature, confidentiality perhaps being the most obvious of these,
368
 and 
which have arisen because equity has recognised the dependency which exists within the 
doctor-patient relationship.  As matters stand at present, in the UK the relationship between 
patient and physician is held not to be fiduciary in nature.  In clinical research, there is 
even less agreement, and no applicable legal precedent in the UK, if one accepts that the 
doctor-patient relationship is different to that of Investigator-Subject.  The basis for the 
differences between the relationships will be explained shortly. 
Elsewhere in the Commonwealth, Australian law has recognised that the doctor-patient 
relationship has fiduciary aspects.
369
  In Canada, in McInerney v MacDonald,
370
 LaForest 
J. emphasised that fiduciary obligations are shaped by the demands of the situation (in this 
case the patient’s right of access to the physician’s medical notes, which had been denied 
on the basis of therapeutic privilege) and the presence of trust and loyalty were essential.  
Thus, we have little guidance from Commonwealth jurisdictions.  Accordingly, it would 
appear that subjects enrolled to clinical trials in the UK do not enjoy the protection which 
would arise from a fiduciary relationship. 
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Even in the USA, where the doctor-patient relationship is held to be fiduciary in law, the 
courts have commented that the concepts inherent in fiduciary relationships do not fit the 
research setting, and attempting to impose this would “pose a host of vexing issues”.371 
5.4 The Physician’s Duty to Minimise Harm? 
In the UK, the GMC lists the first duty of a physician as that of making “the care of your 
patient your first concern”,372 consistent with the Declaration of Helsinki, which includes 
the sentence “The health of my patient will be my first consideration”,373 and the ethical 
obligations of the Hippocratic Oath which include beneficence and non-maleficence.
374
  
The GMC document advises the physician to “take prompt action if you think that patient 
safety, dignity or comfort is being compromised”.  In a conventional medical setting, that 
will include providing the best treatment possible, tailoring the treatment regimen to the 
responses of, and discussing the course of treatment with, the patient.
375
 
If the physician is also acting as the Investigator, some of these may be not possible.  In a 
single-blind study, the treatment allocation is not known to the subject, and in a double-
blind study, neither the subject nor the Investigator is aware of the treatment allocation.  
The protocol will normally stipulate the dose of the experimental medication, and the 
identity and dose of any active comparator, and may also require that the dose regimens for 
other medications are held constant throughout the trial.  In such circumstances, the 
Investigator cannot ascertain that the best treatment possible is being provided or that the 
treatment is tailored to the subject’s responses, and is clearly limited regarding the extent 
of discussion which is possible, since neither party knows which treatment the subject is 
receiving.  Indeed, in a double-blind trial, the Investigator may be prevented from 
reviewing any data generated which could result in unblinding, such as a particular change 
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in clinical chemistry, or the electrocardiogram.  It seems difficult to reconcile such trial 
designs with the ‘best interest and ‘primary consideration’ stipulations in these two codes, 
and where the subject is necessarily exposed to possibly unquantifiable risks, as noted 
earlier, it seems difficult to see this as being with in a framework of best interests.  
Morreim,
376
 argues that the constraints on clinical freedom imposed by adhering to a 
protocol deprives the Investigator of the opportunity to ‘advise’ – an essential element of a 
fiduciary relationship in the USA, and relevant to recovery of damages in the UK.
377
  
Moreover, since research, by definition, is not designed to benefit the individual 
participant, the Investigator cannot be considered as benefiting the patient by enrolling her 
into a research study. 
But what are the patient’s ‘best interests’?  As Wendler indicates, these may not be the best 
‘medical’ interests, but a more holistic appreciation of the patient’s autonomy, e.g., by 
respecting the right of a Jehovah’s Witness to decline a blood transfusion,378 or the right of 
a pregnant woman to accept or decline a particular course of treatment based upon her 
appreciation of the potential impact on the foetus.  The patient’s ability to exercise the right 
to self-determination is based upon a combination of personal beliefs and values and the 
information provided.  The concept of therapeutic exception seems, potentially, to 
compromise the respect of autonomy, but as described above, information is also withheld 
in randomised clinical trials - a situation some have described as unethical.
379
  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, in the two-patient maternal-foetal model, the obligation 
to act in the ’best interests’ of each patient individually will inevitably lead to conflict, and 
the need to choose which patient has primacy; as Wendler demonstrates, this is not a new 
situation for physicians - such choices are required in many settings. 
Given that the option always exists for the subject to withdraw consent, or for the 
Investigator to discontinue the subject should the Investigator consider that to be 
medically-necessary, then the risk of harm is arguably under control.  Provided the subject 
has given valid consent, and was aware that the response to the investigational drug could 
not be foreseen, the Investigator seems unlikely to stand accused of failing in his duties 
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towards a patient.  However, the constraints of a clinical trial are such that the Investigator 
is effectively precluded from discharging the ‘first concern’ or ‘first consideration’ 
behaviours defined in the GMC Guidelines and the Declaration of Helsinki, respectively. 
Miller has argued that the differences between the aims of the researcher and the treating 
physician do not have sufficient significance to justify deviating from the physician’s duty 
to act in the best interests of the patient.
380
  He also posits that,  
“… patients enter relationships with physicians with the reasonable expectation that 
their physicians’ recommendations always will be consistent with, and indeed 
intended to promote, their best interests”.381 
Veatch goes further, suggesting that the duties of physicians of the future will be required 
to promote the ‘best interests’ of the patient as the patient, rather than the physician, sees 
these, due to the increasing ethical demands of patient’s rights including the right to the 
truth and to have autonomy respected.
382
  The courts have wrestled with similar 
situations.
383
 
The Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association states that “Within the patient-
physician relationship, a physician is ethically required to use sound medical judgment, 
holding the best interests of the patient as paramount”.384  The Code also advises that 
“when a physician has treated or continues to treat a patient who is eligible to enrol as a 
subject in a clinical trial that the physician is conducting, the informed consent process 
must differentiate between the physician’s roles as clinician and investigator”,385 a 
construction which suggests that, although information may be drawn from a continuum, 
the response to it may be categorical. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
If the relationship between the trial subject and the Investigator is neither contractual nor 
fiduciary, what is it?  Is clinical research, including clinical trials, a largely utilitarian 
exercise, in which the investigational subjects are merely a means to an end?  Early 
research ethics philosophers such as Jonas
386
 and Donagan
387
 disputed such views of 
clinical research.  Jonas did not accept that the justification for clinical research lay in its 
capacity to advance the common good of the community, or that risks which were not 
offset by benefits to individual trial participants were reasonable only if they were 
sufficiently offset by wider gains in knowledge.
388
  Kant held an essentially similar view: 
because humans are rational beings, each human deserves respect - which means being 
able to set his own goals and being treated as an end in and of himself, and not merely a 
means toward fulfilling others’ goals.389 
The current position in the UK appears to be that the subjects in clinical trials have neither 
fiduciary nor contractual relationships upon which to base their relationship with anyone.  
The only relationship which they seem to have is a common law one with the Investigator. 
In the event that the Investigator is not the subject’s physician, e.g., in a Phase I trial, the 
Investigator’s primary responsibility remains that of conducting research that contributes to 
generalisable knowledge while protecting the rights and welfare of human participants.
390
 
The subject is not the Investigator’s patient, and therefore the Investigator does not bear 
the responsibilities of the physician responsible for the patient’s care.  In that circumstance, 
the Investigator’s responsibility is that of minimising risk to trial subjects, and informing 
the physicians responsible for the subjects’ care of any study emergent findings which may 
require further medical investigation. 
Overall, this seems somewhat unsatisfactory.  These patients are exposing themselves to 
risk, from which they may receive no advantage, for the benefit of other, future patients, 
the Investigator and his employer (who will be paid by the trial sponsor for the work done 
                                                          
386
 Jonas, H. (1969). Philosophical reflections on experimenting with human subjects.  Daedalus, 98, 219–
247. 
387
 Donagan, A. (1977). Informed consent in therapy and experimentation.  J.Med.Phil., 2, 318–329, cited in 
London, A.J. (2007). Two dogmas of research ethics and the integrative approach to human-subjects 
research.  J.Med.Phil., 32, 99–116. 
388
 Jonas, H.  Philosophical Reflections on Human Experimentation.  In: Freund, P.A.  Experimentation with 
Human Subjects.  London: George Allen and Unwin; 1972, at p3. 
389
 Kant, I. Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997.. 
390
 International Conference on Harmonisation, Good Clinical Practice (ICH GCP), para 1.34. 
Chapter 5  The Investigator-Subject Relationship 
93 
 
in support of the trial), and the sponsor (who may reap the rewards of the investment made 
in the development programme should the investigational drug prove successful).  The 
question of a moral duty to participate in research was explored in Chapter 4.4.  However, 
it is unclear whether patients enrolled as trial subjects are aware that the obligation towards 
them, and their foetuses, has moved from that of providing the best care during the trial, 
for one, all or both, depending on the maternal-foetal model, to one of producing 
generalizable information. This change of relationship may be implicit in the consent 
process, but to ensure trial subjects truly understand the implications, perhaps a 
requirement to make this explicit is required.  It is also unclear whether patients are made 
aware of the potential impacts on the scope for recovery of compensation by a child born 
injured (Chapter 7).  Again, an explicit description as part of the consent process may be 
required.  
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Chapter 6 Foetal Protection within the Trial Approval Processes 
6.1 Introduction 
A key aspect of all clinical trials is that of avoiding harm to the participants.  As outlined 
previously, the protection of participants in the clinical trial setting broadly falls into two 
categories, and the overarching question is: to what extent does and should the clinical trial 
process recognise the foetus and provide the same or similar protection?  The first category 
to be considered, and the subject of this chapter, relates to preventing injury to the foetus. 
This concerns the processes which precede the administration of an investigational product 
to a pregnant woman within a clinical trial setting.  It is perhaps more accurately expressed 
as reduction of risk to the foetus as complete prevention is probably unattainable. The 
second category, which will be addressed in the next chapter, relates to the mechanisms by 
which a child born injured following such a trial might recover damages. 
In trials involving pregnant women, potentially two entities will be exposed to an 
investigational drug.  As discussed in Chapter 4, as a society, we have moral duties 
concerning the foetus, and moral duties to the children they will become, such that future 
children should be in our contemplation.  The law has recognised that children born injured 
as a result of harm inflicted in utero have a right to recover compensation, thereby 
recognising that a wrong has been done, and this was addressed in Chapter 2.  The specific 
issue of whether the foetus should be considered as a trial participant is addressed in 
Chapter 6.3.1 and the processes relating to the recovery of compensation in the event of 
trial-related injury will be considered in Chapter 7.  The processes by which clinical trials 
in pregnant women are approved take account of the existence of and minimise the risk of 
harm to the foetus are the subject of this chapter. 
The prevention of harm comprises a number of elements: the review and approval process 
for proposed trials, the pregnant woman’s consent and the implications which arise from 
that, and the legal nature of the Investigator-Subject relationship.  Each of these will be 
considered in turn. 
6.2 The Current Clinical Trial Review and Approval Process 
In the UK, as in most countries, mutually-contingent and independent approvals of clinical 
trials from ethical and technical perspectives are required prior to the commencement of 
any trial-related activities.  The series of conventions developed by countries, regions and 
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regulatory bodies from the late 1980s and intended to set standards for the conduct of 
pharmaceutical clinical trials is generally referred to as Good Clinical Practice (GCP). 
There are several GCP standards around the world, but specific standards evolved in 
Europe,
391
 which culminated in the International Congress on Harmonisation (ICH) 
Guidelines.  These have been in use since 1997, and were developed by European, US and 
Japanese regulators and industries.
392
  The ICH Guidelines define the ethical and scientific 
quality standards for clinical trials,
393
 including chemical stability for the investigational 
drug, preclinical information, and the conduct and reporting of the trials themselves.  ICH 
Guideline E6, which defines GCP, is particularly relevant, having been codified, and other 
Guidelines will be considered in Chapter 6.2.1. 
A common legal framework for conducting clinical trials in the EU and providing a legal 
basis for compliance with GCP was established in 2001 via the Clinical Trials Directive 
(CTD).
394
 transposed into UK law as the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1031; MHU Regulations).
395
  The CTD will be replaced by 
Regulation (EU) No 536/2014),
396
 now due to come into effect in 2018. 
The current clinical trial approval process within the UK, like the CTD, stipulates no 
additional requirements regarding the conduct of clinical trials in pregnant women.  This is 
in contrast to Regulation 536, which introduces requirements regarding trials in pregnant 
women; these will be discussed shortly. 
The CTD created a legal requirement for pharmaceutical clinical trials to be designed, 
conducted, recorded and reported in accordance with GCP.
397
  Although not specifically 
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defined as the GCP standard within the CTD, the obvious standard for European clinical 
trials is ICH Guideline E6.
398
 
A number of additional Directives affecting clinical trials have been introduced by the 
European Commission following the CTD.  The most relevant one to this thesis is the 
Good Clinical Practice (GCP) Directive 2005/28/EC codified by Statutory Instrument 
2006/1928, which strengthens the legal basis for requiring Member States to comply with 
the principles set out in the ICH E6 Guideline.  The GCP Directive also stipulates retention 
periods for specific documents after trial completion by the Ethics Committees, sponsors 
and investigators.  This has particular relevance for clinical trials in pregnant women, 
where iatrogenic injury to the foetus may not manifest in the child for a substantial period 
following the trial, and will be discussed in Chapters 7.2 and 7.3. 
The GCP Directive also requires that all clinical trials must be conducted in accordance 
with the 1996 version of the Declaration of Helsinki, the set of ethical principles regarding 
human experimentation developed for the medical community by the World Medical 
Association.  Although devoid of legal authority, the Declaration of Helsinki is widely 
regarded as the cornerstone document on human research ethics.
399
  This version of the 
Declaration distinguishes between research with potential for therapeutic effect in the 
subjects enrolled and research conducted for the greater good (i.e., the expansion of 
knowledge without the expectation of direct benefit to the subjects enrolled), which is also 
pertinent to the types of trials the regulatory authorities have requested be conducted in 
pregnant women.
400
  Thus, all clinical trials in the UK must be conducted according to the 
ICH E6 Guideline and the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 The approval procedure for clinical trials entails review by the relevant regulatory 
authority (RA) and by a Research Ethics Committee (REC), in both cases appertaining to 
the country in which the trial is intended to be conducted.  Thus, multinational clinical 
trials require both REC and RA approvals from each country under consideration, and the 
roles of these bodies in the UK will next be considered. 
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6.2.1 Regulatory Approval 
The RA for the UK is the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA).  RA approval is currently required if the test article: 
a) is a substance or combination of substances presented as having properties for treating 
or preventing disease in human beings, or 
b) functions as a medicine, i.e., can it be administered to human beings either with a view 
to restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions by exerting a 
pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action or to making a medical diagnosis, 
or 
c) is otherwise administered for a medicinal purpose.401 
Based upon these criteria, clinical trials of new drugs in pregnant women will invariably 
require MHRA approval.  The MHRA assessment is limited to confirmation that the 
technical requirements have been met with regard to the duration of preclinical toxicology 
necessary to underwrite the proposed duration of treatment in humans, and that the 
analytical and stability data for the investigational substance meet the required 
standards.
402
 
The MHRA is charged with undertaking a risk-benefit assessment according to the ICH 
guidelines.
403
  These guidelines, sixty in number, define the quality, safety and efficacy 
requirements for investigational medicinal products.  A number of these guidelines 
specifically address reproductive toxicology,
404
 which is particularly relevant to the 
conduct of clinical trials in pregnant women.  Guideline ICH M3 (R2) states (§11.4) 
“Before the inclusion of pregnant women in clinical trials, all female reproduction toxicity 
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studies [defined in Guideline ICH S5 (R2)] and the standard battery of genotoxicity tests 
[defined in Guideline ICH S2B] should be conducted. In addition, safety data from 
previous human exposure should be evaluated”. 
The note to Guideline ICH S5 (R2) states (§1.1) states: “These guidelines are not 
mandatory rules; they are a starting point rather than an end point”.  In fact, this is the 
status of all the ICH Guidelines, with the exception of ICH E6, which was codified by the 
MHU Regulations 2004. 
The non-mandatory nature of ICH was highlighted by Gøtzsche, from his personal 
experience.
405
  He had requested to know the results of carcinogenicity studies relating to a 
long-term trial in which he was participating; it emerged these studies were being 
undertaken in parallel with the clinical trial of which he was part, and were not available 
when the request was made.  The trial enrolled over 28,000 subjects with a planned 
treatment duration of at least three years before the results of the long term safety studies in 
animals were available.  The sponsor explained that the decision had been taken with full 
agreement by global regulatory agencies based on the toxicology information available at 
that time, despite ICH Guideline S1A recommending that carcinogenicity studies should be 
performed for any pharmaceutical whose expected clinical use was continuous for at least 
six months.
406
 
Thus, it would appear that the MHRA may not be obligated to require sponsors to execute 
the studies defined in the ICH Guidelines prior to approving proposed studies in pregnant 
women if the authority is of the opinion that the risk-benefit assessment is considered 
acceptable, and that such a decision need not be made known to potential trial subjects.  If 
this is correct, it seems to connote potential risks to the foetus: the absence of this 
information, apparently, need not made known to the pregnant woman, who is giving 
consent for her foetus to be exposed to an investigational drug.  In the absence of a duty to 
provide such information, the failure to do so does not constitute a statutory breach, which 
may affect the recovery of compensation in the event a child is born injured.  However, 
given the apparent challenges associated with establishing legal liability of the MHRA, 
which will be described in Chapter 7.7, an injured child’s prospects for recovery of 
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compensation do not appear high.  Few potential subjects would be aware of these 
Guidelines, and if this information is not offered, most subjects would have no reason to 
request it. 
The Authorities have the advantage of access to information not in the public domain 
which is contained within requests to conduct clinical trials relating to investigational 
drugs from many sponsors.  Although the chemical structure of an investigational drug is 
normally patented, chemical structures normally comprise a variety of units, or moieties, 
and these moieties are commonly found across a wide range of drugs.  Certain moieties 
within the structure of an investigational drug may have a suspected association with 
teratogenic or foetotoxic effect when they were contained within the structures of other 
investigational drugs.  Should a new investigational drug contain such a moiety, it is 
unclear whether the RA is under an obligation to disclose such information to sponsors.  It 
seems likely the authority would take such steps as were necessary to minimise the risk, 
either by requesting additional information, or suggesting to the sponsor additional tests 
which the authority considered to be pertinent (these may be the tests conducted by other 
sponsors which disclosed the suspected problem).  However, should the authority fail to do 
this, it is unclear whether, in the event of a child being born injured, the RA would be held 
to have owed a duty to such a child upon which to base an action, because of the lack of a 
duty to disclose such information.  
The reasons the MHRA has for not requiring the conduct of preclinical reproductive 
toxicology studies prior to approving a trial will be based upon a thorough, scientific 
risk:benefit analysis.  This analysis may not be readily amenable to simplification 
sufficient for comprehension by an ‘average’ trial subject.  So the inclusion these reasons 
may be of little relevance to the consent process, which will be discussed later in the 
chapter.  However, consideration may be given to a system whereby the MHRA is required 
to document those reasons as part of a Registry of clinical trials in this population, which 
will be explained in Chapter 8. 
The MHRA website contains reference to seven teratogenic substances, all widely-known 
from the published literature.
407
  The reproductive toxicology reports submitted by 
manufacturers within the Marketing Authorisation Application for a new drug contain a 
plethora of additional information which, being commercially-sensitive, is not normally 
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available under freedom of information legislation.  Consideration should be given to a 
requirement for manufacturers to identify the moiety within the structure, rather than the 
structure itself, suspected of being the cause of such effects, and for those moieties to be 
assembled by the European Medicines Agency (see Chapter 1.1) into a publically-
accessible database.  Again, this is unlikely to be of direct relevance to potential study 
participants as part of the consent process, but the construction and maintenance of such a 
database may guide approvals for future investigational drugs, and be relevant in claims for 
damages. 
6.2.2 Ethics Approval - the Research Ethics Committees 
Currently over 80 RECs operate in the UK, comprising up to 18 members, one-third of 
whom are lay.
408
  National approval from a single REC is applicable to the whole of the 
UK, with additional approvals from NHS Research and Development (R&D) Committees 
at either a hospital or district level throughout the UK.
409
  Thus, a degree of local control is 
still exercised which should ensure that hospitals involved in clinical trials have the 
appropriate levels of resource to ensure subject safety and that resources are not 
preferentially diverted from non-study patients. 
Historical examples demonstrate both the need for some means of ensuring that research 
participants are not mistreated and that regulatory frameworks alone do not always achieve 
this.
410
  The best known illustrations are the Nazi
411
 and Japanese
412
 experiments during 
World War II; the Nuremberg Code of 1947
413
 resulted from the Nazi atrocities.  Post-war 
examples are generally less well-known and mostly involve the USA,
414
 although reports 
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suggest that unethical trials may still be conducted in many, particularly third-world, 
countries.
415
  In the UK, few examples of clinical trials subsequently considered as 
ethically questionable have emerged, although the conduct of clinical research more 
broadly has been criticised.
416
  The behaviour of a small number of Investigators has 
resulted in appearances before the Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical Council 
(GMC), but these arguably represent individual failings rather than any attempt to execute 
an ‘improper’ clinical trial.417 
In the UK, the MHU Regulations 2004 placed RECs in the UK on a statutory basis for the 
first time.  In common with many other member states in the EU, prior to the 
implementation of the MHU Regulations 2004, as a matter of law, it was not a legal 
requirement that all clinical research should be subject to prior ethical review.  The role of 
the RECs in the UK is not to consider the quality of the science underlying the proposed 
trial (the province of the MHRA), nor of enforcing legislative compliance, but of ensuring 
that the proposed trial is ethically sound, safeguarding the rights, safety, dignity and well-
being of research participants (independently of research sponsors), and assessing the 
balance between individual risks and benefits.
418
  In short, the primary duty of RECs is to 
ensure that unavoidable risks are reasonable.
419
 
As part of the assessment of the ethical aspects of any clinical trial, the REC will wish to 
review all patient-oriented materials, including the information provided, the consent form, 
and any diaries or questionnaires which will be used.  Consideration had previously been 
given to information disclosure and consent concerning research involving the foetus in the 
Polkinghorne Report (see Chapter 1.3), which stated: “The written consent of the mother 
must be obtained before any research or therapy involving the foetus or foetal tissue takes 
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place.  Sufficient explanation should be offered to make the act of consent valid”.420 In the 
event that no data, either preclinical or clinical in nature, is available regarding experience 
of the investigational drug in pregnancy, that fact would routinely be included in both the 
information provided and the consent document.  Whether a REC would consider 
approving a clinical trial in pregnant women in the absence of preclinical information is 
open to question, but there appears to be no legal impediment to the REC doing so.  
Analogous to the situation described above regarding the MHRA approval of clinical trials 
in the absence of ICH-specified information, this again suggests potential risk to the foetus; 
how many potential trial participants would be aware that the conduct of such studies was 
described in these Guidelines, and the relevance of the absence of such information?  
Given the apparent immunity to suit of the RECs which will be described in the next 
chapter, an injured child’s prospects for recovery of compensation do not appear high here 
either. 
The REC will require assurance that the trial sponsor holds appropriate levels of insurance 
to meet the potential need to compensate subjects for trial-related injury.  This will be 
affected by the introduction of Regulation 536, which requires the creation of a national 
system for providing compensation in the event of trial-related injury.
421
  The REC is also 
required to ensure that payments to Investigators and NHS Trusts are reasonable and 
proportionate to the work involved,
422
 which should ensure that resources are not diverted 
inappropriately from non-trial subjects, therefore ensuring that distributive justice is done. 
Thus, the regulatory and ethics requirements provide complementary approaches intended 
to protect the interests of subjects recruited for clinical research purposes, and those of 
society by ensuring that investigational drugs are developed in a manner which supports 
reliance on trial data to establish whether such drugs merit approval.  It would appear that 
both bodies may approve trials in the absence of information called for in relevant 
Guidelines without documenting their reasons for doing so.  As will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, neither appears to owe a duty of care to trial participants which would allow 
injured subjects to recover compensation in the event of injury.  This situation applies to all 
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trial subjects, of course, but the implications which arise from this situation in trials 
involving pregnant women are clearly somewhat different.  
6.3 The Future Ethics Process: Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 
The CTD has been much-criticised,
423
 and following consultation the European Parliament 
Council enacted Regulation 536, which will replace the CTD.  This includes a number of 
specific requirements relating to the REC assessment of clinical studies in pregnant 
women:
424
  The first, contained in the introductory part of Regulation 536 sets out a 
number of requirements, including: the need for specialist expertise in the assessment of 
clinical trials by the REC (§19), for specific protection measures (§27), and for specific 
provisions for the protection of pregnant and breastfeeding women participating in clinical 
trials and in particular when the clinical trial does not have the potential to produce results 
of direct benefit to her or to her embryo, foetus or child after birth (§34).  These sections 
stipulate the same requirements for minors and incapacitated subjects. 
Article 10 (Specific considerations for vulnerable populations) and Annex 1B7 
(administrative requirements) also groups together the same three populations (paediatric; 
incapacitated; pregnant or breastfeeding women). 
Article 33 is devoted entirely to clinical trials involving pregnant or breastfeeding women, 
and stipulates: 
“A clinical trial on pregnant or breastfeeding women may be conducted only where 
…. the following conditions are met: 
(a) the clinical trial has the potential to produce a direct benefit for the pregnant or 
breastfeeding woman concerned, or her embryo, foetus or child after birth, 
outweighing the risks and burdens involved; or 
(b) if such a clinical trial has no direct benefit for the pregnant or breastfeeding 
woman concerned, or her embryo, foetus or child after birth, it can be conducted 
only if: 
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(i) a clinical trial of comparable effectiveness cannot be carried out on 
women who are not pregnant or breastfeeding; 
(ii) the clinical trial contributes to the attainment of results capable of 
benefitting pregnant or breastfeeding women or other women in relation to 
reproduction or other embryos, foetuses or children; and 
(iii) the clinical trial poses a minimal risk to, and imposes a minimal burden 
on, the pregnant or breastfeeding woman concerned, her embryo, foetus or 
child after birth; 
(c) where research is undertaken on breastfeeding women, particular care is taken 
to avoid any adverse impact on the health of the child; and 
(d) no incentives or financial inducements are given to the subject except for 
compensation for expenses and loss of earnings directly related to the participation 
in the clinical trial.” 
The new EU Regulation should also address concerns regarding the adequacy of insurance 
coverage, as it charges member states with ensuring “…systems for compensation for any 
damage suffered by a subject resulting from participation in a clinical trial conducted on 
their territory are in place in the form of insurance, a guarantee, or a similar 
arrangement…”.425 Member states will be required to demonstrate proof of insurance cover 
or indemnification,
426
 by, for example, making clinical trials a compulsory class of 
insurance or by setting up a national insurance pool.  The method of funding this provision 
is not specified, but a system of user fees might be the most equitable approach, with 
sponsors who conduct more trials and so, perhaps, creating the greater risk making greater 
contributions to the ‘pot’.  However, the response to this requirement in Spain (see Chapter 
8.4.1) suggests some countries may be concerned by the potential costs of such a scheme.  
Following a 50-year period during which the intentional testing of potential new medicines 
in this population was practically unknown, and given the aims of both the major Agencies 
to collect data in this population (see Chapter 1.1), the specific recognition of this group is 
to be welcomed.  The essence of the argument presented in Chapter 4 is that the holistic, 
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maternal-foetal dyad is the most appropriate model to apply in the clinical trial setting, 
with the pregnant woman making decisions regarding accepting or declining treatment, 
which inevitably impact the foetus.  The additional requirements for approval of studies in 
pregnant women introduced by Regulation 536 create a greater level of protection for the 
foetus than was the case previously, but also raise a number of issues concerning foetal 
status and the pregnant woman’s rights which warrant further consideration. 
6.3.1 Who is/are the Research Subject(s)? 
Article 33(a) requires “direct benefit for the pregnant or breastfeeding woman concerned, 
or her embryo, foetus or child after birth”, which might be taken to imply that the research 
subject could be one or more of the entities listed, although the use of the possessive ‘her’ 
might suggest that the embryo, foetus and child after birth are not considered to be research 
subjects in their own right, but derivatively from the pregnant woman.  The research 
subject has generally been considered in a one-patient model as the individual to whom the 
investigational drug is administered, and from whom data are collected.  In most 
circumstances this would be the case, but as discussed in Chapter 4, a ‘one-patient’ model 
is not easily applicable to trials in pregnant women which may result in foetal exposure to 
the drug or its effects; even if the drug cannot cross the placenta, the pharmacological 
effects produced in the pregnant woman may indirectly affect the foetus.  Although the 
requests from the Agencies relate to the way in which investigational drugs are handled 
within the bodies of pregnant women, the evaluation of the effects on the foetus would 
seem likely to be a secondary objective of all such trials; for example, it is not easy to 
conceive of trials in which the monitoring of foetal heart rate or the progression of 
pregnancy, to establish safety information, would not be standard.  Given that the foetus 
will be exposed to the investigational drug or its effects, its potential harm but also benefit, 
and will provide information which will be relevant to the drug under investigation, why 
would the foetus not be considered as a trial participant? 
The definition of a subject proposed in cluster randomised trials, in which the identity of 
the trial subject may vary depending on the study design, population, or intervention under 
investigation,
427
 seems apposite (emphasis added): “an individual whose interests may be 
compromised as a result of interventions in a research study”.  This terminology is similar 
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to that used by Steinbock when considering the moral standing of the foetus (see Chapter 
4.4.1).  Although the foetus may not be considered as an ‘individual’, it is certainly 
conceivable that its interests may be ‘set back’ as a consequence of any drug given to a 
pregnant woman, regardless of whether or not she is participating in a clinical trial, which, 
in the absence of an intent to terminate the pregnancy, would, in the view of some 
commentators, confer a greater moral standing upon the foetus. 
Of course, not all investigational drugs will cross the placenta, and the pharmacological 
action on the mother may not impact the foetus indirectly, therefore the foetus may not be 
exposed to the investigational drug, or its effects.  However, data are likely still to be 
collected from and regarding the foetus, even if just to prove those points.  If the foetus 
appears to be responding adversely to or following the investigational drug, it seems likely 
that the Investigator would take steps, or discuss with the pregnant woman the need to take 
steps, to manage the situation - just as would happen in any other clinical trial. 
Taken together, the potential foetal exposure to the investigational drug or its effects on the 
pregnant woman, systematic data collection and medical response to adverse reaction are 
all suggestive of the foetus being de facto a trial participant. 
6.3.2 The Requirement for Specific Expertise 
The purpose of the ‘specific expertise’, which broadly requires scrutiny of the trial as part 
of the approval process by experts with some specific knowledge of the population, is not 
explained in the Regulation, and no guidance appears to have been issued regarding this.  
Article 10 (Specific Considerations for Vulnerable Populations) defines the basis upon 
which applications to conduct trials in these populations are to be assessed: 
 pediatrics: “… paediatric expertise or after taking advice on clinical, ethical and 
psychosocial problems in the field of paediatrics”; 
 the incapacitated: “… expertise in the relevant disease and the patient population 
concerned or after taking advice on clinical, ethical and psychosocial questions in the 
field of the relevant disease and the patient population concerned”;  
 pregnant women: “… expertise in the relevant condition and the population represented 
by the subject concerned”. 
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The last is a less structured definition than the other categories.  The expertise relates to the 
condition, but is that the condition from which the pregnant woman suffers or is it the 
condition of being pregnant?  Does the subject represent the population of pregnant 
women, or pregnant women with the target disease, or those with the target disease 
regardless of pregnancy?  If the trial under consideration is a Phase I pharmacokinetic 
study, one might consider expertise in clinical pharmacology rather than pregnancy to be 
the more useful expertise from one perspective, but the assessment of foetal safety may 
require obstetric expertise.  Nevertheless, as we embark upon systematic studies in 
pregnant women for the first time, the requirement for specific expertise, however that may 
be construed, is to be welcomed, as it would be for any other patient group in the same 
situation. 
The requirement for specific expertise indicates the presence of additional factors or 
considerations relating to these populations which differentiate them from the typical adult 
trial subject, i.e., that these are departures from the norm that justify special consideration. 
The next section will consider the extent to which additional factors are, or might be 
present, to justify clinical trials in pregnant women requiring additional consideration to 
those with the general population. 
6.3.3 Pregnant women and foetuses as ‘vulnerable populations’ 
§§19 and 27, Article 10 and Annex 1B7 all identify the same populations - minors, the 
incapacitated and pregnant women - to be subject to additional conditions for conducting 
trials.  As Table 1 illustrates, the specific articles dealing with these populations define 
identical conditions. 
The reference to pregnant women as a vulnerable population under Article 10 is 
perplexing.  The only other reference to a ‘vulnerable population’ in the Regulation 
appears in §15, which gives the examples of “frail or older people, people suffering from 
multiple chronic conditions, and people affected by mental health disorders”, but does not 
include minors, the incapacitated or pregnant women.  Yet these three groups are 
categorised as special - and, under Article 10, vulnerable - populations.  The Regulation 
thus lacks consistency in its reference to and categorisation of vulnerable populations 
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Table 1: Specific considerations in Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 for the conduct of 
clinical trials in pregnant women, minors and the incapacitated adults. 
Population  
Pregnant 
Women 
Minors 
Incapacitated 
Adults 
Additional Conditions  Art. 33 Art. 32 Art. 31 
Direct potential benefit to subject (a) 1(g)(1) 1(g)(1) 
Clinical trial of comparable effectiveness cannot 
be carried out on those not in this population 
(b)(i) 1(e) 1(e) 
No direct benefit to subjects, but potential benefit 
to others from the same population 
(b)(ii) 1(f) 1(g)(ii) 
Study imposes minimal risk and minimal burden (b)(iii) 1(g)(i) 1(g)(ii) 
No incentives or financial inducements are given 
to the subject 
(d) 1(g)(ii) 1(d) 
 
A common denominator for the three groups defined as ‘special populations’ is not 
obvious.  It is not a lack of capacity to consent; the Regulation contains a stipulation for 
consent from the legally designated representative of minor and incapacitated subjects, but 
does not do so for pregnant women, confirming that pregnant women as a population are 
considered to have capacity to consent.  If the rationale relates to the prospect that drugs 
will be handled differently by the body, that would potentially include the “frail or older 
people, people suffering from multiple chronic conditions” listed in §15, much of the 
paediatric population, and, as explained in Chapter 1.4, pregnant women, but would not 
generally apply to the incapacitated (Article 31) or “people affected by mental health 
disorders” (§15), and many other conditions will alter the pharmacokinetics of drugs in 
addition to the ones listed here. 
One possibility is that the Regulation is bringing together, albeit imperfectly, those groups 
of patients who are considered as being vulnerable to exploitation, which would certainly 
include the incapax, minors, the frail and elderly, and - potentially - pregnant women 
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(discussed later in Chapter 6.4.3).
428
  The FDA considers all pregnant women as 
vulnerable.
429
  CIOMS
430
 describes the vulnerable are “Those who are relatively (or 
absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests” as a result of “insufficient power, 
intelligence, education, resources, strength or other needed attributes.”  This may, of 
course, be the case for some, but clearly not for all, pregnant women; the CIOMS 
Guideline explicitly supports the inclusion of pregnant women in clinical research, and 
does not categorise them as a vulnerable group.
431
  This is consistent with the position 
taken by Beauchamp and Childress in their standard work: pregnant women as a class are 
not vulnerable, although some members of that class may be.
432
  This interpretation is 
shared by others,
433
 one author describing the portrayal of pregnant women as vulnerable 
as ‘stereotyping and insulting’.434  In the UK, the legal definition of ‘vulnerable’ varies 
with circumstances; the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, for example, defines a 
vulnerable adult in section 59(1)(d) as someone who is receiving any form of health care, 
which, arguably, could encompass all clinical trial participants.. 
However, if exploitation is the unifying concept amongst all the groups of patients 
identified in this regard in Regulation 536, the reason for including pregnant women may 
lie elsewhere: trials in pregnant women may be deemed to benefit from specific expertise 
as part of protecting the (future) interests of the foetus.  As explained in Chapter 4, 
although lacking legal personality, the foetus is regarded as having ‘interests’ which 
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become vested at birth,
435
 one of which is being born uninjured.  Like minors and 
incapacitated adults, the foetus cannot represent its own present and future interests.  The 
foetus is, so far as we know, unable to form an opinion, and so the decision to participate 
cannot be made on the same basis, i.e., presumed will, as would be the case for minors or 
the incapax.  The Regulation creates provision for minors and incapacitated adults to be 
‘represented’ by a relative or a close friend,436as did the CTD.437  In the absence of a 
similar provision, it can be inferred that the ‘representative’ for the foetus must be intended 
to be the pregnant woman.  This would seem reasonable; who else could it be, unless the 
pregnant woman is a minor or incapacitated, in which case alternate provisions would take 
effect? If this interpretation is correct, the Regulation is, arguably, creating a consistency 
across populations, including the foetus, unable to represent themselves, by requiring 
specific expertise to be brought to bear during the approval process.  As a corollary, this 
would denote an implicit ‘two-patient’ model within Regulation 536. 
The risks to the foetus may constitute an additional consideration regarding the overall 
safety of the trial, hence the need for ‘specific expertise’ when reviewing trials in this 
population.  Pregnancy might pose additional risks to women, although the same would be 
true of a variety of conditions for which special expertise is not, apparently, required.  It is 
tempting to suggest that, although many other circumstances which might make people 
vulnerable could have been included in §19, they are too varied to constitute a 
‘population’, whereas defining populations such as minors, incapacitated adults and 
pregnant women as in Article 10 is more straightforward. 
The interpretation above does not promulgate the notion that pregnant women per se are 
vulnerable in the sense of lacking decisional capacity; it supports and reinforces the 
autonomy of pregnant women to volunteer to participate in clinical trials as any competent 
adult could do, but only trials which have been approved after ‘specific expertise’ has been 
obtained, and the decision made, presumably, that foetal interests are not likely to be 
significantly adversely impacted by the trial.  That said, this construction does not take 
account of the fact that embryos/foetuses are not specifically mentioned in §10 or §19, nor 
in Article 10, although it may be argued they are included by default once pregnant women 
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are included as a population, and they are mentioned specifically in respect of assessment 
of potential benefits in Article 33 and §34. 
The conceptual disadvantage of this construction is that, in contrast to the situation which 
would obtain for any other competent adult, potentially, the trials which are approved for 
pregnant women have already made an assessment of the potential risks to another entity - 
the foetus - and as a result restricted the studies in which pregnant women may participate.  
Again, this is indicative of a ‘two-patient’ model.  The implications of this will be 
considered next. 
6.3.4 RECs and Maternal-Foetal Models 
If the foregoing is a correct interpretation, it leads to some intriguing implications 
regarding the maternal-foetal models.  Clearly, the Regulation does not recognise the ‘one-
patient’ model, in which the foetus is effectively disregarded.  The absence of any change 
of the consent requirement (the consent of the pregnant woman alone is sufficient) is 
perhaps more supportive of the maternal-foetal dyad model than the ‘two-patient’ one, in 
that the decision-making remains exclusively with the pregnant woman, rather than any 
third party who might be identified to represent the foetus’ interests, given that the foetus, 
clearly, cannot consent, and that pregnant women may be considered as having conflicts of 
interests when ascribing moral worth to the foetus (see Chapter 4.2). 
However, if, as suggested above, one of the considerations of the REC is that foetal 
interests should not be adversely affected by the trial, this indicates a recognition of the 
two-patient model; the foetus is ‘not nothing’ and has interests separate from those of the 
pregnant woman, which may be affected by the trial.
438
  Article 33(b) addresses clinical 
trials which have no direct benefit for the pregnant woman or her embryo, foetus or child 
after birth, and stipulates at (b)(iii) that such trials may be conducted only if they pose “a 
minimal risk to, and imposes a minimal burden on, the pregnant … woman concerned, her 
embryo, foetus or child after birth”.  Thus, it would appear that the RECs may be obliged 
to decline to approve a clinical trial which could generate information beneficial to 
pregnant women, because of the potential risk to the foetus.  It also appears that, in contrast 
to trials involving non-pregnant competent adults, the voluntary burden pregnant women 
are permitted to carry may be limited by the REC.  If this is the case, in effect the 
Regulation is recognising the ‘two-patient’ model, and requires potential benefits to one 
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population to be subordinated to the risks of another, despite the foetus’ lack of legal 
personality and the recognised autonomy of pregnant women.  If this analysis is correct, 
then, arguably, the autonomy of pregnant women to participate in clinical trials is 
compromised because they are pregnant - but is that really a fair conclusion? 
For reasons of commercial confidentiality, RECs rarely publish their decisions or the 
reasons for them, but it takes relatively little imagination to conceive of clinical research 
which could provide information which would be medically useful, but only by using 
methods which would be ethically unacceptable.  Knowledge, although important, may be 
less important to a civilised society than the way in which it is obtained, and in entrusting 
such decisions to the RECs, we all are deemed to accept that our individual autonomy may 
be compromised for the sake of relational autonomy - our relationship with the rest of 
society.  For this reason, any individual’s freedom to take part in clinical trials is 
subordinated to the need to ensure that trials are considered to be ethically acceptable. 
Under the CTD, the condition upon which the legal representative of an incapacitated adult 
or a minor may give permission for their inclusion in a trial was that it represented the 
subject’s presumed will.  This condition is absent in the Regulation,439 suggesting the view 
may have been taken that the legal representative, however well-intentioned, might not 
accurately represent the subject’s presumed will, despite, in the case of minors, that 
representative usually being one or both parents.  There are considerable difficulties in 
determining the presumed will of another, even where evidence of past views and wishes is 
available.  In the absence of clear evidence that the individual has ever been able to turn his 
or her mind to the kinds of matters under consideration, these difficulties are profound and 
this would clearly be the case with a foetus.  Nevertheless, additional safeguards to protect 
special groups are in place and these will have been considered before the person who is 
legally empowered to make the decision is asked to give consent, be that a minor’s 
representative, an incapacitated person’s representative, or the pregnant woman.  So, if the 
earlier construction regarding the classification of the foetus as the vulnerable entity is 
correct, or at least that the risk to the foetus is an important factor, it suggests that, without 
explaining the premise upon which the decision has been reached, the European legislators 
have concluded (a) that the foetus deserves similar consideration in this respect as those 
with legal personality who are unable to consent for themselves, (b) that a common 
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standard of ethics review will be applied to all these categories, and (c) the REC may limit 
the pregnant woman’s choice more than any other competent adult to participate in a 
clinical trial.  In doing so, this reduces the sovereignty of pregnant women to make 
decisions which impact their foetuses, and applies a prospective judgment regarding the 
balance of interests between a pregnant woman and her foetus. 
The approach taken in Regulation 536 seems akin to the policy decision underlying the 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act (1976), which allowed children born injured to 
recover damages for injuries suffered in utero without attempting to resolve the apparent 
contradiction of the harmful behaviour taking place before the children had legal 
personality, and that no duty of care can be owed to a foetus; this is discussed further in 
Chapter 7.  Regulation 536 similarly avoids resolving that issue by stipulating that if the 
potential risk to the foetus, or the burden upon the pregnant woman, is considered to be 
more than minimal (Article 33(b)(iii), it may constitute a basis upon which to refuse 
approval for a non-beneficial clinical trial to proceed.  Under the ‘dyad’ model described in 
Chapter 4.4, the autonomy of the pregnant woman is unfettered; she decides the burden she 
will carry, and the extent of risk to which she is willing to expose her foetus.  The 
European Commission, through Regulation 536, is effectively recognising a ‘two-patient’ 
model, and empowering the RECs to make the types of decisions which, under the ‘dyad’ 
model, the pregnant woman would make.  The foetus seems to be considered as a trial 
participant in its own right, whose interests need to be protected; this will be examined 
shortly.  Every section of Article 33 (Clinical trials on pregnant or breastfeeding women) 
which makes specific reference to pregnant women also makes specific reference to the 
foetus, perhaps suggesting that the two are considered as equivalent. 
This aspect of Regulation 536 appears to offer a more consistent level of protection for the 
foetus than might be the case were the decisions to be left in the hands of individual RECs, 
Investigators and pregnant women, and from that perspective is also to be welcomed.  
Clinical trials in this population will certainly be seen as ‘sensitive’; children will 
inevitably be born with injuries following but not necessarily related to such trials, which 
probably will elicit calls for such trials to cease.  This would have the paradoxical, 
undesirable effect of increasing the risk of future iatrogenic injuries to both pregnant 
women and foetuses.  The more that can be done to reduce weaknesses in the approval 
system for such trials, of which inconsistency would be one, the greater the prospect that 
calls for such trials to cease can be resisted. 
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If the foregoing analysis is correct, the criteria defined within Regulation must reduce the 
autonomy of pregnant women who volunteer to participate in such trials, and they may be 
seen as paternalistic. Pregnant women will be free to participate in trials which the RECs 
have considered meet the criteria defined in the Regulation, but they will never become 
aware of trials the RECs considered as unacceptable, so they will be oblivious to their 
autonomy having been compromised.  The requirement for ‘specific expertise’ indicates 
that such trials raise complexities which the RECs would not usually face, so if the 
experienced members of RECs are deemed to require assistance, how much more difficult 
might it be to explain such complexities to the target population in such a way as to ensure 
consistency whilst maintaining ethically-acceptable levels of risk to which the foetus can 
be exposed?  None of this is attractive, but more acceptable alternatives seem difficult to 
define, in a sense similar to the current position regarding pregnant women who drink to 
excess. (see Chapter 3.5).  Perhaps like other situations involving the foetus, the ‘least 
detrimental option’ may be the best one, in this case the compromised autonomy of 
pregnant women. 
6.3.5 Studies with no therapeutic benefit to the study population 
The second issue raised by the parts of the Regulation specific to pregnant women relates 
to the study designs which, implicitly, are being contemplated.  Article 33(b) permits the 
conduct of studies offering no therapeutic benefit, which represents a significant change in 
stance.  As explained in Chapter 1, as part of the FDA-mandated exclusion of women of 
child-bearing potential from early-phase, i.e., Phases I and II, clinical trials in 1977, on the 
grounds that such trials held no prospect of benefit for the participants,
440
 a specific and 
narrow exemption was made for clinical trials in women with life-threatening conditions, 
i.e., a population in which a therapeutic benefit was sought for the most critical conditions. 
As explained in Chapter 1.3, no requirement or incentive existed in the UK to encourage 
the conduct of such trials.  This new provision indicates that Phase I trials to assess the 
pharmacokinetics of investigational drugs are now considered legitimate in this population 
in a wider range of circumstances, albeit with the safeguard provided within Article 
33(b)(iii), discussed above.  A clinical trial of this type revealed the inadequacy of the 
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advice relating to anthrax prophylaxis;
441
 the pregnant women enrolled to this study were 
healthy - they did not have anthrax.  The new position is also consistent with the 1996 
version of the Declaration of Helsinki, described earlier in this Chapter.  The Regulation 
thus appears to have constructed a way to enable non-therapeutic studies to be undertaken 
in accordance with the ethical standards defined in the Declaration of Helsinki which will 
minimise the risk of harm to the foetus, albeit at the expense, to a degree, of the pregnant 
woman’s autonomy. 
6.4 Consent and Related Matters 
In legal and ethical terms, the consent of an individual to participation in research is 
fundamental and there are few exceptions to this ’golden rule’.  The requirement derives 
from the principle of autonomy, one of the pillars of medical ethics (autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and equality) described by Beauchamp and Childress.
442
  
The intent of the consent process is to ensure the patient or subject understands the 
purpose, benefits, risks, and other options regarding the treatment or the clinical trial.  The 
assumption underpinning the doctrine of consent is that the process protects the rights, 
welfare and autonomy of individuals to make free and informed choices; it respects the 
patients’ rights of self-determination, although O'Neill adopts a different perspective, 
suggesting that the function of consent is to limit deception or coercion.
443
  Despite 
ostensible resemblances in the issues raised, consent in the research setting has developed 
quite distinctly from consent for conventional treatment.  In the UK, the latter is largely a 
product of common law, with some later statutory modifications.  Consent to research has 
been shaped by professional codes, statutes and administrative regulations, with the courts 
playing, until now, a less formative role. 
Issues relating to consent may arise, broadly, in two contexts.  The first is the absence of 
consent.  In conventional medicine, failure to obtain consent could give rise to civil claims 
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for damages, for example, on the basis of assault and battery, or trespass to the person,
444
 
and although untested in a UK court, there seems no reason to suggest this would not be 
the same in a research setting.  Consent must be obtained from subjects prior to the 
conduct of any protocol-defined procedures not constituting normal medical care or 
investigation, including the collection of additional information.  In the UK, failure to 
adhere to the principles of GCP, including these requirements for consent, constitutes a 
criminal offence under MHU 2004,
445
 the penalties for which include a fine and 
imprisonment. 
The second context relates to the adequacy of the consent process, and in particular the 
information provided to the patient.  Valid consent is predicated upon the adequacy of the 
information provided, with insufficient or inaccurate information providing the grounds for 
an action in negligence should anything untoward occur.  For many years the standard for 
adequacy was that defined in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee,
446
 based 
on the Scottish case of Hunter v Hanley,
447
 and was that which a reasonable doctor, as 
adjudged by a responsible body of medical opinion, would provide, i.e., the information 
the medical profession considered appropriate for a patient to know.  One of the issues 
physicians were duty bound to consider, according to Lord Scarman, was whether the 
patient’s best interests were served by withholding certain information - the notion of 
therapeutic privilege.
448
 Over succeeding years, Bolam was followed in many cases, 
although not without challenges, perhaps the most compelling of which were those in 
Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital
449
 and  Pearce v United 
Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust.
450
 
In his dissenting judgment in Sidaway, Lord Scarman argued that the Bolam test should 
not be applied to the matter of consent; his opinion was that a physician should have a duty 
to inform the patient of the inherent and material risk of the treatment proposed to enable 
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an objective, reasonable, prudent patient to decide whether to proceed.
451
  In Pearce, Lord 
Woolf MR, whilst applying Bolam, endorsed the ‘prudent patient’ standard described by 
Lord Scarman, although he concluded that the plaintiff in that case would have proceeded 
with the operation even had she been aware of the risk which subsequently materialised.
452
 
The year before Pearce, in Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority
453
 the once-
unthinkable question had been raised of whether that responsible body of opinion relied 
upon under Bolam might, in some cases, be neither reasonable nor responsible, and 
concluded that could - rarely - occur.  In Birch v University College London Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust,
454
 the court held that the duty to inform a patient of the risk of a 
particular procedure was sometimes discharged only if the patient was also made aware of 
an alternative procedure with fewer or no associated risks.  The standard was moving to 
one of provision of information which a reasonable, prudent patient would expect, largely 
on the premise of patient autonomy.
455
  In Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board
456
 this 
movement progressed further, the Supreme Court holding that physicians were required to 
discuss all relevant options for treatment and associated risks with their patients, including 
those arising from the option of no treatment.  The concept of therapeutic privilege 
remained, Lord Kerr warning that its use was “ 
not intended to subvert that principle (of the patient being provided with all the 
information he or she considered necessary to make the decision to proceed) by 
enabling the doctor to prevent the patient from making an informed choice which 
the doctor considers to be contrary to her best interests.”457 
The test of materiality was whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient's position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, 
or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to 
attach significance to it.  The court also recognised that a patient could exercise a right not 
to receive such information.  By reaching their judgment, the court brought the law on 
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consent in a conventional medical setting in line with the professional standard defined by 
the General Medical Council.
458
 
In a conventional medical setting, while the patient’s understanding should be facilitated, 
there is no legal duty on physicians to try to persuade patients to accept treatment,
459
 and 
some have argued that the physician’s duty should be limited to providing information 
rather than advice.
460
  Others consider that “…such an approach reduces the professional to 
a technician and undermines his or her role responsibility as beneficent healer”.461  
However, the key to this apparent impasse surely lies in the judgment in Montgomery: 
 “Most decisions about medical care are not simple yes/no answers. There are 
choices to be made, arguments for and against each of the options to be considered, 
and sufficient information must be given so that this can be done”.462 
The physician’s greatest service to the patient is to provide sufficient information for the 
patient’s needs such that the doctor is not acting negligently and giving due protection to 
the patient's right of autonomy
463
 - the essence of consent. 
6.4.1 Consent in Clinical Trials 
The vast majority of clinical trials entail administering the investigational drug (or placebo 
or comparator agent) to each subject, and monitoring the sequalae.  If the subject has 
capacity, the subject gives consent prior to the conduct of any trial-specific procedures.  If 
the subject lacks capacity, then the MHU Regulations 2004 stipulate the classes of person 
who may give permission for the trial to proceed (legal representative or, in the case of a 
minor, a parent), and the basis upon which they do so (that the decision represents the 
presumed will of the subject).
464
  In either case, in the event of injury, established pathways 
exist by which compensation may be recovered. 
Reliable evidence that a consent process has been correctly followed and consent properly 
obtained is stipulated within the MHU Regulations 2004, which define consent as a 
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‘decision which must be written’ (Article 2(j)), except in ‘exceptional cases as provided for 
in national legislation’ (Article 3.2(d)).  This absolute requirement for documented 
(normally by dated signature) subject consent prior to enrolling in a clinical trial seems 
likely to provide a deterrent to subjects being included into clinical trials unknowingly, i.e., 
to reduce the prospect of the first issue described above arising - the absence of consent.  
However, clinical trials may be more susceptible than conventional medicine to the second 
issue - the adequacy of the consent process. 
Most commentators consider that the subject’s rights regarding provision of information 
are greater in the research setting.  In the UK, the move towards a ‘prudent subject’ 
standard had begun before Chester and Birch,
465
 but once again, the USA took the lead.  In 
1991, the Department of Health and Human Services issued the Common Rule, one part of 
which specified the elements of information which had to be provided to a subject (or legal 
representative) participating in research.
466
 These included a description of the objective(s) 
of the research, foreseeable risks and benefits to participants and others, provision for 
compensation in the event of injury, and reasonable alternatives, where relevant.  In 1995, 
the ICH version of GCP
467
 (later captured as ICH Guideline E6, subsequently codified in 
the CTD and the GCP Directive) expanded this list to encompass a further twelve elements 
to be included in consent forms used for clinical trials.  Consequently, RECs will and do 
expect consent forms to comply with these requirements.  Should a research case come 
before the courts in the UK, it would seem likely that the assessment of ‘sufficiency’ 
would be based upon the requirements stipulated in the MHU Regulations 2004 and also in 
the light of the judgment in Montgomery, i.e., the information must be sufficient to enable 
the particular subject to choose which risks to undertake in a manner reflecting the 
subject’s autonomy and ability to determine his or her own life course.  It would seem 
unreasonable to set a lower standard of information provision to those volunteering for 
research intended to benefit others than to those receiving conventional medical treatment 
which will benefit themselves. 
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A number of studies have examined the difficulties experienced by trial participants in 
relation to the concepts, terminology and design of clinical trials.
468
  For many years, 
consent documents have been subjected to review and re-assessment by commentators and 
researchers, many concluding that they contain significant shortcomings, resulting in poor 
participant understanding of the research processes, and a lack of knowledge regarding the 
expectations and demands of trials.
469
  The areas of poor understanding which feature most 
commonly include potential risks and the probabilities of particular risks actually 
occurring, the concept of randomisation resulting in therapeutic misconception (a mistaken 
belief that subjects will receive whichever treatment was best suited to them), benefits to 
participants and provision for compensation.
470
 These documents are often long, and 
employ complex, quasi-legal language.
471
  Proof of comprehension by trial subjects is not 
required and rarely obtained.
472
  Considering the functions the consent documents are 
expected to fulfil, these analyses are perhaps not surprising, as the documents face the 
competing, and at times incompatible, goals of completeness and comprehensibility.
473
  If 
a consent form includes all risks relating to the illness and treatment(s), the length of the 
document may grow to the point of being incomprehensible to most subjects.
474
 
The UK RECs do not appear to have released information regarding their experiences of 
reviewing forms developed by study sponsors, but their USA counterparts have done so.  
While IRBs generally seek to decrease the length and complexity, institutions and industry 
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sponsors often seek to position these as ‘legal’ documents, a practice Savulescu has 
described as ‘pernicious’,475 with the result that the length and complexity has increased 
substantially over time.
476
  The perception of sponsors and institutions seems to be that 
once a subject has been informed of all possible risks associated with the study procedures, 
the investigational drug and the comparator(s), by then agreeing to participate in the study 
the subject is implicitly accepting these risks;
477
 there may be a degree of truth in this, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 7.5.  However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, providing 
progressively more information may constitute ‘disclosure’ rather than improved 
understanding.
478
 
No requirement exists for any assessment of the effectiveness of the consent process.  Most 
processes in the pharmaceutical industry are subject to routine quality control 
procedures,
479
 and whilst inspection of the consent process would inevitably be 
retrospective, the findings could be applied prospectively to improve the consent process 
for future subjects.  At present, we have no way to ascertain whether subjects truly 
understand the clinical trial process, and its consequences, for which they have 
volunteered, and as Chapter 7 will demonstrate, this lack of knowledge may have 
significant consequences in the event of a child being born with an injury. 
6.4.2 Consent in Clinical Trials in Pregnant Women 
For trials involving pregnant women, the wording of the information provided and the 
consent form should also explain the relevance for the foetus of the woman’s consent, and 
provision for compensation in the event of iatrogenic injury, is likely to be particularly 
important.  Clinical research is an inherently uncertain exercise; future risks and benefits 
are largely unknown and sufficient evidence rarely exists to assign an objective probability 
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to a particular risk - especially when an investigational drug is being administered to a 
specific group, such as pregnant women, for the first time.  On what basis is a pregnant 
woman able to consent to taking investigational drugs to assess their properties, 
particularly when the foetus is not an intended beneficiary? 
Medical research commonly involves risk which is undertaken for the benefit of others and 
clinical trials in pregnant women not intended to benefit the foetus will be categorised as 
non-therapeutic for the foetus.  Under the MHU Regulations 2004, non-therapeutic clinical 
trials are acceptable in incompetent adults and minors as a carefully-controlled, risk-
minimised method to accrue information which will help others in the future, provided the 
same information cannot be acquired from different populations and the trial will produce 
some benefit for the populations represented by the incompetent adult or minor.
480
  Proxy 
consent is acceptable in these circumstances.  So, if the foetus was to be considered 
morally, rather than legally, as incapax or an extreme minor, given these same conditions, 
with the pregnant woman giving proxy permission, that would not be different to the 
current positions regarding the incapax and minors, assuming the appropriate prior 
deliberations of the REC.  The information gained in these trials will be used to better 
manage maternal illnesses, some of which have the potential to harm the foetus.  Defining 
an alternative study population from which the data would be as applicable seems 
impossible, as pregnancy is a unique condition. 
In giving her consent, the pregnant woman is consenting for herself; the foetus has no legal 
personality, and is not independent of the pregnant woman: she cannot participate in a 
clinical trial without involving the foetus, and so this is part of her consideration prior to 
enrolling.  Accordingly, in this setting, the pregnant woman is not giving permission for 
the foetus to be the subject in a clinical trial, although, arguably, it has become a 
participant.
481
  The primary objective will be to collect data as it relates to the pregnant 
woman.  However, inherent in her consent is her acceptance that her foetus will be a 
participant in the trial.  This is quite different from the position in a neonatal trial, in which 
permission would be provided by the parent(s) and the neonate would be the trial subject.  
The pregnant woman may withdraw her consent at any time, just as the parents of a 
neonate may do. 
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Some commentators have argued that if doing so does not generate a high personal cost, 
the pregnant woman has a duty to prevent harm to the foetus.
482
  In opposition, proponents 
of maternal autonomy argue that no one but the pregnant woman can make such intimate 
decisions.
483
  If we adhere to the notion of consent, which is entirely voluntary in nature, 
then the duty argument must fail; doing something because others perceive it as a duty 
surely vitiates the voluntary essence of consent. 
As described in Chapter 6.2.1, the MHRA appears to have the authority to allow studies to 
proceed in the absence of preclinical information defined in the ICH Guidelines, and so 
potentially-relevant information may not have been generated, but most trial subjects seem 
unlikely to be aware of that.  In consequence, whilst the known and reasonably foreseeable 
risks can be explained, the relative lack of knowledge regarding the investigational drug 
creates an unavoidable uncertainty, which should be reflected in the information provided 
to potential subjects, and this, as the next chapter will show, may impact the provision for 
compensation in the event of injury. 
6.4.3 Motivation for Pregnant Women to Participate in Trials 
Perhaps as a result of the exclusion of pregnant women from clinical trials for so long, 
research into trial participation during pregnancy to date has largely focused on the general 
attitude to trials and on reasons for participation and non-participation, and there has been 
a lack of qualitative research in this area.
484
 Some studies have explored the difficulties 
experienced by trial participants regarding the concepts, terminology and design of clinical 
trials,
485
 and there are published reports describing the particular problems experienced by 
                                                          
482
 Schucklenk, U., Kleinsmidt, A. (2007). Rethinking mandatory HIV testing during pregnancy in areas with 
high HIV prevalence rates: ethical and policy issues.  Am.J.Public Health, 97, 1179–1183. 
483
 Johnsen, D.E. (1986). The creation of "fetal rights": conflicts with women's constitutional rights to liberty, 
privacy, and equal protection.  Yale Law J., 99, 599-625; Perry, C. (2011). Unacceptable risk in pregnancy: 
whose choice and responsibility?  Am.J.Bioethics, 11, 64-65; Laufer-Ukeles, P. (2011). Reproductive choices 
and informed consent: fetal interests, women's identity, and relational autonomy.  Am.J.Law Med., 37, 567-
623. 
484
 Kenyon, S., Dixon-Woods, M., Jackson, C.J., et al. (2006). Participating in a trial in a critical situation: a 
qualitative study in pregnancy.  Qual.Saf.Health Care, 15, 98-101. 
485
 See, for example, Featherstone, K., Donovan, J.L. (2002)  “Why don’t they just tell me straight, why 
allocate it?” The struggle to make sense of participating in a randomised controlled trial.  Soc.Sci.Med., 
55,709–19; Donovan, J., Mills, N, Smith, M. et al. (2002)  Quality improvement report: Improving design 
and conduct of randomised trials by embedding them in qualitative research: ProtecT (prostate testing for 
cancer and treatment) study. Br.Med.J., 325, 766–70; Mills, N., Donovan, J.L., Smith, M., et al. (2003)  
Patients’ perceptions of equipoise are crucial to trial participation: a qualitative study of men in the ProtecT 
study. Cont.Clin.Trials, 24, 272–282. 
Chapter 6  Foetal Protection within the Trial Approval Processes 
124 
 
people approached to take part in trials during stressful critical situations, such in pre-term 
labour and neonatal settings.
486
 
One small labour-related study in the UK
487
 found that subjects depended upon their 
‘socio-emotional’ interactions with the research staff when responding to recruitment 
invitations; they attributed their decisions to participate in the trial more to this interaction 
than to written trial information or their own thoughts regarding the trial interventions or 
processes. A few studies report that women in active labour have impaired recall of the 
informed consent process when assessed post-partum, some authors suggesting this 
indicates diminished decisional capacity during labour and delivery.
488
  Others dispute 
this,
489
 and two recent publications support the validity of consent sought during labour.
490
  
However, other than in trials involving drugs under assessment for the management of 
labour, this sub-population is not likely to be included in the evaluation of investigational 
drugs; the physiological stresses of labour together with the attendant medical risks 
preclude this group as a stable cohort in which to conduct clinical trials, and the relevance 
of their results to the general population of pregnant women seems questionable. 
Most potential subjects indicated their willingness to participate in a randomised placebo-
controlled trial of an injectable medicine given throughout pregnancy in another small 
study in the USA, their reasons being benefit to foetal health (68%), benefit to personal 
health (27%), and altruism (5%).  The first of these has been found in other studies too,
491
 
but all have been relatively small studies sited in the USA.  The healthcare system in the 
USA is radically different from those of the UK and many EU countries, therefore the 
motivations for patients to become trial subjects may be somewhat different.  The 
possibility of therapeutic misconception looms large in these reports; indeed, the first of 
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these studies reported a greater rate of participation amongst low-income populations.  
Although the dataset is small, it seems hard not to suspect that, in the USA, the prospect of 
access to otherwise unaffordable treatment may play a role in the decisions of some 
pregnant women to participate in clinical trials.  If this is so, then, at least in the USA, this 
population may be at risk of exploitation.  If financial considerations underlay their 
decision-making process, that demonstrates these women retained decisional capacity, but 
this does not remove the risk of exploitation. 
Information from Europe is even more sparse.  The one published study found seven 
aspects which influenced the pregnant women’s decision to participate: external influence 
(the Investigator), research and healthcare (altruism), perception own situation (therapeutic 
misconception), study design (science), intervention (therapeutic misperception), 
information and counselling (the Investigator), and uncertainty.
492
  Once again, the 
relationship with the Investigator and the prospect of therapeutic misconception come to 
the fore. 
The influence of the relationship with the Investigator and the misunderstandings which 
result in therapeutic misconception, combined with the lack of assessment of the consent 
process, leaves this population particularly liable to exploitation, as these women will in 
most if not all cases, most likely be considering not only themselves and their immediate 
families, but also the foetuses they are carrying.  This could result in their enrolling into 
clinical trials which otherwise they would not have done, leading to the possibility that 
these pregnant women are being exploited. 
6.4.4 Exploitation of Pregnant Women 
Exploitation has been described in many ways.  Two carefully defined models, one by 
Kant
493
 and the other by Wertheimer,
494
 have been considered in the clinical trials setting, 
and both seem applicable to clinical trials in pregnant women.  Kant views exploitation as 
an affront to the principle of autonomy; therefore, exploitation of this type must involve 
the consent process.  Wertheimer conceives of exploitation as an affront to the principle of 
justice, so mooting this type of exploitation does not necessarily involve the consent 
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process.  Wendler
495
 concludes that it is a Wertheimer-type of exploitation to permit a 
misconception to exist among trial participants that the study-related interventions 
provided by the Investigator are based on clinical judgement, rather than mandated by 
protocol.  On the other hand, failing to ensure participants understand randomisation or 
blinding before they can give a valid consent is essentially Kantian. 
In clinical trials, there are, broadly, two ways in which a pregnant subject might be 
exploited.  The first is the exploitative potential of subjects desperate for benefit, who may 
elect to participate in trials, at least in part, because they are unable to afford the treatment 
the trial offers.  Since Appelbaum’s landmark publications,496 numerous analyses have 
shown that therapeutic misconception remains a significant reason for patients agreeing to 
become subjects in clinical research.  As Wild explains, situations in which the pregnant 
woman feels moral pressure to do what is ‘best’ for her foetus (or subsequent child) might 
constitute exploitation,
497
 and the theme of potential benefit clearly emerges from the 
examples cited earlier.  It is, of course, conceivable that some women will overlook or 
downplay the risks to themselves in a clinical trial which held potential benefit for the 
foetus.  Clinical trials intended to benefit the foetus directly are beyond the scope of this 
work, and will not be considered further.  However, indirect benefit to the foetus resulting 
from improved management of a condition in the pregnant woman would surely constitute 
the type of exploitation described by Wild if therapeutic misconception was present.  That 
said, some extensive reviews have demonstrated that, overall, subjects generally benefit 
simply by participating in randomised clinical trials.
498
  So, although therapeutic 
misconception may be present, patients may not actually suffer, medically, as a 
consequence.  This form of exploitation seems to encompass both Kant’s and 
Wertheimer’s descriptions, and clearly is not unique to pregnant women, but given the 
concern most women have for the foetuses they carry, they may be more susceptible to it. 
                                                          
495
 Wendler, D. (2009). Must research participants understand randomization?  Am J.Bioethics, 9, 3-8. 
496
 Appelbaum, P.S., Roth, L.H., Lidz, C. (1982)  The therapeutic misconception: informed consent in 
psychiatric research.  Int.J.Law Psych., 5, 319-329.   
Appelbaum, P., Roth, L.H., Lidz, C.W., Benson, P., Winslade, W. (1987)  False hopes and best data: consent 
to research and the therapeutic misconception.  Hast.Cent.Rep., 17, 20-24 
497
 Wild, V. (2007). How are pregnant women vulnerable research participants?  : Int.J.Fem.App.Bioethics, 
5, 82-104.   
498
 See, for example, Djulbegovic, B., Kumar, A., Glasziou, P. et al. (2013). Trial unpredictability yields 
predictable therapy gains.  Nature, 500 (7463), 395-396; Vist, G. E., Bryant, D. et al. 2008. Outcomes of 
patients who participate in randomized controlled trials compared to similar patients receiving similar 
interventions who do not participate. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 3: MR000009; Lantos, J.D., 
(1999)  The “inclusion benefit” in clinical trials.  J. Pediatr., 130, 130-131. 
Chapter 6  Foetal Protection within the Trial Approval Processes 
127 
 
The second type of exploitation occurs when a particular research population bears most of 
the burden of research while another population reaps most of the benefits.  Given the 
unique setting of pregnancy, it seems unlikely that other populations could benefit from the 
types of studies the Agencies have requested.  Moreover, the perception of risk regarding 
such studies which developed during the years the embargo was in effect continues today, 
with pregnant women still being significantly under-represented in clinical trials.
499
  As a 
result, trials in this population seem unlikely to be undertaken to generate data which will 
be relevant to other populations; even if such a population could be defined, it would be 
difficult to imagine a population more complex than pregnant women in whom to conduct 
such trials, a consideration which reduces the prospect of this form of exploitation.
500
 It 
therefore seems likely that the pregnant population will bear the burden of generating data 
relevant to the pregnant population. 
In the debates which led the FDA to rescind its prohibition of clinical trials in pregnant 
women, a number of commentators argued that there was no reason to believe that 
pregnant women could not make autonomous decisions or that pregnant women were 
particularly prone to being exploited.
501
  Even if this is correct, it follows that pregnant 
women are no less likely to be exploited, especially if therapeutic misconception is present.  
However, there is a consideration unique to pregnant women - the foetus. 
6.4.5 Foetal Exploitation 
Some would exclude pregnant women from clinical trials on the premise that if the 
treatment is for the benefit of the woman, her capacity to consent for the foetus is 
compromised by the inherent conflict of putting the foetus in a hazardous situation without 
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countervailing benefit.
502
 The alternative would be the insertion of a third-party to 
‘consent’ on behalf of the foetus, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, but given the 
requirement for equipoise, there may be no benefit to the pregnant woman either.  This 
argument is grounded on the premise that the foetus is a ‘person’, albeit in utero at the time 
of exposure to the drug, and that the combination of foetal ‘personhood’ and the pregnant 
woman’s conflict of interest entitle the foetus to protection, perhaps even representation.  
In conventional medicine, physicians regularly administer medication to pregnant women 
which have unknown effects on the foetus.  Doubtless in some cases the pregnant woman 
is forewarned of a specific risk, and her capacity and right to consent to treatment for her 
own benefit is accepted within the medical and legal communities, even when that 
treatment may endanger her foetus, without the additional requirement of approval by a 
third party whose role is to consider foetal interests.
503
  Given the more stringent, formal 
consent requirements in clinical trial setting, the appointment of a foetal representative 
seems excessive.  Yet is this not, in effect, the outcome of the requirement in Regulation 
536 for ‘specific expertise’ as part of the process for considering applications to conduct 
clinical trials in pregnant women, as well as in the incapacitated and minors? 
Foetal ‘exploitation’, accepting for the purpose of this analysis that an entity which lacks 
legal personality can be exploited, could arise in two ways.  If one considers the foetus as a 
trial participant (see Chapter 6.3.1), then the second form of exploitation described above 
unavoidably arises.  Should an investigational drug be teratogenic, then the foetus bears 
most of the burden of research while another population - future pregnant women and their 
foetuses - reaps most of the benefits. 
Almost paradoxically, the setting in which there is no prospect of therapeutic benefit and 
for that reason was highlighted in most previous guidelines as being unacceptable - Phase I 
trials - is in this respect the most morally acceptable: the consent process will disclose to 
these subjects the absence of potential benefit for themselves and the foetus, and their 
decisions to participate seem more likely to be based on altruism, making the prospect of 
therapeutic misconception almost negligible. 
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However, another possible method of exploitation exists.  Under Article 33(d) of 
Regulation 536, a patient enrolling in a Phase II or III trial is entitled to compensation for 
expenses and loss of earnings directly related to the participation in the clinical trial.  The 
provision of payment to volunteers in Phase I studies is customary in the UK.  An analysis 
of a recent advertisement 
504
 indicates the rate of payment to be approximately £12.50 per 
hour, which corresponds to around £26,100 per annum, close to the UK average salary of 
£26,500.
505
  Thus, based on average earnings, such payments do not seem disproportionate, 
but could payments of this magnitude entice pregnant women into enrolling for multiple 
consecutive trials as a means to earn an income, potentially increasing the risk to which the 
foetus is exposed?  The USA has witnessed the growth of ‘professional’ trial volunteers 
who proceed from one trial to the next as a means of earning a living.
506
 If a pregnant trial 
subject gives birth to a child with a congenital abnormality, attributing that to a particular 
drug will be more difficult if the pregnant woman has taken multiple investigational drugs, 
which will affect the prospect of recovery of damages.  In the wake of the TeGenero 
incident,
507
 a process was introduced in the UK to prevent volunteers from participating in 
clinical trials too frequently.
508
  This should provide another safeguard for the foetus, albeit 
by restricting pregnant women’s activities to the same extent as other potential trial 
participants, both by restricting the number of investigational drugs to which the foetus can 
be exposed within a trial setting (preventative) and by increasing the likelihood of being 
able to ascribe an abnormality to a specific intervention, thereby supporting recovery of 
damages (a corrective aspect). 
The combination of the consent issues (Chapter 6.4.1), the misguided motivations for 
pregnant women to participate in clinical trials (Chapter 6.4.2) and the potential means by 
which both the pregnant woman (Chapter 6.4.3) and foetus (above) might be exploited 
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combine to produce a situation in which pregnant women may become involved in clinical 
trials without fully understanding the consequences of doing so.  Assuming the trial has 
been appropriately approved and is properly conducted, this lack of understanding does not 
connote a greater immediate risk to the foetus - but it may form the basis of a future risk 
relating to compensation in the event of injury, which will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
6.5 Conclusions 
Taken together, the combination of approvals, permissions and consent required creates a 
process which should ensure that the risks to participants in clinical trials have been 
minimised, and to a large extent the process appears likely to achieve that, at least for the 
vast majority of subjects who will normally be enrolled, i.e., competent adults.  However, 
the level of protection for the foetus appears to be deficient in a number of respects, and 
the implications of the way in which the foetus appears to be considered under the new 
Regulation 536 raises some questions which, at present, probably cannot be answered 
satisfactorily. 
The introduction of the specific expertise requirement under Regulation 536 is surely to be 
welcomed.  As Lord Mustill phrased it, “the foetus is a unique organism”,509 and the law 
has for decades wrestled with the ‘not one but not two’ model of pregnancy.  Most 
pregnant women would wish to be assured regarding any potential risk to their foetus 
resulting from trial participation.  Whilst the Regulation seems unclear regarding the 
precise purpose or provider of the ‘specific expertise’, the fact that the trial will receive 
additional focus must increase the prospect of risks being identified and possibly mitigated.  
This therefore represents an increased level of protection for the foetus compared to the 
current position.  The introduction of the ‘register’ restricting the number of trials in which 
an individual may participate similarly increases the level of protection for the foetus.  
That said, the seeming absence of any technical impediment to the REC approving a 
clinical trial in pregnant women in the absence of reproductive toxicology data remains a 
concern, and will remain so until RECs are required to make public the basis upon which 
clinical trials are approved. 
Another concern relates to the apparent authority of the MHRA to adjudge the risk-benefit 
ratio in the absence of ICH-defined preclinical information, as exemplified by Gøtzsche’s 
experience.  When he first requested the information, he was told (by the Investigator, the 
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CRO and then the sponsor) that the documents which contained it were confidential, 
despite a decision by the European ombudsman in 2010 that trial protocols do not contain 
commercially confidential information.
510
  This combination of circumstances suggests 
that the MHRA may approve clinical trials in pregnant women in the absence of these data, 
that the trial participants do not need to be made aware of this fact, and that, if they ask, 
they may be refused the information, even if it exists.  This seems an unsatisfactory 
position, and the obvious solutions would appear to be (a) that the MHRA should not 
approve clinical trials in this population in the absence of such data without documented 
justification, and (b) requests by potential trial participants for such information as part of 
the consent process should be honoured, bearing in mind that consent is a continuous 
process.  Moreover, the responsibilities of the regulatory authorities to draw attention to 
potentially teratogenic comparators might usefully be clarified.  Few trial subjects, 
probably, would contemplate asking such questions, but as Chapter 7 will illustrate, 
iatrogenic teratogenic injury attributable to the comparator has significant implications 
regarding the process for recovery of damages. 
Similarly, few trial subjects, probably, would be aware that the constraints of GCP mean 
that the physician acting as an Investigator changes responsibility to that of ensuring 
compliance with the approved protocol whilst minimising risk of harm to the trial subject.  
In many cases, physicians enrol their own patients into clinical trials.  A number of ethical 
guidelines for clinical research suggest that the voluntariness of consent by patients may be 
compromised when their own treating physician obtains consent,
511
 and several studies 
have shown that treating physicians can have a considerable influence on the decision-
making of their patients with regard to research.
512
  The knowledge physicians gain by 
virtue of their relationship with patients is substantial which should contribute significantly 
to the safety of patients who become trial subjects, and so should not be disregarded - but 
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the trial subjects perhaps need a clearer explanation of the limitations within which the 
‘doctor’ must now operate as part of the consent process. 
Finally, the status of the foetus needs to be clarified.  From being not mentioned at all 
under the CTD, Regulation 536 seems to confer upon the foetus the status of a trial 
participant incapable of providing consent (or assent), but whose ‘interests’ are such that a 
trial may legitimately be declined by the REC, thereby compromising the pregnant 
woman’s autonomy.  However if the pregnant woman’s consent is considered as 
equivalent to proxy consent for minors or the incapax, other trial participants incapable of 
providing consent, then the pregnant woman’s consent should not constitute a barrier to 
recovery of damages in the event of injury in utero.  The implications of this will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Routes to Compensation in the Event of Trial-Emergent Injury 
7.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have described the legal and moral standing of the foetus, and the 
aspects of the trial approval processes which offer a level of protection for the foetus in 
clinical trials recruiting pregnant women.  Within the UK, as with many other countries, 
we have imposed legal constraints, founded on moral and, in some cases, practical 
considerations, to prevent the termination of pregnancy other than in defined 
circumstances.  We have created laws to impose criminal or civil liability on those other 
than the pregnant woman who inflict harm on the foetus resulting in postnatal death or 
injury.  One of the purposes of the clinical trial approval process is that of minimising risk 
of harm to participants, and the argument was advanced in Chapter 6.3.1 that in clinical 
trials involving pregnant woman, even where the foetus is not the primary trial subject, it is 
nevertheless a trial participant. 
As outlined previously, the protection for the foetus in clinical trials may be viewed as 
comprising two elements: a preventative component (risk reduction and prevention of 
injury), and a corrective component (provision for compensation should injury occur) i.e., 
protection of the interests of the child the foetus will become, should injury arise.  Clinical 
research is an inherently uncertain exercise, and despite the pre-trial approval processes, 
trial participants will, occasionally, suffer injury.  Should a child be born injured after a 
pregnant woman had participated in a trial, she would naturally seek compensation for the 
child, as well as any additional costs that arise in raising it.  The mechanisms by which 
damages may be recovered in such circumstances will be examined in this chapter. 
Clinical trials, generally, have a remarkably good safety record,
513
 although there have 
been tragic exceptions, such as the death in the USA of a volunteer in a 1999 gene therapy 
trial,
514
 and of a volunteer in an asthma study in 2002,
515
 as well as the TeGenero trial in 
the UK in 2006, which will be addressed later in this chapter.  Based on possibly 
misinterpreted information, the popular press has reported that both healthy volunteers and 
                                                          
513
 Stein, C.M. (2003). Managing risk in healthy subjects participating in clinical research.  Clin.Pharmacol. 
Ther., 74, 511-512. 
514
 Raper, S.E., Chirmule, N., Lee, F.S., et al. (2003). Fatal systemic inflammatory response syndrome in an 
ornithine transcarbamylase deficient patient following adenoviral gene transfer.  Mol.Genet.Metab., 80, 148-
158. 
515
 Savulescu, J., Spriggs, M. (2002). The hexamethonium asthma study and the death of a normal volunteer 
in research.  J.Med.Ethics, 28, 3-4. 
Chapter 7  Routes to Compensation in the Event of Trial-Emergent Injury 
134 
 
patients enrolled in clinical trials experienced serious, unexpected suspected adverse 
reactions; one report cited injuries (none classed as treatment-related) to 7,187 subjects 
over five years.  With 90,000-95,000 subjects now participating in clinical trials in the UK 
annually, this suggests annually 1-2% of trial participants may experience such 
reactions.
516
  Of course, adverse reactions may result from many causes, including the 
investigational drug, a comparator agent, a procedure, which may be protocol-specified or 
part of normal clinical care, or the underlying condition. 
Trials recruit subjects over variable periods of time.  A small (perhaps 6 subjects) single-
dose Phase I study may recruit and treat all the subjects within a two week period, whilst a 
Phase III study may enrol hundreds of pregnant subjects over a 2-3 year period, and 
involve treatment for twelve months or more.  In the latter example, it is likely that a large 
number of pregnant women will have been treated for variable periods of time, and in the 
former the study will most likely be complete before any effects on the foetus are 
suspected.  This will particularly be the case where problems become apparent at birth or 
some time afterwards.  Thus, the possibility of taking preventative action by suspending 
enrolment or stopping a trial should something untoward be detected will, in some cases, 
not exist at all, and in other cases it will be of limited impact. 
As explained in Chapter 6, the possibility that such events may occur and the provisions 
for compensation should be addressed within the consent process.  Should they occur, a 
child born injured potentially may seek compensation from a range of sources, depending 
upon the circumstances of the injury.  These could include, in theory, those who approved 
a trial if the approval was found to be inappropriate, i.e., the REC and the MHRA, the 
Investigator, the Investigator’s employer (should the Investigator’s conduct be in some 
way deficient), and the sponsor of the trial if the drug is ‘faulty’.  The legal bases upon 
which these potential respondents might be approached varies.  This chapter will explore 
each of these, focussing on their relevance to the foetus exposed to an investigational drug 
when a pregnant woman participated in a clinical trial. 
Two matters may impact attempts to recover damages regardless of the route taken and so 
will be considered as preliminary issues: the limitation period for personal injury claims, 
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and the retention of records.  Thereafter, the general position regarding insurance coverage 
for clinical trial subjects will be summarised before considering potential respondents. 
7.2 Limitation Period 
In England and Wales, section 11(4) of the Limitation Act 1980 provides that in personal 
injury cases the limitation period is three years from the date upon which the cause of 
action accrued, or from the date (if later) that the person is aware of the injury.  Section 38 
defines personal injuries broadly, including both physical and psychological injuries, even 
if the latter do not constitute recognised psychiatric injuries, which has the particular 
advantage to children of encompassing developmental, behavioural and cognitive injuries.  
The 3-year period need not commence from the date the injury was inflicted, e.g., by the 
administration of an investigational drug to a pregnant woman; it can be argued to 
commence from the time at which the claimant had ‘requisite knowledge, defined in 
Section 14 as the date the claimant first had knowledge 
(a) that the injury in question was significant; and  
(b) that the injury was attributable in whole or part to the act or omission which is 
alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty; and  
(c) of the identity of the Defendant. 
Under section 28 of the Act, for injured children the time limit begins from the date of their 
18th birthday.  A claimant may overcome the statutory bar by proving that s/he did not 
acquire knowledge of essential elements of his cause of action, usually ‘significant injury’ 
and ‘attribution’, until a later date.  Furthermore, under section 33, the court retains a 
discretion to permit the claim to proceed where it is equitable to do so.  This extended 
limitation period constitutes a significant advantage for children injured in utero; with the 
possible exception of diethylstilboestrol,
517
 all drugs suspected of expressing teratogenic 
effects have done so within this period.  Of course, cases may be brought before the child 
has legal capacity to institute proceedings, in which case the claim will need to be brought 
on child’s behalf, but it remains the child’s claim. 
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An injury may be immediately apparent, as was the case for thalidomide, or it may take 
years to become manifest, as happened with diethylstilboestrol.  The consent document, a 
copy of which the pregnant woman would have been given, will name the Investigator, the 
NHS Trust, and the trial sponsor so the identity of the defendant(s) is likely to be known, 
although with the passage of time such documents may have been lost.  However, the 
principal challenge is likely to arise regarding knowledge that an act (or omission) may 
have caused injury and that there may have been negligence.  The applicability of the 
limitation period depends upon the court’s interpretation of the word ‘knowledge’.  English 
courts had traditionally rejected suspicions and beliefs as constituting knowledge, but this 
changed with Lord Donaldson’s comment in Halford v Brookes518 that ‘reasonable belief 
will normally suffice’ to mean ‘knowledge’. Regarding the extent to which a belief is 
considered ‘reasonable’, Lord Donaldson in Halford and subsequently Purchas LJ in Nash 
v Eli Lilley &Co
519
 adopted a common approach, defining ‘reasonable belief’ as a belief 
that makes the claimant contemplate preliminary steps in the pursuit of a claim.  The later 
case of Spargo v North Essex District Health Authority appeared to raise the threshold for 
the test of reasonableness, requiring the claimant to have taken some action, e.g., 
consulting a solicitor, to demonstrate that belief.
520
 
Thus, the limitation period per se seems unlikely to be a major problem in most cases 
where a child who allegedly suffered injury in utero in a clinical trial seeks damages, 
although the associated criteria may be difficult to satisfy if the injury has a long onset 
time, where the link between the injury and the trial may not be obvious. 
7.3 Record Retention 
As the examples of diethylstilboestrol
521
 and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
522
 illustrate, 
iatrogenic injury may take years to become apparent.  This alone will render the causal 
relationship between a drug and a condition difficult to establish.  If the drug is licensed, as 
a condition of approval the manufacturer of the drug (which in almost every circumstance 
will also be the legal sponsor of any trial in which harm arose) is required to submit to the 
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regulatory authorities all preclinical and clinical information relating to the drug, and to 
keep that up to date until two years after the last patent for the drug expires.  Furthermore, 
the manufacturer must retain registration-related documentation, i.e., data relating to the 
approval of the drug in any indication, for 10-15 years after the last withdrawal of the drug 
from any market.
523
  So, theoretically, all of the information the manufacturer accumulated 
during the development phase of the drug is recoverable.  This was the situation in the 
Paxil
®
 cases, in which the manufacturer allegedly failed to warn prescribers of the drug’s 
risks after the company began receiving reports of birth defects; these reports were 
considered during the (much) later litigation.
524
  For pregnant women whose foetuses may 
have been harmed in pre-registration clinical trials, this is potentially helpful; even if a 
drug is withdrawn a year after its approval, and the clinical trial in which they participated 
was conducted immediately before approval, this creates a period of at least 11 years after 
the trial for harm to the child to become manifest during which complete records need to 
be retained.  
However, should the drug not proceed to be licenced, the challenge may become 
significantly greater for a child who wishes to make a claim as the manufacturer is not 
mandated to retain all data relating to investigational drugs which do not proceed to 
registration.  In Europe, manufacturers are not required to compile formal preclinical or 
clinical reports to support initial applications to conduct clinical trials, and so data may not 
have been released to European regulatory agencies, which could later be recovered should 
the need arise.  This is not the case in the USA, so if a drug is withdrawn from 
development for any reason following an application to conduct a trial in the USA, such 
documentation will have been submitted to and is potentially recoverable from the FDA.  
Under the provisions in the European GCP Directive, the REC is required to retain 
specified essential documents for three years, and the sponsor and the Investigator for five 
years, after completion of a trial.
525
  Thus, data which might disclose preclinical evidence 
of an association between a congenital abnormality and an investigational drug may no 
longer exist if the harm does not become apparent for a significant period of time 
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following the trial, although still within the limitation period for personal injury litigation 
in the UK. 
The mother may suspect the injury occurred as a result of the clinical trial but, initially, she 
will have neither proof nor a ready way to confirm her suspicion, especially if the injury 
became apparent years after the trial.  She may not have retained her trial-related medical 
records or a copy of the data which was sent to the trial sponsor for analysis, if she was 
even offered these, and she will rarely have the medical knowledge to analyse potential 
associations between the drugs in the trial and the suspected congenital injury.  She may, 
of course, seek access to her own and her child’s hospital notes, which should contain 
information relating to her participation in the clinical trial, but these may not be as helpful 
as one might anticipate. 
A key concept in all clinical trials is that the information collected can be verified by 
comparing it to the source data.  ICH Guideline E6 §1.51, defines source data as "All 
information in original records and certified copies of original records or clinical findings, 
observations, or other activities in a clinical trial necessary for the reconstruction and 
evaluation of the trial."  ICH Guideline E6 §1.52, defines source documents as "Original 
documents, data and records (e.g., hospital records, clinical and office charts, laboratory 
notes, memoranda, subjects' diaries of evaluation checklists, pharmacy dispensing records, 
recorded data from automated instruments, copies or transcriptions certified after 
verification as being accurate and complete, microfiches, photographic negatives, 
microfilm or magnetic media, x-rays, subject files, and records kept at the pharmacy, at the 
laboratories, and at medico-technical departments involved in the clinical trial)”.  Under 
Directive 91/507/EEC,
526
 the Investigator is obliged to retain patient files and other source 
data for the maximum period of time permitted by the hospital, institution or practice, 
although the treatment allocation code must be retained for at least 15 years after the 
completion or discontinuation of the trial. 
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Under the NHS Records Retention Schedule,
527
 an adult trial subject’s medical files must 
be retained for a minimum period of five years, and a child’s files for at least 25 years.  
Thus, if trial participation records were kept in the pregnant woman’s medical file, it is 
possible that these would have been destroyed (with the exception of the treatment 
allocation code) before injury to the child became apparent.  Conversely, if the injury was 
apparent at birth or during childhood, assuming it was recorded in the child’s medical file, 
that information should be accessible for at least as long as the limitation period for 
personal injury litigation. 
The attrition rate of drugs in clinical development is ferocious.  Approximately 1/3 of 
drugs which enter Phase I trials will not reach Phase II, of those which enter Phase II, 2/3 
will not reach phase III, and of those which reach Phase III, 1/3 will not achieve 
registration; this corresponds to an overall attrition rate of 85-90%.
528
  Thus, even if studies 
in pregnant women are commenced during the Phase III development programme, the risk 
of the drug not proceeding to licensing, and thus imposing the obligation on the sponsor to 
retain the data beyond five years, is around 33%.  Obviously, if these studies are conducted 
earlier in the development programme, this allows more time for any injury to become 
apparent, an advantage offset by the increased prospect of the drug being withdrawn from 
development. 
The required retention periods may be appropriate for most trials involving adults without 
mental health conditions, whose psychological and physiological functions have reached 
relative stability.  Whether they are appropriate for those whose functions are still 
developing, including minors and the foetus, and whose participation in trials was not 
widely in contemplation when these periods were specified, merits consideration.  It might 
not seem unreasonable to create a legal requirement for the REC, sponsor, Investigator and 
the NHS to retain all documentation relating to such trials for 25 years, as would be the 
case for a child’s file, such that most developmental issues should have been detected 
within the limitation period for personal injury litigation in the UK. 
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7.4 Insurance Provisions 
As described in Chapter 6.2.2, part of the purpose of the REC review is to establish 
whether sufficient insurance or other coverage exists to meet the potential costs of injuries 
to trial participants.  
For studies conducted within NHS facilities, the NHS indemnifies its own staff, medical 
academic staff with honorary contracts, and those conducting clinical trials against 
litigation arising from negligent harm caused to patients or healthy volunteers who are 
subjects of clinical research.
529
  The NHS Indemnity does not apply to non-negligent harm, 
such as teratogenic injury possibly related to an investigational drug, although in 
exceptional circumstances NHS bodies may consider whether an ex-gratia payment could 
be offered.
 530
 
Sponsors of clinical trials usually indemnify the NHS against personal injury claims except 
where the injuries are attributable to negligence by NHS staff.  The NHS body also carries 
legal liability for claims in negligence (or compensation under the sponsor’s indemnity will 
be abated) where there has been significant non-adherence to the approved protocol, or 
negligence on the part of an NHS employee, e.g., by failing to deal adequately with an 
adverse drug reaction.
531
 
As the NHS Guidance Document notes, the form of indemnity may not be readily accepted 
by sponsoring companies outside the UK or which are not members of the Association of 
the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI).
532
  The NHS body will carry liability for any 
claims in negligence if the indemnity is not honoured by the trial sponsor and there is no 
supporting insurance.
533
  Annex B of the NHS Guidance Document stipulates that the NHS 
body and the sponsor will each give to the other such help as may reasonably be required 
for the efficient conduct and prompt handling of any claim by or on behalf of subjects (or 
their dependants), and requires the Sponsor to operate in good faith the Clinical Trial 
Compensation Guidelines published by the ABPI.  This appears to signify a genuine intent 
to resolve such issues rapidly. 
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The NHS Indemnity is, therefore, extensive, and certainly offers a potential route to the 
protection of the future interests of a child injured in utero as a result of the pregnant 
woman’s participation in a clinical trial, but only if the injury can be shown to be the result 
of negligence by NHS staff.  In most of the recognised cases of teratogenic injury, the 
cause is related to other factors, and in a clinical trial setting, suspicion will inevitably fall 
upon the investigational drug, assuming trial conduct has complied with the protocol. 
The ABPI’s Clinical Trial Compensation Guidelines recommend the assurance ABPI 
members provide, mostly without legal commitment, through the Investigator to the REC.  
The Guidelines state that subjects need to establish only that they were injured as a result 
of participating in a trial; they do not need to prove that anyone was at fault,
534
 in effect 
offering no-fault compensation, although causation needs to be established.  These 
Guidelines apply when the study is conducted according to the protocol, and the sponsor is 
notified of the injury and has control over any offer of compensation.  The coverage 
provided by the Guideline is not legally binding upon the sponsor of the trial, and as 
mentioned above, not all trial sponsors are ABPI members.  In many cases, sponsors do not 
self-insure and rely instead upon specialist insurance companies.
535
  However, there are 
some specific potential limitations of the ABPI scheme which are relevant to clinical trials 
in pregnant women, which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
As explained in Chapter 6.3, Regulation 536, which will replace the CTD, should go some 
way toward addressing potential concerns regarding the adequacy of insurance coverage, 
as it requires member states to “ensure that systems for compensation for damages suffered 
by a subject are in place which are appropriate to the nature and the extent of the risk”,536 
and places the onus for provision of insurance on the member states.
537
  Member states will 
also be required to demonstrate proof of insurance cover or indemnification.
538
  One might 
reasonably assume that most member states of the EU are better-placed financially to 
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discharge these obligations than most pharmaceutical manufacturers; the costs of life-long 
treatment for a child injured in utero in a clinical trial could be substantial, and member 
states would be expected to have greater access to funds and support facilities than, 
possibly small, private companies.  As suggested previously, the system may, in part, be 
funded by a system of user fees, and so the costs may be borne, at least in part, by trial 
sponsors.  At §61, Regulation 536 stipulates that the conditions for liability in the case of a 
subject sustaining injury as a result of participating in a clinical trial, including issues of 
causality and the level of damages and sanctions, should remain governed by national law.  
Once again, it would appear that recourse to tort law is the most likely route to a remedy in 
the event of injury, a route which is likely to present particular challenges as the courts 
have not yet formulated an adequate theoretical basis for addressing the distinctive issues 
of research, and because research-related injuries often do not conform to the elements 
required in tort litigation.
539
  An alternative approach will be explored in Chapter 8. 
Since the trial sponsor is the most obvious respondent, the ABPI Guidelines will be 
considered first, followed by the Investigator and then the bodies responsible for approving 
the trial, before considering some of the specific legislative instruments which were 
introduced in part to overcome the challenges recognised in the application of tort to 
medical injury cases. 
7.5 The Sponsor as a Respondent - The ABPI Guidelines 
The latest version of the ABPI’s Clinical Trial Compensation Guidelines540 is applicable to 
all clinical trials commenced from 1st January 2015 onwards.  §5.4 requires the trial 
sponsor to encourage the Investigator “to make clear to participating patients that the trial 
is being conducted subject to the ABPI Guidelines relating to compensation for injury 
arising in the course of clinical trials and have available copies of the Guidelines should 
they be requested”.  The Guidelines are eight pages long, and are laid out in a relatively 
clear format, with a Flesch-Kincaid level
541
 of 9.4, so should be comprehensible to 
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someone aged 14-15 years.  They are available for the trial subject to see “should they be 
requested”, rather than being required to be offered to the subject together with the study-
specific information and consent documents.  One recent study in 2014
542
 found that the 
median length of consent documents given to all potential participants was 20 pages (range 
8-28 pages), and that they were “complex to read” (although the Flesch-Kincaid score 
averaged 9.8, so on this scale they were only slightly more complex than the ABPI 
Guidelines).  This observation regarding complexity has been made by others,
543
 although 
there is some evidence that these documents are becoming easier to read.
544
  Nevertheless, 
the absence of a specific instruction to offer trial subjects a copy of the Guidelines seems 
disappointing, considering the plethora of information being provided to trial subjects.  
Given the seeming importance attached to these Guidelines, arguably, their provision 
should be part of the consent process, although this would add to the volume of written 
information being provided.  Since a similar Flesch-Kincaid score for consent documents 
was judged to be complex in the 2014 study, consideration should also be given to the 
simplification of the Guidelines, to try to improve understanding by trial participants. 
7.5.1 Phase I Studies 
The background paragraph of the section addressing Phase I clinical trials contains a 
requirement that member companies sponsoring Phase I studies ensure that the 
arrangements they put in place for these studies create a “legally binding obligation, 
through the terms of the consent form and subject information, to pay compensation to the 
volunteer in the event of injury due to participation in the study”.  As the wording ‘due to 
participation’ makes clear, a successful claim will be predicated upon the establishment of 
causation.  This section of the Guidelines does not mention trials in pregnant women (nor 
minors, nor the incapacitated) from which one might infer that these groups will be 
considered in the same manner as all others participating in Phase I studies, or that the 
conduct of Phase I studies in these populations was not in the contemplation of those who 
developed the Guidelines.  
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Instinctively, the term ‘volunteer’ does not sit easily with minors and the incapax; whilst 
their proxies may believe they are reflecting the subjects’ presumed will, the ‘voluntary’ 
intent is clearly absent.  However, the same is not true for pregnant women, for two 
reasons: pregnant women are undoubtedly trial subjects capable of expressing their own 
will, and it is not possible to infer any kind of will or presume it for a foetus.  As discussed 
in Chapter 6.3.1, even if Regulation 536 is adopting a ‘two-patient’ model, the special 
expertise inherent in the prior approval of the trial by the REC means that pregnant women 
should be able to consent to participate in trials in exactly the same way as other competent 
adults.  Thus, a pregnant woman can ‘volunteer’ for a Phase I trial, and in doing so 
knowingly commits her foetus to the risks of exposure to an investigational product or its 
effects, i.e., consistent with the ‘dyad’ model in which the pregnant woman and the foetus 
are considered holistically.  Given the unique considerations for pregnant women discussed 
previously, clarification of the application of the Guidelines to Phase I studies in this 
population would be useful.  Replicating §1.3 of the Phase II - IV Guidelines described in 
the next section within the Phase I section would have the advantage of providing the same 
degree of clarity for all pregnant participants. 
7.5.2 Phase II and III Studies 
The section addressing Phase II, III and IV clinical trials contains a recommendation that a 
member company sponsoring a study should provide a written assurance to the Investigator 
(and through the Investigator to the REC) that the Guidelines will be applied in the event 
of injury caused to a participant and attributable to participation in the trial.  This again 
emphasises the need to establish causation, but without this assurance forming a legal 
commitment.  The lack of legal commitment is a long-standing position which has been the 
subject of similarly long-standing criticism.
545
 
This section of the Guidelines does make explicit mention of pregnant subjects, §1.3 
stating: “Compensation should be paid to a child injured in utero through the participation 
of the subject’s mother in a clinical trial as if the child were a patient-volunteer with the 
full benefit of these Guidelines.” 
The phraseology in this paragraph is reminiscent of the nasciturus principle, the guidelines 
being construed such as to favour the foetus.  The categorisation of the child born injured 
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as a patient-volunteer (and accordingly as a research subject) is interesting; it suggests this 
situation will be interpreted in the same way as, for example, an injury sustained by a 
neonate for whom the parent(s) had given consent to participate in a clinical trial.  This 
approach is consistent with the ‘crystallisation’ construction first advanced in Montreal 
Tramways,
546
 and discussed in Chapter 3.3.  However, as the discussion later will 
demonstrate, this provision may not be as comprehensive as the wording of this paragraph 
might suggest. 
§1.6 stipulates that the fact that the patient has freely consented to participate in the trial 
should not exclude the patient from consideration for compensation under the Guidelines.  
Once again, however, the phraseology is important; “consideration for compensation” 
means precisely that, as the wording of §4.2.2, addressed below, illustrates.  
§1.7 asserts that the trial subject is not required to “prove that the (sponsor) company has 
been negligent in relation to research or development of the medicinal product under trial 
or that the product is defective”.  Here, too, the comprehensive tone of this paragraph is 
somewhat qualified in §4. 
Under §5.2, the sponsor’s responsibilities extend to injury arising (at whatever time) from 
all administrations, clinical interventions or procedures occurring during the course of the 
trial, i.e., the Guideline is not restricted to iatrogenic injury and does not apply the usual 
limitation period for personal injury.
547
  Accordingly, the later recognition of a possible 
association between a now-approved medicine and a teratogenic injury may result in these 
compensation provisions being engaged. 
As explained in Chapter 4.4.3, establishing causation for congenital injury will always be 
challenging, due to the underlying natural incidence of birth defects.  According to a World 
Health Organisation report published in 2014, there are approximately 3.2 million birth 
defect related disabilities every year affecting an estimated 1 in 33 infants globally.
548
  The 
most recent published data for Europe in 2010 shows congenital anomalies occur in 1 in 42 
infants, 
549
 and incomplete data for the UK for the same year indicates an incidence of 1 in 
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45 live births.
550
  Thus, even in a relatively small Phase II study of 100 pregnant women, 
one would expect 2-3 congenital abnormalities.  In a Phase I study of 10-20 subjects, a 
single congenital abnormality would not immediately appear to be unexpected.  In both 
situations, of course, the nature of the abnormalities is important; the uniqueness of those 
produced by thalidomide was instrumental in identifying the drug as the causative agent.  
In the absence of distinctive characteristics, the balance of probabilities suggests that such 
occurrences are unlikely to be related to investigational drug treatment - yet it is entirely 
possible that a particular case would not have arisen but for exposure to the investigational 
drug. 
Claims relating to the first few occurrences of any iatrogenic injury are always likely to fail 
under a ‘balance of probabilities’ argument.  In a current case in the UK,551 a trial sponsor 
and ABPI member has declined to compensate an injured subject on the basis that the 
sponsor “is unable to establish on the balance of probabilities that [the subject’s] 
development of [the injury] was caused by his participation in the trial”.  This subject is the 
first to have developed the particular injury following administration of the investigational 
drug, but a temporal relationship does not establish causation: the development of the 
injury could be coincidental.  The Guidelines contain provision for arbitration (§4(iii)), but 
each case is considered independently, so it seems difficult to envisage a process by which 
a possibly erroneous ascription of causation could be avoided. 
The Guidelines also contain other limitations which, although applicable to all trials, are of 
particular interest when considering trials in pregnant women, and are addressed below. 
7.5.3 Comparator Agents 
A number of approved drugs which might be used as comparators in clinical trials of 
investigational drugs in pregnant women are associated with hazard to the foetus.
552
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§3.2 states that “No compensation should be paid for injury caused by other licensed 
medicinal products administered to the patient for the purpose of comparison with the 
product under trial.”  Thus, if a pregnant woman has been randomised to the comparator 
and delivers a child with a congenital abnormality, although she has been injured as a 
result of participation in the trial, neither she nor her injured child will be able to seek 
compensation under the Guidelines; they will need to pursue claims through other 
mechanisms.  In one sense, this does not seem unreasonable; why should one trial sponsor 
meet costs associated with another company’s drug?  The answer may be that the trial 
sponsor specified the comparator, and so must live with the consequences, consistent with 
the wording in §5.2.  In refusing to meet these costs, the sponsor is passing the burdens 
associated with recovery of damages on to the subject who has volunteered to assist with 
the sponsor’s research, aware that she may gain no personal benefit by doing so.  §3.2 also 
brings a new meaning to the term randomised: subjects are randomised not only to a 
particular treatment but, as a consequence, to a particular path to recovery of damages in 
the event of foetal harm.  It would be interesting to establish the proportion of pregnant 
subjects who understand this when consenting to participate in a trial, particularly given 
the absence of a requirement to provide a copy of the ABPI Guidelines to trial subjects.  
Whilst the 15 year retention period for the treatment allocation code should be adequate for 
most purposes, should an injury become apparent at a later time, establishing the treatment 
to which the pregnant woman had been allocated may no longer be possible.  Once again, a 
requirement to retain such information for a 25 year period may be appropriate. 
§3.3 stipulates that “No compensation should be paid to patients receiving placebo in 
consideration of its failure to provide a therapeutic benefit”.  Given the requirement for 
equipoise in all clinical trials, this seems entirely consistent; the approval of a placebo-
controlled study is dependent on the premise that no treatment for the condition under 
study has been approved, or that the condition under study is relatively benign and so 
randomising subjects to placebo does not result in materially increased risk to the health of 
these subjects.  
7.5.4 Limitation of Compensation 
§3.4 of the Guidelines states that “No compensation should be paid (or it should be abated 
as the case may be) to the extent that the injury has arisen: 
§3.4.1 through a significant departure from the agreed protocol; 
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§3.4.2 through the wrongful act or default of a third party, including a doctor’s 
failure to deal adequately with an adverse reaction; 
§3.4.3 through contributory negligence by the patient.” 
Although the circumstances defined in §§3.4.1 and 3.4.2 are covered by the NHS 
Indemnity, these sections raise concerns.  Trial subjects do not see the protocol, and so are 
unlikely to suspect an injury to the foetus may be the result of either of these circumstances 
unless they had greater than average insight into the conduct of clinical trials.  Information 
relating to adverse reactions and their management is normally contained in the protocol 
and Investigators’ Brochure,553(a compilation of the clinical and nonclinical data on the 
investigational drug relevant to its study in humans) another document trial subjects do not 
see.  Given that the harm might not be apparent for many months (until birth) or years (as 
the child begins to show developmental abnormalities), the prospect of a trial subject’s 
parents relating a developmental abnormality to a departure from the protocol or a 
wrongful act must be remote once again placing a child injured in utero at a disadvantage 
seeking to claim compensation under these Guidelines. 
Providing the protocol and the Investigators’ Brochure to the trial subjects will not resolve 
this issue; few participants will have the knowledge or experience to use the information 
they contain.  Congenital abnormalities are reported to the regulatory authorities as serious 
adverse events, and causality assessed independently by the Investigator and the sponsor.  
For a child whose injuries are apparent at or before birth, assuming pre-study examinations 
gave no cause for concern, an independent assessment may establish whether there was a 
significant departure from the agreed protocol or a wrongful act, as a finding of fact rather 
than an assignment of causation.  The sponsor may be keen to ensure that an association 
between the injury and the investigational drug is not established, and an Investigator may 
wish to ensure that the conduct of the trial is not criticised.  The REC has the advantage of 
such independence; however, such investigations may be beyond the capacity of most 
RECs, which are composed of volunteers, and the investigative traits which may be 
necessary place such assessments more in the province of the MHRA.  However, the 
possibility of using the arbitration function defined within the Guidelines to examine such 
cases should be considered, as this would provide an independent assessment, and those 
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involved in such activities almost certainly will have developed the necessary investigative 
traits. 
For injuries which become apparent long after birth, solutions are less obvious.  A number 
of regional registers exist which capture congenital abnormalities at birth,
554
 but not later-
onset developmental abnormalities, and they are not configured to follow up trial 
participants.  The advantages of some form of prospective registry for pregnant trial 
participants will be considered in Chapter 8.  However, the prospect that some form of 
tracking of developmental abnormalities might uncover a protocol departure which 
possibly occurred many years earlier seems remote, and, accordingly, the child’s prospects 
of recovering compensation are low. 
7.5.5 Contributory Negligence 
The third category in §3.4 - contributory negligence - is perhaps the most controversial and 
legally complex.  The underlying concept is that an individual’s acts or omissions 
contributed to the harm or the extent of the harm sustained by that individual.  In such 
cases, a defendant may argue that this should defeat a claim for compensation entirely or 
reduce the level of damages, depending on the extent of the contribution to the harm.  In 
clinical trials involving pregnant women, it seems reasonable that this approach should 
apply to injuries sustained by the women themselves as much as they do to any other study 
participant.  However, the application of these criteria to injuries sustained by the foetus in 
utero is a different matter.  As discussed in Chapter 3.5, the pregnant woman has never 
been held to owe a legal duty of care to her foetus, and no child has successfully brought a 
claim against its mother in the UK for harm caused by her behaviour during the pregnancy. 
With one exception (attempting to procure an abortion) the law in the UK does not seek to 
control pregnant women’s behaviours which might adversely affect the foetus.  Should a 
child be born injured as a result of the pregnant woman’s acts or omissions, then, again 
with one exception (injuries sustained by the foetus in a road traffic accident when the 
pregnant woman is driving), she is immune from suit by the child under the Congenital 
Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 (CDCLA 1976), which will be examined later.  
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However, whilst the child cannot generally sue its mother for injuries arising from her 
negligence during the pregnancy, S.1.7 of the CDCLA 1976 does permit contributory 
negligence by the parent to be considered when assessing the child’s claim for 
compensation against a defendant who owed a duty of care to the pregnant woman and 
whose wrongful act caused foetal injury ‘to such extent as the court thinks just and 
equitable having regard to the parent’s responsibility’. 
The ABPI Guidelines make the same provision (§3.4.3), but it is unclear how this part of 
the Guidelines will be applied, i.e., whether it is intended to apply only to the pregnant 
woman to reduce a claim for compensation for injuries she has suffered herself, and that 
§1.3 (that the child should be treated as a patient-volunteer) should be read as applying to 
the child.  If §1.3 should be read in this way, then the pregnant woman’s behaviour is 
irrelevant to any claim by the child; the child cannot be said to have contributed in any 
meaningful way toward its own injury when it was in utero.  This interpretation of the 
Guidelines requires that the foetus is to this extent viewed as an independent research 
subject from the pregnant woman, which would be consistent with the ‘two-patient’ 
construction in Regulation 536 discussed in Chapter 6.3.  Conversely, if this provision of 
the Guidelines affects the compensation payable to the child as a result of the conduct of 
the woman, they are consistent with the CDCLA 1976, i.e. a ‘dyad’ model.  However, if 
compensation for in utero injury payable to the child is influenced by the conduct of 
someone who is, in this sense, an independent trial participant, that seems inconsistent with 
the principle laid down in §1.3 that the child should be treated as a patient-volunteer.  This 
apparent inconsistency between the ABPI Guidelines and the CDCLA 1976 seems unlikely 
to clarify matters, and so ensuring consistency between these two instruments would be 
desirable. 
Precedent for contributory negligence on the part of the pregnant woman which could 
affect the compensation recovered by the child is sparse.  A Canadian case
555
 concerning 
medical treatment rather than research concluded that the pregnant woman had contributed 
to the injuries with which her children were born, but that case was complicated by a failed 
termination.  The woman underwent an ‘abortion’ early in pregnancy, but failed to attend a 
post-operative examination.  Some three months later she discovered she was still pregnant 
and elected to continue the pregnancy, delivering twins, one of whom had a congenital 
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heart defect.  The physician was held to be negligent for not having reviewed a report 
which would have indicated the termination had failed, and the woman’s failure to attend 
the post-operative examination was held to constitute contributory negligence.  There 
appears to be only one reported clinical negligence case in the UK in which the court found 
contributory negligence by the patient.
556
  In that case, a woman was held to have 
contributed to the development of her own cervical cancer by having disregarded smear 
test appointments for six years.  However, here the (non-pregnant) claimant was the victim 
as well as the person who was contributorily negligent.  Given the paucity of cases, it 
appears that such issues are rarely raised and so the extent to which UK courts would be 
willing to ascribe contributory negligence to pregnant women giving birth to injured 
children within a conventional medical setting is unclear.  Even if all of the requirements 
for negligence could be established, one might assume that the policy which generally 
prevents a child from suing its mother for antenatal injury would remain a significant 
consideration, and might add to the reluctance of courts to reduce damages by ascribing 
contributory negligence to pregnant women.  It therefore seems unlikely the courts will 
support a radically different approach regarding clinical trials in which pregnant women 
are, seemingly knowingly, assuming a greater risk than their non-trial counterparts, to 
enable the generation of information which could help the wider population, and given the 
scrutiny which all clinical trials must undergo before enrolling participants.  Consistent 
with the ABPI Guidelines, it seems likely that mere participation would not be considered 
as contributory negligence and it would require some very significant conduct by a 
pregnant woman before that would be regarded as affecting any compensation to the child. 
Herring
557
 has described circumstances in which patients could, conceivably, be partly to 
blame for injuries which befall them.  These include cases where the patient has (i) not 
revealed relevant facts, (ii) chosen the wrong treatment, (iii) failed to take the treatment 
provided, and (iv) an unhealthy life-style which worsens the consequences of the 
negligence.  Other commentators have proposed that patients have responsibilities in 
addition to their rights,
558
 which should follow, in essence, the ‘neighbour’ principle set out 
by Lord Atkinson in Donoghue v Stevenson.
559
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However, few authors have considered pregnancy or the foetus, and all have restricted 
their deliberations to the conventional medical setting, rather than the clinical trial context, 
where the application of these considerations is perhaps somewhat tenuous.  The foetus 
cannot be accused of any of the acts described by Herring.  Of the four circumstances 
Herring outlines, within a trial setting, the second and third are likely to be under the 
control of the Investigator.  The fourth circumstance, if relevant, should have been 
addressed in the selection criteria within the protocol, which, of course, the trial subject 
does not see, and so cannot answer to, although she may be able to infer some of the 
criteria from the questions she is asked, but such deduction is clearly different from being 
given the information. 
The first circumstance, however, may be relevant.  Pregnant women may conceal 
information for many reasons, including (see Chapter 6.4) a desire to participate in the 
belief that doing so would confer benefit to herself or her foetus, i.e., therapeutic 
misconception.  The Investigator ought to be able to rely upon a competent pregnant 
woman’s statements;560 doing so will not normally constitute negligence, so the NHS 
Indemnity will not be relevant.  The concealed information may have excluded her from 
the study.  Should the pregnant woman experience a serious adverse event, that will 
impose additional work on the Investigator and medical team in managing and reporting 
the event to the sponsor, and for the sponsor in reporting the event to regulatory agencies 
worldwide.  This will inevitably incur costs which, should the child be born with a serious 
injury, could be substantial.  The pregnant woman appears to bear no liability towards any 
party, excepting, perhaps, her injured child in the form of a possible reduction of damages 
due to her contributory negligence should she make a successful claim on behalf of the 
child, and the concealed information was discovered.  Given the clear challenges of 
ascribing causality for any congenital abnormality, seeking to relate an abnormality to 
specific information withheld by the pregnant trial subject seems likely to be extremely 
difficult. 
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However, in all of this there is also the matter of justice for the child; why should its claim 
against a trial sponsor be reduced because of the conduct of its mother?  The child is 
clearly not at fault and it cannot recover damages from her.  Conversely, there is the 
argument that a sponsor should not be held liable to a child if the injury, or its extent, is not 
wholly attributable to some aspect of the trial within the sponsor’s control, including an 
inherent defect in the investigational drug.  The acts or omissions which would constitute 
relevant contributory negligence are unclear in both the ABPI Guidelines and S.1.7 of the 
CDCLA 1976. 
Both §3.4.3 of the Compensation Guidelines and S1.7 of the CDCLA 1976 could 
potentially be invoked in such a circumstance to reduce any compensation payable to the 
child.  It is not obvious that these circumstances would necessarily be brought to the 
attention of a potential trial subject within the consent process.  An abatement of 
compensation due to contributory negligence of the pregnant woman could amount to a 
potential injustice to the child, but that would be the same as in any other antenatal injury 
situation. 
The lack of clarity regarding the behaviours which would constitute contributory 
negligence, the remarkably small number of reported occasions upon which this appears to 
have been invoked, and the resulting injustice to the child, together, suggest that retaining 
this provision is unwarranted, and it should be removed from both the ABPI Guidelines 
and the CDCLA 1976, with removal from the latter restricted to a clinical trial setting, for 
reasons which will be explained in Chapter 8. 
7.5.6 Relative Risks, Benefits and Consent 
§4.2 of the ABPI Guidelines defines additional restrictions regarding compensatory 
payments in the event of trial-related injury.  It states:  
“Compensation may be abated, or in certain circumstances excluded, in the light of 
the following factors (on which will depend the level of risk the patient can 
reasonably be expected to accept): 
§4.2.1 the seriousness of the disease being treated, the degree of probability that 
adverse reactions will occur and any warnings given; 
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§4.2.2 the risks and benefits of established treatments relative to those known or 
suspected of the trial medicine.” 
This section is based on the premise that, having been properly informed of the potential 
risks, by enrolling into the trial, the subject has accepted the level of risk and so cannot 
reasonably seek compensation for the occurrence of an adverse reaction of which she was 
told.  Essentially, the ABPI is prospectively invoking a volenti defence
561
 which seems to 
contradict the essence of §1.6 (the fact that the patient has freely consented to participate in 
the trial should not exclude her from consideration for compensation under the Guidelines) 
and §1.7 (that the trial subject is not required to prove that the (sponsor) company has been 
negligent or that the product is defective).  
The interpretation of §4 should a foetus be injured in utero is unclear.  Having given her 
consent, the pregnant woman has also ‘consented’ for the foetus (see Chapter 4).  Even if 
the child is considered as a patient-volunteer under §1.3, it would appear that the pregnant 
woman’s consent may restrict the child’s possibility of recovery as much as it would affect 
the pregnant woman’s, if she were the injured person.  If this is correct, and if the criteria 
under §4.2 are deemed to be met, then a child born with a congenital injury would appear 
not to have a basis for claim under these Guidelines.  An alternative, canvassed earlier, 
might be that if §1.3 of the Guidelines is construed to favour the child,
562
 the pregnant 
woman’s consent may not constitute a bar to recovery.  The latter would be the preferable 
situation, for reasons of justice to the child. 
§4 raises two further issues.  The first is the appropriateness of another person giving 
consent and the possibility of the foetus being injured when the pregnant woman is not.  
This was explored in Chapter 4; the conclusion was that the maternal-foetal ‘dyad’ 
represented the best model, with the fully-informed pregnant woman taking decisions in 
the knowledge of the possible effects upon the foetus.  However, both the ABPI Guidelines 
and Regulation 536 seem to categorise the foetus as ‘another subject’ - although the ‘other 
subject’ cannot consent.  As discussed in Chapter 6.3, if the pregnant woman is considered 
as giving proxy consent for the foetus, i.e., a ‘two-patient’ model, as exists for paediatric 
and incapacitated subjects, then a child injured in utero should be able to claim 
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compensation in exactly the same way as minors and the incapax.  Perhaps the issues 
simply need to be disentangled.  The pregnant woman - alone - may consent to participate 
in a clinical trial which the REC - having utilised the special expertise specified in 
Regulation 536 - has decided is acceptable for pregnant women.  Should the resulting child 
be born injured, and that injury is held to be attributable to the clinical trial, then the child 
should receive appropriate compensation under §1.3, without limitations; this will be 
discussed in Chapter 8.  
The second relates to the statement regarding the gravity of the condition being treated.  
More serious conditions generally require more aggressive treatment, which may carry 
with it an increased risk of an adverse event, including foetal harm.  The adverse event 
might be considered to constitute a ‘less detrimental option’ than the untreated condition, 
at least as far as the woman is concerned, but could lead to an abatement of compensation.  
Should a pregnant woman enrol in a clinical trial with an investigational drug which offers 
the potential to treat her life-threatening condition, one would expect that the potential 
risks to her and her foetus would have been explained and accepted as part of the consent 
process.  If the woman is also giving consent ‘for’ her foetus, then the resulting child 
would be considered to have assumed the same risks as the pregnant woman who gave her 
consent for the trial.  Such a construction is certainly internally-consistent, if somewhat 
unedifying.  One might think that a pregnant woman who enrolled in a clinical trial would 
expect assurance that in doing so she was not also taking a significant risk of 
disadvantaging her future child, and that would still be the case where the condition she 
was suffering from was a serious one.  Women are legally entitled to balance the risks for 
themselves and their foetuses when considering medical treatment and if a drug was being 
given as part of routine medical treatment for a life threatening condition, a child born 
damaged may similarly find difficulty in recovering compensation.  However in a clinical 
trial setting, the additional issue arises that the demands of equipoise mean there may be no 
countervailing benefit to the woman to offset the risk to the foetus, as considered earlier.
563
 
Under §4.2.2, compensation may be abated, or in certain (undefined) circumstances 
excluded, depending on the risks and benefits of established treatments relative to those 
known or suspected of the trial medicine.  As described in Chapter 6.2, it would appear 
that, in the UK, clinical trials may proceed in advance of ICH-specified preclinical testing.  
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If clinical trials in pregnant women proceed in parallel to or in advance of reproductive 
toxicology testing, then - arguably - the investigative drug may have no known or 
suspected teratogenic effect, because the relevant research has not been conducted, in 
which case it may appear to be ‘safer’, or at least no riskier, than established treatment.  
Furthermore, established treatment may be simply supportive care; there may be no known 
treatment for a particular condition.  As discussed in Chapter 4.4, if the condition itself is 
teratogenic or foetotoxic, then once again the investigational drug may appear to be a 
‘better’ or ‘less detrimental’ option, as a result of which, should it express teratogenic 
effect, then recovery of compensation may prove challenging.  The occurrence of 
teratogenesis is not yet predictable, and so an approach which may deny compensation to a 
child born injured on the premise that an alternative treatment might have done the same 
seems flawed; it is arguably consistent with a ‘fault’ approach and less consistent with a 
no-fault one. 
A related issue arises when an investigational drug is administered to pregnant human 
subjects for the first time.  Given the lack of predictive accuracy of preclinical models,
564
 it 
would seem inconceivable that the consent documents would not contain a warning that 
the effects of the drug on the foetus are unknown, and yet that information, intended to 
inform and support the pregnant trial subject is the same piece of information that 
seemingly results in her child, if born injured, being prevented from seeking 
compensation.
565
  The child born injured is prevented from asserting a legal claim for 
compensation as that would be contrary to the prior conduct of another, i.e., the pregnant 
woman, signing the consent document warning that there were unknown teratogenic risks.  
So, although consent to participate per se should not exclude a claimant from consideration 
for compensation under the Guidelines (§1.6), and the claimant does not need to establish 
negligence or that the product was defective (§1.7), it would appear that the pregnant 
woman signing a consent form which contains relevant warnings may potentially prevent 
her child’s claim - and yet signing the consent form is a prerequisite for participation.  If 
correct, this construction would also seem, potentially, to exclude claims from all subject 
groups.  Since awards under these Guidelines are not made public, the accuracy of this 
construction cannot be ascertained. 
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7.5.7 Relevance of the ABPI Guideline in this population 
Whilst the absence of a requirement to furnish all trial subjects with the ABPI 
Compensation Guidelines (when the trial sponsor is an ABPI member) is disappointing, 
based on the analyses above, the Guidelines may not provide the level of protection which 
the trial subjects may believe is the case. 
The Compensation Guidelines, like the data retention periods discussed earlier in this 
chapter, may be applicable to the vast majority of the people who now become trial 
participants annually.  Were this not the case, the press and the courts would surely abound 
with cases, and they do not.  The Guidelines were introduced in 1970, and so we have 45 
years of experience, involving an unknown number of trial participants (due to incomplete 
record-keeping prior to the implementation of the CTD in 2004), upon which to make this 
conclusion.  However, for the reasons explained in the Introduction to this thesis, the 
number of pregnant trial subjects on whom to base an assessment of these Guidelines is 
infinitesimally small, and given the low incidence of iatrogenic teratogenicity, the number 
of cases which would arise for consideration would - hopefully - be even smaller.  
However, the ABPI Guidelines clearly contain a number of limitations and uncertainties 
which are scattered throughout their eight pages, and so may not be readily-assimilated by 
participants, which could mean, even if they request a copy of the Guidelines, they remain 
unaware of the impacts of these restrictions.  Since pregnancy constitutes a unique 
condition which raises many distinct issues, a separate set of Guidelines specifically for 
use in clinical trials in pregnant women may be an appropriate means by which potential 
participants are properly informed regarding this route to compensation in the event of 
foetal injury. Of course, should the sponsor not be a member of the ABPI, these Guidelines 
would be inapplicable, and recourse may need to be made directly to the courts, most 
likely via the provisions within the CDCLA 1976. 
7.6 The Investigator as a Respondent - the NHS Indemnity 
The current position regarding NHS insurance is contained in the recently-released 
document by the Department of Health to all universities in the UK.
566
  In the event of 
negligent harm during a clinical trial, when the NHS body owes a duty of care to the 
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healthy volunteer or patient harmed, the NHS Indemnity comes into effect, as described 
earlier in this chapter.  Public bodies, including the Department of Health, the Medical 
Research Council and NHS trusts, are unable to pay compensation for non-negligent harm, 
although they may consider an ex-gratia payment in the case of a claim.  In the event of 
foetal harm manifesting upon birth, the mother, representing her child, would need to raise 
an action in negligence against the Investigator should she elect to follow this route, again 
most likely via the provisions within CDCLA 1976.  As indicated in the previous section, 
evidence of negligence in the form of departure from the protocol or disregard of 
information within the Investigators’ Brochure, i.e., fault, would be particularly difficult to 
establish, in addition to the causation requirement. 
7.7 The Trial Approvers as Respondents 
 7.7.1 The REC 
Successive UK governments have seemed keen to distinguish between the ethical and legal 
issues associated with clinical trials.  This distinction seems sensible.  The purpose of the 
review by the REC is to assess whether a proposed study is ethical; the REC structure in 
most European countries, whilst admitting lawyers, is neither intended nor equipped to 
provide a comprehensive review of compliance with applicable legislation, and approval 
from the REC is predicated upon the condition that the trial will be conducted in a manner 
consistent with applicable law.  The most recent version of Department of Health’s 
Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees,
567
 published in 2011, states at 
§5.4.2 that “RECs will accept credible assurances that others will do what is expected of 
them” and gives the following examples: 
(a) A REC need not reconsider the quality of the science, as this is the responsibility of 
the sponsor (the TeGenero incident, discussed later, arguably illustrates the flaw in 
this position); 
(b) A REC can expect to rely on established mechanisms for ensuring the proper 
conduct of the research at individual sites (the processes in NHS hospitals for 
establishing protocol non-compliance months or years previously are not 
established); 
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(c) Where others have a regulatory responsibility, a REC can expect to rely on them to 
fulfil it; the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has the primary 
legal responsibility for considering the safety of the research it regulates, and it may 
authorise trials in the absence of data defined in the relevant ICH Guidelines. 
The responsibility for ensuring legislative compliance rests with the sponsor, and a list of 
Enforcing Authorities is given in Appendix D of the Governance Arrangements.  Appendix 
D also contains the statement: “An appointing (health) authority…. indemnifies members 
of its RECs to relieve them of personal liability in respect of their opinions of the ethics of 
research”.  The reason for this indemnification is not immediately obvious, nor is the basis 
upon which the REC, seemingly, cannot be held liable in negligence by subjects injured in 
clinical trials.  The answer appears to be that a REC lacks a legal personality separate from 
that of its members; it is an unincorporated association brought together for a particular 
purpose but which does not have legal personality
568
 as would be the case for a limited 
company.  As a result, an action regarding a REC’s conduct must be brought against the 
individual members or the Health Authority (hence the members’ indemnification), as the 
appointing body, and possibly, for some of the members, the employer.  Neither the MHU 
Regulations 2004 nor Regulation 536 alters the existing legal position of the REC.  Thus 
the prospect for successful action against the REC itself is doubtful, although RECs may 
be subject to judicial review.
569
  Were an action to be brought against an NHS REC it 
would need to be brought against the body establishing the REC and individual members 
would be joined in the action.  Alternatively the NHS body establishing the REC may be 
held to owe a duty owed to research subjects; the REC is, in effect, a sub-committee of the 
Health Research Authority, and the Authority is legally responsible for the decisions of the 
REC.
570
  
Thus, in the event of injury, the REC would appear to be unlikely to shoulder any legal 
liability, although the RECs’ apparently unquestioning acceptance of assurances from 
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other parties may be open to criticism.  This is in contrast with the position in the USA, for 
example, where IRBs bear responsibility for ensuring legislative compliance.
571
 
 7.7.2 The MHRA and Related Bodies 
The MHRA also seems an unlikely respondent in the event of an action to recover 
damages for trial-related injury.  The MHRA is neither a ‘producer’ nor ‘supplier’ under 
the Consumer Protection Act 1987, so no claim against the MHRA could be mounted on 
that basis; in any event, investigational medicinal products are not subject to this 
legislation.  No cause of action for breach of statutory duty exists in relation to any 
breaches of the Medicines Act 1968, which provides the statutory basis for UK medicines 
regulation
572
.  Accordingly, if a trial subject brought an action for damages against the 
MHRA, it would most likely need to be framed as a common law action in negligence, on 
the basis that the MHRA did not properly consider the safety aspects of a trial in 
authorising it to proceed. 
To date, there has not been a successful civil action for damages against the UK or any 
European regulatory body, although there have been attempts to establish liability.  The 
most recent of these in the UK involved the development of Reyes Syndrome in a child 
given aspirin.  The UK regulatory body at the time was the Committee on the Safety of 
Medicines (CSM).  In Smith v Secretary of State for Health,
573
 Morland J found on the 
facts that no fault was established against the Secretary of State, the Department’s 
Secretariat or the CSM.  He considered whether the CSM could owe a duty of care, and 
concluded that the relevant acts or omissions (in this case, an alleged failure to issue a 
warning in a timely manner) should be categorised in law as discretionary/policy decisions, 
taken in the exercise of statutory powers or duties, and so were not justiciable, although he 
did not rule out the possibility of the CSM ever owing a duty of care in tort to an individual 
member of the public affected by a failure to exercise or an improper exercise of its 
statutory powers and functions.  This case appears not to have been cited subsequently, 
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suggesting that any attempts to establish the MHRA’s possible liability have not 
progressed to the courts. 
7.8 Specific Legislative Instruments 
The four instruments which might offer a route to compensation for foetal injury are the 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 
1979, the Consumer Protection Act, 1987, and the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994.  
The latter two are of less relevance to the setting of clinical trials of investigational drugs, 
and so will be addressed first before considering the two items of legislation introduced 
with the specific intent of providing routes to a remedy in the event of iatrogenic injury. 
7.8.1 Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 (SSGA 1994) 
The SSGA 1979 places upon sellers an obligation to ensure that merchandise meets the 
standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any 
description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and other pertinent circumstances.  The 
extent of this Act, defined in section 8 (3) is that it “has effect in relation to contracts of 
sale of goods, hire purchase agreements, contracts for the transfer of goods, contracts for 
the hire of goods and redemptions of trading stamps for goods (as the case may be)”, 
which clearly does not capture the situation which obtains in a clinical trial setting.  Thus, 
whilst a reasonable person might not consider as satisfactory an investigational drug which 
is possibly teratogenic, this Act does not offer a child born injured a route to a remedy. 
7.8.2 Consumer Protection Act, 1987 (CPA 1987) 
The CPA 1987 is applicable to approved medicines.  Pursuant to European Community 
Directive 85/374/EEC (the Product Liability Directive), Part 1 of the Act introduces a 
regime of strict liability for damage arising from defective products.  Section 2 imposes 
civil liability in tort for damage caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product upon the 
producer and importers of the product into the European Union for commercial sale.  Thus, 
the requirement to establish causation remains.  As a condition of approval the 
manufacturer of the drug will have been required to submit to the regulatory authorities all 
preclinical and clinical information relating to the drug, to maintain the documentation 
described earlier in this chapter, and so recovery of relevant information in support of a 
claim should be possible.  Section 4(1)(e) of the CPA 1987 provides a statutory defence, 
commonly referred to as the ‘Development Risks Defence’, which states that: “the state of 
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scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a producer of 
products of the same description as the product in question might be expected to have 
discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his control”. 
Although not strictly analogous, Burton J.’s judgment in A v National Blood Authority,574 
set something of a landmark: he considered that the ‘development risks’ defence did not 
apply where the existence of a generic defect was known or where it should have been 
known from accessible information, and the knowledge held by the medical profession was 
irrelevant; potential patients had a right to be warned too.  This case was heard shortly after 
Pearce,
575
 and it is tempting to suggest that the concept of the ‘prudent patient’ was in 
Burton J’s contemplation in coming to his ruling. 
As the CPA 1987 is applicable to approved drugs, this ruling is irrelevant to investigational 
drugs, but the Act could be engaged regarding a comparator agent in a clinical trial, and to 
this limited extent it may therefore have some utility, although the difficulties in 
establishing causation would remain.  The ‘development risks defence’ could provide a 
response to a thalidomide-type claim, or at least ensure such complicated litigation resulted 
that redress could be long deferred.
576
  As noted by Howells and Weatherill: 
“Given the presence of the development risks defence it is likely that thalidomide 
would not be labelled defective because the state of scientific knowledge would not 
have revealed the defect.”577 
Miller and Goldberg concur, contending that it is “strongly arguable” that for thalidomide 
one would have had to identify “some standard or general acceptance within the advanced 
sectors of the relevant scientific community that there was a need for … testing on 
pregnant animals.”  Given the absence of such a standard at the time, they conclude that 
the manufacturers of thalidomide may well have succeeded with a development risks 
defence had the Directive been in force.
578
 
                                                          
574
 A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All E.R. 289. 
575
 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust, [1999] P.I.Q.R. P53. 
576
 As Stevens comments, the “battle for the Thalidomide victims of Great Britain lasted longer than the 
Trojan War”. Stevens, T.D. Dark Remedy: The Impact of Thalidomide and Its Revival as a Vital Medicine.  
Cambridge: Basic Books, 2001, at p79. 
577
 Howells, G., Weatherill, S.  Consumer Protection Law, 2
nd
 Edn.  Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005, at 
p249. 
578
 Miller, C.J., Goldberg, R.S.  Product Liability, 2nd edn.  Oxford, OUP, 2004 at p520. 
Chapter 7  Routes to Compensation in the Event of Trial-Emergent Injury 
163 
 
Upon becoming aware of reports that a licenced drug may be associated with a teratogenic 
risk, the manufacturer is obliged to warn prescribers and patients of that risk.  Had the risk 
been known prior to the approval of the drug, either the drug would not have been 
approved, or that information would have been contained in the package insert which 
accompanies all medicines, and it would also have been documented in the information 
provided to prescribers.  The approval of the drug and the absence of relevant warnings 
indicate that the existence of the defect was not known and, arguably, “not discoverable in 
the light of the scientific and technical knowledge, available …. at the time.”579 
Since the thalidomide tragedy was one of the main drivers behind both the CDCLA 1976 
and the CPA 1987, these conclusions perhaps illustrate most poignantly how ineffective 
the legislative protection is for the foetus. 
For trial subjects allocated to the investigational drug, the CPA 1987 does not provide an 
avenue to a remedy.  Even if that drug goes on to become an approved medicine, and a 
claim can be brought within the limitation period, the development risks defence - that the 
defect could not have been known based on available information at the time of the injury - 
would potentially apply.  For an approved drug being used as a comparator in a clinical 
trial, the CPA 1987 could be engaged, but causation would need to be established, and if 
the teratogenic injury was the first reported, the claim may be defeated by a combination of 
the development risks defence described above and the balance of probabilities argument 
addressed later in this chapter. 
7.8.3 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 (CDCLA 1976) 
The perceived hiatus in the common and civil law approaches for the recovery of 
compensation for congenital injury in England and Wales in the wake of thalidomide led 
the Law Commission
580
 to recommend a legislative approach to permit the recovery of 
damages by a child born injured.  Two years later, the CDCLA 1976 came into force in 
England and Wales; all claims for antenatal injury at common law are now brought under 
this Act.  The Scottish Law Commission considered that Scots law already accorded a 
common law right of action to live-born children injured in utero.
581
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The legislative approach seems attractive for many reasons, not least that it avoids the need 
for the courts to manipulate the traditional elements of tort law to resolve the apparent 
contradiction of a duty of care being owed to a foetus which lacks legal personality, and 
whose existence may be unknown at the time the injury is suffered, e.g., during the first 
trimester when the foetus is at its most biologically vulnerable as organogenesis begins.
582
  
The existence of the foetus will be known for clinical trials intentionally conducted in a 
pregnant population, and the fact that the Act explicit states that a duty may exist to 
compensate a child born injured as a result of acts or omissions before its birth provides a 
clear starting point for litigation.  That said, the relevance of the provisions of the CDCLA 
1976 to the clinical trial setting has not been clarified in the courts. 
The Act imposes liability for antenatal injury when a child is born alive and suffering from 
a disability caused by a wrongful act affecting either parent in his or her ability to have a 
healthy child (section 1(2)(a)), or affecting the mother in her pregnancy, or the mother or 
the child in the course of birth (section 1(2)(b)).  The defendant is liable to the child if 
he/she would also be liable in tort to the parent (section 1(3)).  Liability to the child is 
derivative, usually from the mother,
583
 for example a physician negligently administering a 
teratogenic drug to a pregnant woman.  Thus, the CDCLA 1976 might appear to be 
applicable to clinical trials involving pregnant women, as the Investigator certainly can be 
liable in tort to the trial subject - the pregnant woman (applying the ‘dyad’ model).  
Assuming the Investigator has complied fully with the approved protocol, and has not in 
any sense fallen short of the expected standards of a clinical Investigator in minimising the 
risk of harm, to the extent it was within his power to do so, to the pregnant woman and her 
foetus, as discussed in Chapter 5.4, then it is difficult to see how a congenital abnormality 
could be the result of a wrongful act by the Investigator. 
However, an additional demand is imposed on a child seeking recovery for injury in utero 
regarding causation.  The CDCLA at section1(2)(b) provides that (emphasis added) “An 
occurrence to which this section applies is one which…(b) affected the mother during her 
pregnancy, or affected her or the child in the course of its birth, so that the child is born 
with disabilities which would not otherwise have been present.”  Thus, in addition to 
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establishing causation, the child needs also to prove that but for the ‘occurrence’ he could 
have been born uninjured.  The defendant could maintain that, despite proof that the 
pregnant woman had not been provided with adequate information regarding the risks, the 
claimant child still has to establish that, had adequate information been provided, the injury 
would not have happened, i.e., the woman would not have taken part in the trial because of 
the additional information, consistent with the judgement in Pearce,
584
 explained in 
Chapter 6.4, and as a result the child would have been born uninjured.  This is in addition 
to the need to establish that the injury was, on the balance of probabilities, due to the trial 
drug, rather than being an unrelated congenital abnormality. 
Section 1(5) of the Act stipulates that a person tortiously liable to the parent is not 
answerable to the child for anything he did or omitted to do when responsible in a 
professional capacity for treating or advising the parent, if he took reasonable care having 
due regard to then received professional opinion applicable to the particular class of case.  
This section contains three distinct elements: professional capacity, treatment and advice, 
which will be addressed in turn. 
The reference to received professional opinion is reminiscent of the Bolam
585
 standard 
which was unchallenged when the CDCLA 1976 was enacted.  In Sidaway,
586
 Sir John 
Donaldson MR commented that “’Due regard’ involves an exercise of judgement inter alia 
as to whether ‘received professional opinion’ is engaged in the same exercise as the law”, 
and suggested the alternative wording (additional word emphasised) “The duty is fulfilled 
if the doctor acts in accordance with a practice rightly accepted as proper by a body of 
skilled and experienced medical men.”  As discussed in Chapter 6.4.1, it seems likely that 
the standard defined in Montgomery would now be considered appropriate.  The question 
of whether the ethics and regulatory review processes which preceded approval of the trial 
would constitute received professional opinion, thereby insulating the Investigator and the 
sponsor from liability, has similarly not been tested.  If those reviews do constitute 
received professional opinion, issues might then arise in respect of the liability of the 
MHRA and/or the REC, but as discussed previously, this seems unlikely to be a successful 
route for legal action. 
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Given the uncertainties regarding the Investigator-Subject relationship explained in 
Chapter 5, and the restrictions regarding the information the Investigator has within a 
clinical trial, the treatment element of section 1.5 is difficult to sustain.  In a Phase I study, 
the subject is not being treated at all.  In a Phase II or III study, the subject may be 
receiving placebo or a comparator, and the Investigator may not know this.  Given the 
ethical requirement for equipoise, even if the subject is allocated to the investigational 
drug, the conduct of the trial means that the efficacy of the agent is unproven, and it may 
be ineffective.  Taken together, the Investigator can hardly be said to be treating the 
subject. 
Similarly, as adherence to the approved protocol is a requirement under the MHU 
Regulations 2004, the Investigator is deprived of clinical freedom.  A number of 
commentators have argued that the constraints on clinical freedom imposed by adhering to 
a protocol deprive the Investigator of the opportunity to advise.
587
  Thus, if the Investigator 
is not treating the patient, and is deprived of the opportunity to advise the patient, arguably, 
section 1.5 is not applicable to the clinical trial setting. 
Nevertheless, if the trial participant has signed the consent document(s) approved by the 
REC, and the Investigator has been available to answer the pregnant woman’s questions, 
the Investigator arguably has acted in a professional capacity when advising the participant 
insofar as that is possible within the constraints of a clinical trial described previously, and 
so would appear to have complied with the defence defined in the Act in section 1(5). 
Finally, section 1.7 of the CDCLA 1976 creates provision to reduce damages to the extent 
the court considers just and equitable should the parent, in this setting the mother, share the 
responsibility for the child being born disabled.  Given that participation in a clinical trial 
is entirely voluntary and therefore avoidable, one might construe that the mother is entirely 
responsible for the child’s disability (factual causation of the but-for test).  However, 
unless the mother was negligent in some way, e.g., not following the trial protocol, or 
withholding relevant information, as described above, her participation does not seem 
likely to be deemed to be the cause of the injury.  The legal causation will come from the 
list given in the Introduction to this chapter (an adverse reaction to the investigational drug, 
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an adverse reaction to a comparator agent, an adverse response to a procedure, and an 
adverse consequence due to the underlying condition), but, as indicated above, the child 
will need to establish that the specific injuries would not have arisen but for one of these 
causes.  
Unless negligence in some aspect of the conduct of the trial can be established, then the 
CDCLA 1976 does not constitute a promising route by which a child injured in utero by an 
investigational or an approved drug given to a pregnant woman in a clinical trial setting 
might seek a remedy.  In such a circumstance, recourse would, where possible, be made to 
the ABPI scheme in the first instance to avoid the expense of and time for litigation.  
However, as explained in Chapter 7.5, the conditions within the Guidelines generate a 
number of uncertainties.  Although it seems to be intended that compensation can be paid 
without proof of fault, a number of limitations within the Guidelines mean that the 
outcome may be the same under either route.  The CDCLA 1976 was drafted when 
thalidomide, a marketed product, was, understandably, to the fore, and the conduct of 
clinical trials in pregnant women was not in contemplation.  Both of these situations have 
now changed: acutely teratogenic drugs have not been seen since thalidomide, thalidomide 
has now found a therapeutic niche, and clinical trials are about to be conducted using 
thalidomide in pregnant women.  The question of whether the CDCLA 1976 is relevant to 
clinical trials will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
7.8.4 The Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 (VDPA 1979) 
There is no doubt that vaccination has played a significant role in reducing the incidence of 
a number of formerly commonplace infectious diseases, with a resultant reduction in 
morbidity.
588
  The rationale behind vaccination programmes is that of ‘herd immunity’: if a 
sufficiently large proportion of people in a community is immunised, then it is more 
difficult for that disease to be passed to unimmunised people.
589
  In the case of some 
vaccinations, therefore, this constitutes a medical procedure conducted primarily for the 
good of society as a whole, rather than for the clinical benefit of the recipient.  The most 
obvious example of this is rubella vaccine for boys; the disease would probably be almost 
harmless to the child himself, but his vaccination contributes to the protection of the foetus 
which can be seriously harmed by maternal rubella during the first trimester of pregnancy 
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(another example of foetal protection, in which we do something to the living to protect the 
not-yet-born).
590
  However, vaccination has long been known to carry a range of risks, and 
there have been numerous reports of ‘vaccine disasters’.591 
The VDPA 1979, like the CDCLA 1976, was one of the results of the Pearson commission, 
the major inquiry into civil damages in the UK in the 1970s.  It is applicable to disabilities 
resulting from vaccinations against particular diseases specified by the Secretary of State, 
including those resulting from maternal vaccination against one of the diseases in the 
relevant list during pregnancy.  In the mid-1970s the UK Government had started to make 
ex gratia payments for vaccine injury.  The Commission recommended that the 
Government should accept liability to pay full ‘compensation’ for vaccine injury on the 
basis that this is the very occasional price that society pays for the benefit of defeating 
disease through national vaccination programmes, and the Government had recommended 
numerous such programmes.
592
  The 1979 Act placed this recommendation on a statutory 
basis.  Since the Act was originally passed, the list of diseases has been updated on a 
number of occasions, the extent of disability required has been reduced, the time within 
which to make a claim has been extended, and the size of payments increased.  It does not 
specifically restrict disability to that resulting from an approved, licenced vaccine, and 
given the general benefit to society which has resulted from vaccination, one might infer 
that the Act could be engaged in respect of congenital injuries related to investigational 
vaccines targeting the specified diseases.  The Act does not create a no-fault liability 
scheme, or, arguably, a compensation scheme; the classic view of tortious compensation is 
that its purpose is to put the victim back into the pre-tortious position, and this is clearly 
impossible in cases of the irreversible personal injuries which characterise vaccine damage. 
Immunisation against whooping cough was much in the public eye in the mid-1970s.
593
  
Vaccination rates were falling, due to concerns regarding the risk of vaccine-related 
neurological damage.
594
  Reassurances from the Joint Committee on Vaccination and 
Immunisation were not helped by the lack of reliable data on the incidence of vaccine-
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related damage.
595
  The Government-commissioned National Childhood Encephalopathy 
Study (NCES) was launched in 1976 to assess the risks of such injury.  The initial report, 
published in 1981, found a significant association between pertussis vaccination and severe 
neurological injury and death.
596
  The Pearson Commission had recommended the 
introduction of strict liability in tort for vaccine damaged people.  However, in 1983, the 
Government made clear that the recommendation would not be implemented, considering 
that the 1979 Act already provided vaccine damaged children with a measure of preference 
without prejudicing their right to institute legal proceedings on the grounds that negligence 
had occurred.
597
 
Thus, there are two potential routes to financial recompense for the victims of vaccine 
damage: they can claim under the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme created by the VPDA 
1979 and/or bring claims before the civil courts.  The latter route has never led to a 
successful claim in England or Wales, principally because of the outcome in Loveday v 
Renton.
598
 In an unusually proactive judicial intervention, Stuart-Smith LJ ordered 
discovery of some of the individual medical records examined in NCES and subsequently 
adjusted the data tables to eliminate the effect of certain cases which appeared to have 
caused errors.  His Lordship concluded that the published results were erroneous, that the 
study did not reveal any meaningful additional risk attributable to pertussis vaccine, and 
that the claimant had failed to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that pertussis 
vaccine could cause brain damage in young children.  The aim of the case was to 
determine the general issue of causation, not to ascertain whether pertussis vaccine had 
caused injuries to the claimant herself, and the financial provisions within the VDPA 1979 
had been intended as a temporary measure pending the outcome of this test case.  The 
study’s authors subsequently published a follow-up study which addressed the judge’s 
criticisms of the original study, and again concluded that on rare occasions, the vaccine 
could cause severe neurological injury.
599
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The Loveday case was the third case of alleged vaccine damage to reach court in Britain. 
The first claimant lost his case in the Court of Session in Edinburgh in 1985 because the 
court was not satisfied that his condition had been caused by the vaccine,
600
 although the 
Vaccine Damage Tribunal had previously accepted that a temporal relationship was 
sufficient grounds to establish a causal link between the vaccine and the brain damage but 
this was rejected in the Court of Session.  The first English test case collapsed in 1986 
when the legal aid certificate was discharged because the claimant’s mother (in Lord 
Justice Stuart Smith's words) "was not telling the truth" about the date of onset of 
symptoms.
601
  
This therefore leaves the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme as the more likely route for 
injured people to seek recompense.  Up to June 2005, 918 of 5312 (17 per cent) of claims 
were successful. Approximately 850 awards were made between 1979 and 1989; the 
apparent progressive reduction in the number of awards may reflect the backlog of cases 
when the 1979 Act was introduced
602
 and the continuing increase in the safety of vaccines, 
although a recent Parliamentary debate drew attention to injuries resulting from newer 
vaccines.
603
  Of the 4394 refusals, 4017 (91 per cent) were rejected on the grounds that 
causation was not established.  Some 12 million children are vaccinated annually, meaning 
that in the 25 years since the VDPA 1979 was enacted approximately 300 million children 
had been vaccinated, of whom only 918 (0.0003 per cent) suffered harm satisfying the 
criteria described in the VDPA 1979.
604
  Yet the concerns in the 1970s which led to the 
VPDA 1979 seem still to be present, i.e., that in a small number of people vaccines cause 
significant injury, and we lack an effective mechanism to ‘compensate’ them. 
The VDPA 1979 has, therefore, three potential shortcomings in the protection it provides 
for pregnant women participating in clinical trials: it does not cover disability resulting 
from drugs other than vaccines, it is restricted to specific diseases, and it requires the 
occurrence of specified level of disability.  However, it has the advantages of an automatic 
entitlement without the need to establish negligence, and pre-defined fixed levels of 
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payments.  The major issue, however, is that of establishing causation, will now be 
addressed more extensively. 
7.9 The Burden of Causation 
To demonstrate factual causation in tort law, the claimant must establish that the loss 
suffered was caused by the defendant (assuming the defendant owed the claimant a duty of 
care), and in most cases a simple application of the 'but for' test will resolve the question of 
causation, i.e., 'but for' the defendant's actions, would the claimant have suffered the 
loss?
605
  This requirement is present in the CDCLA 1976 as well as the VPDA 1979.  If the 
defendant’s breach of duty is a factually relevant cause, the court must proceed to assess 
whether liability should follow, based upon the balance of probabilities.  The principle of 
corrective justice requires that a defendant should only be liable only for harm that he/she 
has wrongfully caused. 
Causation may be problematic where more than one possible cause exists.  Over the years, 
a number of exceptions to the ‘but for’ test have been created.  One example is the 
Fairchild principle, which allows claimants to succeed on causation grounds without 
having to prove a causal connection between the defendant’s faulty behaviour and the 
pleaded harm, and was a policy-based response to the difficulties encountered by 
mesothelioma victims who had been negligently exposed to asbestos by multiple 
consecutive employers.
606
 This exception does not appear to be applicable to the setting of 
clinical trials in pregnant women, but the precedent of a policy-based exception will be 
discussed later. 
Liability for injuries caused by medicinal products is notoriously difficult to prove.  All 
bioactive substances can produce undesirable, just as desirable, effects.  Thus the claimant 
faces the challenges of distinguishing a drug-related effect from the consequences of the 
condition for which the drug was prescribed or from the underlying incidence of the 
‘injury’ in the population at large, entailing the consideration of hundreds of thousands of 
documents.
607
  The lack or uncertainty of scientific evidence regarding the cause of injuries 
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is amongst the most difficult problems faced by courts in determining causation.
608
  These 
may arise from limitations in scientific knowledge about a particular biological process 
(general causation) or from the difficulty in providing a scientific explanation for the 
sequence of biological processes in an individual case (individual causation).
609
  Proof of 
the former is necessary but not sufficient in product liability and personal injury litigation, 
because even if the claimant falls within the class of individuals who might or could have 
sustained the relevant injury as a result of the postulated cause, it remains to be established 
whether the particular claimant in fact did so. 
Scientific evidence frequently presents a problem for the courts: the subject-matter is often 
complex; the experts who present the evidence can be selected on the basis that they are 
already known to hold particular opinions; judges and juries are frequently unsure about 
how to assess the evidence.
610
  Epidemiology is the study of disease patterns in populations 
which seeks to identify and understand causes of disease.  By using this data to predict 
how and when diseases are likely to arise, it aims to prevent the disease and its 
consequences through public health regulation or the development of medication.  
Epidemiological studies may disclose an apparent association between a substance and a 
disease, and often are submitted as evidence in product liability and toxic tort litigation.
611
  
At present, the UK courts are highly sceptical of epidemiological evidence,
612
 and judges 
have been known to re-analyse the data presented.
613
 
However, a distinction must be drawn between evidence of association from 
epidemiological data and proof of causation.  In epidemiological research in the UK, the 
most common set of causal inference criteria used to assess whether a statistical 
association is indicative of a causal relationship between an exposure and a disease is the 
Bradford-Hill Criteria.
614
  These criteria are: 
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1. Strength (effect size): A small association does not mean that there is not a causal 
effect, though the larger the association, the more likely that it is causal. 
2. Consistency (reproducibility): Consistent findings observed by different persons in 
different places with different samples strengthens the likelihood of an effect. 
3. Specificity: Causation is likely if there is a specific population at a specific site and 
disease with no other likely explanation. The more specific an association between a 
factor and an effect is, the greater the probability of a causal relationship. 
4. Temporality: The effect has to occur after the cause; if there is an expected delay 
between the cause and expected effect, then the effect must occur after that delay. 
5. Biological gradient: Greater exposure should generally lead to greater incidence of the 
effect. However, in some cases, the mere presence of the factor can trigger the effect. 
In other cases, an inverse proportion is observed: greater exposure leads to lower 
incidence. 
6. Plausibility: A plausible mechanism between cause and effect is helpful (but Hill noted 
that knowledge of the mechanism is limited by current knowledge). 
7. Coherence: Coherence between epidemiological and laboratory findings increases the 
likelihood of an effect. However, Hill noted that ".. lack of such [laboratory] evidence 
cannot nullify the epidemiological effect on associations". 
8. Experiment: "Occasionally it is possible to appeal to experimental evidence". 
9. Analogy: The effect of similar factors may be considered. 
As explained in Chapter 7.5.2, the first few cases of any adverse reaction to a particular 
drug may be extremely difficult to link to the drug.  In the well-known iatrogenic injury 
cases, such as thalidomide, TeGenero and, more recently, Bial,
615
 the injuries were 
obvious, temporally-clustered, and occurred in a high proportion of those who were given 
the suspect drug, thereby satisfying criteria 1-4, above.  Should a drug express a 
teratogenic effect in preclinical toxicology studies, the manufacturer will attempt to 
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establish the mechanism, to assess whether it exists in humans, the species which exhibit 
the effect, and the dose or plasma concentration at which it occurs, to enable a decision to 
be reached regarding the adequacy of the safety margin.
616
  Such an approach may satisfy a 
general causation argument.  However, if a teratogenic effect is not detected at doses 
several times those anticipated to be clinically-effective in humans, and the literature is 
devoid of such information, as would be expected in pharmaceutical research where the 
focus is on developing patentable and therefore mechanistically-unprecedented agents, 
then a biologically-plausible explanation for a particular injury may not yet be known and 
coherence between findings impossible to establish.  Teratogenic injury may not be 
immediately obvious, and the delay between drug administration and detectable 
consequence may be many months or years.  Most clinical studies examine only one or two 
doses, and so a biological gradient may be difficult to identify.  Taken together, the utility 
of the Bradford-Hill criteria in the area of teratogenesis does not appear high. 
The balance of probabilities test will rarely favour a claimant.  As explained earlier,
617
 the 
incidence of spontaneous congenital abnormalities is in the range of 1 in 33 to 1 in 45 live 
births.  The term ‘spontaneous’ denotes only that a specific cause has not been identified, 
and so the true rate of genuinely ‘spontaneous’ abnormalities may be substantially lower.  
If a drug is responsible for a teratogenic injury in 1 out of 333,000 pregnancies 
(approximately the same rate as vaccine damage injuries satisfying the criteria for 
payment; see Chapter 7.8.4), then the first example may arise long after the drug is 
approved for use, as an isolated, unprecedented case; neither the Bradford-Hill criteria nor 
the balance of probabilities upon which a civil claim for damages would necessarily be 
based would favour the claimant, given the underlying incidence of congenital 
abnormalities.
618
  That said, if the drug is approved and marketed, the prospect always 
exists of developing a series of cases which may support a claim for damages.  Conversely, 
if that first case arises during a pre-registration clinical trial, it may not be recognised as 
related to the drug, unless, like thalidomide, the injury is immediately obvious and has 
extremely unusual characteristics.  If the drug concerned is withdrawn from development, 
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and never reaches clinical use, no further cases will arise, and so the opportunity to 
establish a causal link in epidemiological terms or a case series will never exist.  However, 
if the drug’s development is continued, then a second case may arise only after some 
660,000 pregnant women have been treated, which could be many years after the clinical 
trial in which the first foetal injury occurred.  So, although the opportunity might then exist 
to establish a case series, the prospect of recompense for that first, injured child is at best 
remote, and certainly much-delayed. 
The latter scenario, however, illustrates another difficulty for the courts: that of resolving 
cases based on the existing evidence.  The continuing accumulation of scientific 
knowledge means that, over time, the balance of probabilities may change.  By then, of 
course, the original ‘victim’ may have been deprived of recompense for many years. 
7.10 Alternative Potential Routes to Compensation 
The time seems appropriate for the legal issues regarding provision for compensation in 
clinical trials specifically involving pregnant women to be reviewed.  Such trials are in 
their infancy and Regulation 536 has yet to come into effect, so it seems likely a case will 
not arise for 2-3 years.  Consolidation into a single process would have the advantage of 
providing one clear route to be followed in the event of congenital injury following trial 
participation.  The unique characteristics of this population, and its small size from a 
clinical trials perspective, mean it offers a vehicle within which to explore the development 
and application of a new item of legislation, which could lay a foundation for future 
revisions affecting other trial populations.  Given the challenges of applying existing 
compensation processes to this setting described above, the assessment of alternative 
approaches is warranted.  A range of alternatives has been explored in personal injury 
cases, although none in the particular setting of congenital injury following maternal 
participation in a clinical trial. 
The obvious starting point would be that of negotiation - but with whom?  The parent is the 
person most likely to initiate a negotiation, and that discussion may need to involve the 
NHS authority in whose premises the trial was conducted, the Investigator, who may have 
moved or retired, and the sponsor, who seems unlikely to wish to be drawn into such a 
discussion, other than to refute liability.  Even with legal representation, this seems 
unlikely to be a discussion amongst equals.  If the sponsor is an ABPI member, then the 
claimant may be referred to the ABPI arbitration procedure. 
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Arbitration has simpler procedural and evidentiary rules than litigation, and may lead to 
more rapid resolution.  The ABPI Guidelines contain provision for such a process, but the 
decisions in cases brought under the Guidelines have not been made public, and arbitration 
decisions do not set precedents for future decisions to follow.  Therefore, each individual 
case would need to be settled separately, the consistency of decisions would be open to 
question, and the claimant would still need to establish that the injury was the result of 
some attributable act or omission related to the trial.  Arbitration, sometimes but not 
always binding, is widely used in medical malpractice disputes in the USA, and less 
commonly in Mexico and a small number of European countries, 
619
 but apart from the 
ABPI scheme, this approach appears not to have been employed in the UK.  Given the 
highly specialized knowledge and fact-finding needed in all medical injury claims, and 
probably more so in this area, once again this seems unlikely to be a process in which the 
parties are equals. 
Mediation is a method of resolving disputes which involve the assistance of or interaction 
by a third party who does not have the authority to impose an outcome,
620
 which 
distinguishes mediation from arbitration.  Attempts have been made in the UK to introduce 
this approach.  A recent automatic referral to mediation (ARM) scheme piloted in the UK 
in 2004-2005 experienced a high opt-out rate; only a small proportion of cases was 
mediated, of which medical malpractice cases formed a fraction.
621
  A similar pattern had 
been seen in the Central London Voluntary mediation scheme which ran from 1999-2004, 
in which the take-up rate was 4%,
622
 and the voluntary mediation initiative by the National 
Health Service Litigation Authority, where the take-up rate was 15% over three years.
623
  
The ARM scheme was initially based on the Canadian Ontario Mandatory Mediation 
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Programme.
624
  However, the mandatory nature of the scheme was criticised in Halsey v 
Milton Keynes NHS Trust,
625
 as being inconsistent with Article 6 of the Human Rights Act 
1998.  This form of dispute resolution does not appear to have found favour in the UK, 
even when the dispute relates to medical malpractice and involves only the claimant and 
the physician.  It seems difficult to conceive of a non-binding process of mediation which 
could involve claimants, Investigators, NHS trusts and trial sponsors being acceptable to 
all, particularly given the level of medical evidence likely to be led in cases of congenital 
injury. 
The extension of the CPA 1987 and the SSGA 1994 to drugs prior to their approval could 
also be considered.  The impact of such a step on the pharmaceutical industry would be 
particularly severe, and, arguably, the risks in other areas are just as great as they are for 
pharmaceuticals.  Given that carefully-controlled, legally-regulated clinical trials constitute 
a required element of assessing whether an investigational drug merits approval, imposing 
sanctions should the trials detect adverse reactions, which is one of the objectives of all 
clinical trials and which, on a risk-benefit argument may be acceptable, seems inherently 
contradictory. 
One option which has been widely considered is a no-fault compensation system.  The 
philosophy underlying no-fault compensation in the conventional medical setting is that 
injuries may not be attributable to the act(s) or omission(s) of an individual, but rather from 
system errors.  Moreover, the complexity of medical practice often makes it difficult to 
determine fault when errors occur.
626
  A no-fault scheme therefore should allow 
investigation and compensation of claims without the need for the claimant to establish 
negligence.
627
  As this and the preceding chapter have shown, the trial approval and injury 
compensation processes involve many individuals, commonly acting as members of a 
group (the REC, the MHRA, the sponsor, the Investigator and his staff), and so 
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establishing the individual who is answerable in the event of a congenital injury following 
trial participation is more complex than would be the case in a conventional medical 
setting.  The system error approach inherent in the no-fault approach seems well-suited to 
the clinical trial setting. 
When first proposed in the 1960s, the concept of no-fault compensation was recommended 
as applicable for all patients with untoward and unexpected medical outcomes.
628
  In the 
1970s, the concept of relative avoidability was advanced,
629
  and all five Nordic countries 
(Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland) have replaced negligence-based 
compensation systems at different times over the last 30 years
630
 with an avoidability-
based standard.  An outcome is considered avoidable if it could have been avoided using 
an alternative course of treatment or which would not have occurred in the hands of the 
best practitioner, and so such avoidability does not necessarily connote negligence.  
However, the avoidability approach does not provide for compensation in cases where the 
injury was unavoidable because it was unforeseeable, as may be the case for congenital 
injury due to an investigational drug, or indeed a comparator. 
New Zealand has also adopted a ‘no-fault’ model, driven initially by a desire to ensure that 
disability insurance was available to all those who became unemployable due to an 
accident at work, and was based on a ‘community responsibility’ philosophy.631  In France, 
a no-fault compensation scheme was created to limit the use of the criminal law in medical 
malpractice.
632
  Some countries have chosen a specific medical area for such an approach 
rather than implementing a general scheme, one example of which is the Obstetrical Injury 
Compensation Scheme begun in 2009 in Japan,
633
 so there would be some precedent for 
introducing a restricted, targeted scheme in the UK.  No-fault schemes have worked well in 
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countries which have a comprehensive social security system and high national insurance 
contributions, such as the Nordic countries, France and Japan, arguably because the 
additional costs above normal state-provided care are relatively small and therefore 
manageable.
634
  However, under these systems, injured parties do not necessarily receive 
the equivalent compensation they would have received had they successfully pursued 
medical negligence litigation; their essence is more restorative than punitive.  A key 
feature of the Scandinavian and New Zealand systems is the limitation of compensation 
based on the severity of the injury.  Under the New Zealand ACC scheme, the duration of 
disability and hospital stay is used as a proxy to determine severity and for setting the 
limits on compensation.  In the Scandinavian countries, the injuries need to be more severe 
than the patient ‘could reasonably be expected to bear’.635 
In England, proposals to introduce a no-fault compensation scheme for medical injury have 
been abandoned principally on grounds of cost.
636
  In Scotland, the No-fault Compensation 
Review Group recommended that, in conjunction with improved social welfare provisions, 
the Scottish government implement a no-fault system similar to that which operates in 
Sweden.
637
  Unlike the Swedish scheme, the proposed Scottish scheme would not be based 
on avoidability, but ‘on a clear description of which injuries are not eligible for 
compensation under the no-fault scheme’.  From this, it is unclear whether the scheme 
would provide for compensation in cases where the injury was unavoidable.  The Scottish 
Government still has the matter under active consideration and remains committed to 
exploring a no-fault compensation scheme.
638
  
A limited form of no-fault liability was introduced by the National Health Service 
(Concerns, Complaints and Redress Arrangements) (Wales) Regulations 2011.  The intent 
of the system is that of ‘putting things right’ by resolving issues locally rather than by 
                                                          
634
 Dingwall, R. (2003). No fault is no panacea.  Br.Med.J., 326, 997-998. 
635
 Accident Compensation Corporation, ACC Background Paper: Comparison of International Schemes that 
Compensate for Medical Injury (2003), available at  
http://www.acc.co.nz/wcm001/groups/external_claims_care/documents/internet/wcmz002318.pdf  accessed 
28
th
 Septmeber, 2015. 
636
 Cave, E. (2011). Redress in the NHS.  P.N., 27, 138-157 
637
 The Scottish Government, No-fault Compensation Review Group Report (15 February 2011), 
recommendation 2, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Health/NHS-Scotland/No-
faultCompensation, accessed  30
th
 September, 2015. 
638
 Consultation Report - Consultation on recommendations for no-fault compensation in Scotland for 
injuries resulting from clinical treatment, 4
th
 April, 2014.  Available at  
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2014/04/6437 , accessed 28
th
 September, 2015. 
Chapter 7  Routes to Compensation in the Event of Trial-Emergent Injury 
180 
 
recourse to the courts,
639
 introducing a single system for dealing with complaints and 
claims of modest value, referred to as ‘concerns’.  Under Regulation 25, the responsible 
body must consider whether there is a ‘qualifying liability in tort’, defined in the 
Regulations as ‘a liability in tort owed in respect of, or consequent upon, personal injury or 
loss arising out of or in connection with breach of a duty of care owed to any person in 
connection with the diagnosis of illness, or in the care or treatment of any patient:(a) in 
consequence of any act or omission by a healthcare professional; and (b) which arises in 
connection with the provision of qualifying services’.  Thus, the Welsh system requires the 
establishment of both causation and breach of duty, combining the major challenges 
inherent in the ABPI Guidelines and the CDCLA 1976, respectively.  Should both be 
established, the responsible body may offer compensation up to a £25,000 limit.  If the 
offer is accepted, the complainant waives the right to bring civil legal proceedings in 
respect of the injury.  The scheme is administered by NHS Wales, an arrangement open to 
criticism for lack of impartiality.  However, given the level of compensation for congenital 
injury, it seems unlikely that many cases of that type would fall within the scheme and, 
again, recourse would need to be made to other mechanisms.  In addition, concerns need to 
be raised within twelve months of coming to the notice of the person raising it, which may 
be insufficient time to establish whether a true congenital abnormality exists.  During the 
period when the concern is investigated, the limitation period applicable under the 
Limitation Act 1980 is suspended. 
.The operation of the Welsh system has recently been reviewed,
640
 concluding that the 
system is, in many cases, not operating as intended, with reports of delays, lack of patient 
involvement, lack of detailed investigation of quantum and concerns regarding the 
independence of the process.  Thus, one of the potential deficiencies of employing 
arbitration or mediation - that of the parties not being equals in terms of knowledge - seems 
to arise here, perhaps not surprisingly as in the first stage of the investigation, the NHS 
body is effectively acting as defendant, judge and jury.  Given the potential compensatory 
costs for congenital injury, inconsistency regarding quantum must be considered as a 
significant issue.  Suggestions have been advanced for improvements to the process,
641
 and 
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their implementation may resolve many of the complaints which have been made, but the 
major hurdle to implementing the system in cases involving congenital injury remains that 
of the financial ceiling of awards. 
These systems were developed for use in conventional medical settings, and their 
application to the research environment does not appear to have been reported.  Attempts 
to introduce no-fault systems in the USA, which carries out more clinical research than any 
other country, have been unsuccessful.
642
  Provisions in other European countries are 
variable.  In Germany, the trial sponsor is required to hold an insurance policy which 
provides benefits when no-one else is liable for the injury.
643
  Similarly, in Belgium, the 
sponsor assumes, without fault, liability for injury to participants related directly or 
indirectly to experimentation.
644
  Spain also requires mandatory insurance on a no-fault 
basis.
645
  Partly triggered by the impending Regulation 536 requirement for a system of 
national insurance for trial participants (Chapter 6.3), Spain is reviewing its current no-
fault system and contemplating the institution of a negligence-based system.
646
  If 
compensatory payments have been made in these countries in respect of congenital injury, 
they appear not to have been reported publically.  In France, payment of compensation for 
injuries caused in clinical trials may be avoidable if the researcher or the sponsor proves 
there was no negligence.
647
  The no-fault systems in Germany, Belgium and Spain require 
the injuries to be the result of participation in the clinical trial and quantifiable in financial 
terms, both extremely difficult to establish with congenital injuries becoming apparent 
many years after the trial in which the harm may have arisen. 
7.11 Conclusions 
The currently-available processes do not provide a straightforward legal route to a remedy 
for a child born injured following his mother’s participation in a pre-registration clinical 
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trial during her pregnancy.  In some cases, the ABPI Compensation Guidelines will be 
applicable, in others the NHS Indemnity will be relevant, in some recourse will need to be 
made to the CDCLA 1976, whilst in others the CPA 1987 may be the preferred route - and 
all of this against a background of possibly incomplete record retention.  Whilst a 
purposive approach to interpretation may avoid the difficulties raised by the intricacies of 
the CDCLA 1976 and CPA 1987, and give effect to the original intent of the legislation, 
there is little black letter law on the meaning and application of the key concepts of either 
Act in a research setting.  The injured child cannot sue the mother as she is immune under 
the CDCLA 1976 although her contributory negligence may reduce any available 
compensation under that Act and, possibly, under the ABPI Guidelines.  The Investigator 
cannot be sued if he has acted properly, nor the REC, the MHRA or the sponsor, assuming 
the pregnant woman’s consent was valid, and that she consented to run the risk which 
subsequently eventuated, on the basis of adequate information.
648
  Even if the information 
was inadequate, the injured child may need to establish that this materially influenced the 
(now) mother’s decision to participate.  A pregnant woman has a legal right to consent to 
or decline treatment that will affect the foetus, and her consent appears to provide a 
defence for other possible respondents in an antenatal injury claim under the CDCLA 
1976 and possibly the ABPI Guidelines. 
Injuries to clinical trial participants seem to arise on remarkably few occasions, probably 
reflecting the extent of the preclinical testing which precedes them and the safeguards built 
into their designs,
649
 but possibly also the result of the majority of cases which do arise 
being settled before going to trial.  A search of Westlaw conducted in August 2015 
identified only two cases of clinical trial injuries being considered by the courts, one of 
which was a surgical trial, and the other was Wylie
650
 (see Chapter 5.2).  It is tempting to 
speculate that a combination of the experience of Gøtzsche (Chapter 6.2), with the 
effective functioning of the ABPI scheme is responsible for the dearth of cases which have 
come before the UK courts.  However, this situation may change if children are born 
injured following clinical trials, as claims for compensation may be significant in terms of 
their value and the willingness of their families to pursue them.  As discussed above, it 
seems likely that establishing causation will prove a significant hurdle in such trials, and 
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yet, given the risks these subjects take on behalf of society, one might consider society 
owes them a greater debt. 
One spectacular case of trial-related injury, which did not reach the courts but did enter the 
public domain, was the TeGenero trial in the UK in 2006, in which healthy volunteers 
were seriously injured.
651
  In that trial, the harm was apparent within an hour of drug 
administration, and the characteristics of the harm were so unusual that an association with 
the investigational drug was immediately obvious.  TeGenero’s insurance policy had a 
£2M cap, which was wholly inadequate for the harm which eventuated.  Within four 
months of the incident, TeGenero filed for insolvency making it impossible for the injured 
participants to recover compensation from the sponsor.  The MHRA investigation 
concluded that the adverse incidents did not involve errors in the manufacture, formulation, 
dilution or administration of the investigational drug, and that an unpredicted biological 
action of the drug in humans was the most likely cause of the adverse reactions.
652
  In other 
words, as all of the relevant processes were followed and requirements satisfied, this was 
‘no-one’s fault’, demonstrating the exposed position of trial subjects in the UK.  A 
subsequent report suggested that the adverse events in this case were, in fact, 
predictable,
653
 based on accumulated historical experience with investigational drugs of 
similar mechanism, information that was already available in the public domain, and which 
could have been generated with TeGenero’s drug prior to the conduct of the trial had the 
MHRA required it.  This trial has been described as ethically flawed,
654
 and an illustration 
of significant shortcomings in the clinical trial approval system in this country.
655
 
The commencement of the limitation period for personal injury cases at 18 years of age, 
with potential for extension should harm not become obvious until later, provides a 
significant degree of protection for children who have been indirect trial participants (see 
Chapter 6.3.1) before birth, allowing time for many, possibly most, developmental 
abnormalities to become apparent.  For drugs which are later licenced, it permits time for 
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parents who suspect their children may have been affected by drugs taken during 
pregnancy to compile relevant information.  This is less likely to occur with investigational 
drugs which have not proceeded to approval, and the relatively short mandatory document 
retention periods for such drugs reduce the prospect that children injured in this way will 
be able to recover damages. Creating a legal requirement for drug manufacturers, trial 
sponsors, RECs and Investigators to retain all documentation relating to clinical trials in 
pregnant women for a fixed period of 25 years after the end of the trial (end of trial is a key 
date, which must be made known under the CTD to the REC, the Investigators and the 
regulatory body), with appropriate penalties, would assist in the assessment of claims by 
increasing the security of relevant information.  This is not, of course, a fail-safe approach; 
conditions with significantly-delayed onset, and particularly those which are inter-
generational, may become apparent at a later date.  However, this period would ensure that 
data were retained at least as long as the limitation period for the majority of personal 
injury claims and matches the retention period for children’s medical files, thereby 
introducing a degree of consistency. 
The apparent immunity from prosecution enjoyed by the REC and the MHRA seems - 
mostly - justifiable, if only on practical grounds.  If subjects injured in clinical trials can 
involve the RECs in litigation, then the largely voluntary, normally rapid (initial decisions 
made within 60 days) system we enjoy at present will probably cease to function as REC 
reviewers become involved in protracted personal injury cases.  Furthermore, faced with 
such liability, it would be relatively easy for the RECs to adopt a more conservative 
approach, which could render the UK a relatively unattractive location for clinical trials.  
The argument is, perhaps, less clear for the MHRA, and in particular the basis upon which 
trials are approved in the absence of information required in the ICH Guidelines; a 
scientific assessment may confirm the correctness of such decisions, but in the interests of 
transparency and potential future claims, those reasons should be documented.  The 
reasons had not been documented in the TeGenero incident. 
Clinical trials in pregnant women raise challenges regarding liability where the woman 
gives consent ‘on behalf of’ her foetus.  By consenting, the pregnant woman also appears 
to accept any risk indicated in the consent documents not only for herself, but also ‘on 
behalf of’ her foetus, thereby compromising any later claim for compensation.  If the 
injured child has a valid claim, it may be abated if the pregnant woman is found to have 
been contributorily negligent. If these circumstances are properly explained as part of the 
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consent process, they would seem likely to act as a deterrent to pregnant women to 
participate in clinical trials. 
Establishing causation is likely to be problematic, particularly for a pregnant subject who is 
also a patient.  She may have experienced disease-related consequences not attributable to 
the clinical trial which could have impacted the foetus; she might have received treatment 
for a serious condition which could have injured the foetus; or she could have been 
randomised to a comparator which had been approved for many years, and suspected of 
being teratogenic, but even there establishing causation is far from easy.
656
  Once again, if 
this is explained properly during the consent process, it seems unlikely to encourage 
pregnant women to participate in clinical trials.  
The ABPI Guidelines were intended to provide a route to compensation without the need 
to establish negligence but they contain a number of uncertainties and apparent limitations.  
These may, in fact, have been clarified as a result of settlements made under the 
Guidelines, the details of which have not been made public.  The Guidelines were drafted 
when clinical trials in pregnant women were not in contemplation and so the issues 
identified may be understandable, but that situation has now changed.  The Guidelines 
should be amended to reflect that, or a specific Guideline should be developed for the 
pregnant population, given the unique issues in that group of subjects.  In either case, the 
issues identified in Chapter 7.5 should be clarified, and a key aspect of that would be to 
clarify the nature of the Investigator-Subject relationship (Chapter 5). 
The CDCLA 1976 was conceived in part to avoid the protracted difficulties which 
followed the thalidomide disaster and facilitate the process by which children injured in 
utero could gain compensation.  However, the Act seems unsuited to a clinical trial, 
especially a Phase I, environment.  There are clear problems with the application of tort 
doctrine in the research setting, in particular, identifying those who owe a duty of care to 
the future child and the applicable standard of care it would be reasonable to expect, as 
well as defining a breach of that duty.  Since the thalidomide tragedy was one of the main 
stimuli behind both the CDCLA 1976 and the CPA 1987, the conclusions of the textbook 
writers cited above (Chapter 7.8.2) - that the manufacturers of thalidomide would likely 
have been able to employ the development risks defence successfully - illustrate most 
poignantly how ineffective the legislative protection is for the foetus.  The conduct of 
                                                          
656
 Multiple Claimants v Sanifo-Synthelabo Ltd & anr.  [2007] EWHC 1860 (QB). 
Chapter 7  Routes to Compensation in the Event of Trial-Emergent Injury 
186 
 
clinical trials is quite different from the practice of medicine, the Physician-Patient and 
Investigator-Subject relationships differ in key respects and the CDCLA 1976 seems 
unlikely to be effective in that setting without considerable judicial interpretation.  
The importance of the information generated in trials in the pregnant population is such 
that circumstances which might deter participation would be deeply regrettable; it would 
reduce the benefits and increase the risks for both pregnant women and foetuses.  One such 
circumstance would be that of a child of a trial subject being born with a congenital 
abnormality and facing a protracted struggle to recover compensation.  Yet, taken together, 
the uncertainties described above seem more likely than not to create such a circumstance.  
The core of the challenge is causation.  Under the ABPI Guidelines, the child would need 
to establish that his injuries were related to some aspect of the trial in which his mother had 
been a subject.  Under the CDCLA 1976, the child would need to establish his injuries 
were the result of a wrongful act.  To make a claim against the NHS, the child would need 
to establish negligence by an NHS employee. 
The only way to have avoided harm in most clinical trials would be for the pregnant 
woman not to have participated, and given the drive to increase participation of this 
population, a failure to provide adequate recognition of the risks to foetuses and 
compensation to children who are born injured may act as a deterrent to achieving that 
objective.  The current approaches, either in conventional or research settings, are not 
designed to provide compensatory justice for congenital injuries which may not 
immediately be apparent.  Negotiation, arbitration and mediation seem likely to be 
ineffective, and extensions of the CPA 1987 or the SSGA 1994 would be likely to have 
much more wide-reaching consequences.  Some form of targeted no-fault compensation 
system, such as the one in Japan, offers promise, but there is no perfect reform that 
adequately addresses the concerns regarding the present processes; every reform can be 
advocated or opposed for reason of fairness and/or public policy. 
A major challenge in the concept of no-fault liability is in defining a compensable event.  
Although different countries with no-fault systems have developed different criteria for 
defining compensable events, such criteria are still debatable with respect to their 
appropriateness and fairness. 
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The system of compensation for such injury merits further consideration, as the need for 
reform to ensure easier routes to recovery of compensation for children injured in utero is 
overdue.  An option for doing so will be presented in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 8 Final Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
The medical justification for the requests from the EMA and FDA for data relating to the 
handling of investigational drugs in pregnant women prior to the drug’s approval is 
unassailable.  As described in Chapter 1.4, the changes of biochemistry and physiology 
which accompany pregnancy are marked, and can alter the absorption, distribution, 
metabolism and excretion, i.e., pharmacokinetics, of drugs to the extent that the efficacy 
and safety of approved dose regimens are altered.  The health risks associated with sub-
optimal management of conditions in pregnant women may also impact foetal health, as 
explained in Chapter 6.4.5.  However, pregnancy can also alter the pharmacokinetics of 
medication given to pregnant women which is intended to benefit the foetus.  A recent 
paper reported that the pharmacokinetics of folic acid supplements, routinely given to 
pregnant women to reduce the risk of neural tube defects,
657
 are altered in pregnancy, such 
that a steady-state red blood cell concentration is not achieved,
658
 explaining earlier clinical 
observations.
659
  The medical need to generate this type of information for the benefit of 
pregnant women and foetuses is clear.  The question is whether, given the unavoidable 
risks associated with the studies necessary to generate the information, the legal 
recognition and protection of the foetus is adequate.  The answer to that question appears 
to be a qualified ‘no’, particularly regarding provision for recovery of compensation in the 
event of a trial-related, iatrogenic injury. 
The root cause is that the current legislation was developed without clinical trials of 
investigational drugs involving pregnant women being contemplated.  Even the reference 
to consent in the 1989 Polkinghorne Report conveys the tone of a physician speaking to a 
patient in a conventional medical setting, rather than being a part of a global clinical trial.  
The CDCLA 1976 may be effective in a conventional medicine setting, and the ABPI 
Compensation Guidelines may work well in more customary clinical trial designs, 
involving subjects whose physical, intellectual and cognitive development is complete or at 
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least (in the case of children) fairly advanced, and in whom trial-related injuries are 
generally apparent relatively quickly.  Clinical trials in pregnant women are, at present, not 
conventional, and trial-related injuries may not become apparent for years.  With the 
impending implementation of Regulation 536, and the requests from the Agencies for 
clinical trial information from pregnant women prior to the approval of new drugs, the time 
seems right for amendment of the CDCLA 1976, or the introduction of new legislation, to 
address the conduct of clinical trials in this population within the UK. 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, law and ethics have, in various ways, accorded the 
foetus a degree of recognition which limits what can be done to it without penalty.  The 
enactment of legislation relating to abortion and common law judgments regarding injury 
sustained in utero demonstrate this.  Morally, it is difficult to distinguish a foetus in utero 
from a neonate, particularly given the wide window of viability, unless one accepts the fact 
of live birth as a moral argument.  Numerous commentators have advanced a range of 
ethical arguments that the foetus, and the child it is intended to become, should be in our 
contemplation when conducting medical treatment and research.  Some, mostly American, 
writers have developed these arguments to the point of viewing the foetus as a separate 
entity from the pregnant woman carrying it.  This position raises many questions 
concerning the pregnant woman’s autonomy, which has been recognised by the courts both 
in the UK and the USA, and was discussed in Chapter 4. 
Largely as a consequence of the thalidomide tragedy in the early 1960s and the responses 
of the public and regulators, clinical trials of investigative drugs in pregnant women were 
not contemplated until the 1990s.  During that period, legislation was enacted which was 
intended to protect the future interests of children harmed by drugs in utero (CDCLA 
1976), and to provide defined routes to compensation for anyone who suffered injury from 
approved drugs which proved defective (VDPA 1979; CPA 1987).  In addition, processes, 
some subsequently codified, were introduced to regulate the approval and conduct of 
clinical trials of investigative drugs (ICH-GCP, codified in the MHU Regulations 2004 and 
GCP Directive 2006), and to provide a route to compensation for those injured in clinical 
trials (ABPI Guidelines, 1970-2015).  However, as explained in Chapters 6 and 7, none of 
these measures was constructed with the foetus in mind, and as a result a number of 
shortcomings are apparent. 
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A number of specific inadequacies and possible solutions were identified in Chapters 6 and 
7, each of which could be categorised as predominantly preventative or compensatory in 
nature.  These were: 
 The basis upon which the MHRA can approve trials to proceed in the absence of ICH-
defined preclinical data, in this case reproductive toxicology, needs to be documented; 
although seemingly immune from civil actions, the MHRA nevertheless must be seen 
to be accountable to the Government and to the public.  (Chapter 6.2.1) (Preventative) 
 A process by which teratogenic moieties in molecular structures can be identified from 
pre-clinical studies and the information made available within the approval process 
needs to be developed; in this way, suspect moieties might be more readily 
prospectively-identified, and molecules containing these structures withdrawn from 
development as new medicines, or subjected to additional monitoring measures for 
approved medicines.  (Chapter 6.2.1) (Preventative) 
 The content and format of consent documents needs to be further improved, and 
consideration given to assessing proof of comprehension, particularly regarding the 
processes for recovery of compensation in the event of injury; these deficiencies 
compromise the consent process, and are particularly of concern for pregnant women 
who are, in effect, also giving consent ‘for’ their foetuses.  (Chapter 6.4.1) 
(Preventative) 
 Care should be taken to avoid the exploitation of pregnant women by establishing a 
register to track or limit the number of clinical trials pregnant women may enter, 
similar to the process for all Phase I volunteers; with the scope to reimburse lost 
earnings for trial participants introduced within Regulation 536, the risks to the foetus 
of pregnant women enrolling into multiple clinical trials will need to be managed.  
(Chapter 8.3.1) (Preventative) 
 We need to recognise the particular risks to the foetus resulting from pregnant women 
participating in clinical trials and develop approaches to compensate children born 
injured without providing incentives which would constitute exploitation.  (Chapter 
6.4.5)  (Compensatory) 
 The legal nature of the Investigator-Subject relationship needs to be clarified and the 
implications explained to potential trial subjects; this seems a central issue regarding 
the applicability, or not, of the CDCLA 1976 to a clinical trial setting.  (Chapters 5 and 
7.8.1)  (Compensatory) 
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 Record retention practices need to be changed to ensure records remain available at 
least as long as the limitation period for personal injury; the current requirements 
potentially leave the child born with a delayed-onset injury in the position of being 
unable to prove the case.  (Chapter 7.3)  (Compensatory) 
 The CDCLA 1976 is not suited to the relationships which exist in a research setting, 
and relies upon the tortious requirement for negligence; the application of tort law to 
personal injury arising in a research setting is contentious, and the reality is that 
scientists cannot know the unknowable, resulting in the unavoidable prospect of harm 
to the foetus which is not attributable to negligence.  (Chapter 7.8.1)  (Compensatory) 
 The ABPI Compensation Guidelines need to be revised to clarify a range of matters 
relating to pregnant women in trials, or a separate Guideline generated for this 
population; a number of considerations are unique to this population, and so a unique 
Guideline does not seem unreasonable.  (Chapter 7.5)  (Compensatory)  
A recurring conceptual issue arises regarding the maternal-foetal relationship, and the 
extent to which the decisions the pregnant woman makes ‘for’ the foetus can have 
consequences in the event of teratogenic injury.  The key instruments relating to 
compensation, i.e., the CDCLA 1976, Regulation 536 and the ABPI Compensation 
Guidelines, at different points all contain constructions consistent with the ‘two-patient’ 
and ‘dyad’ models.  The intent in all of these may be one of creating safeguards which 
would otherwise not exist for a child born injured, and these safeguards are to be 
welcomed.  The Guidelines, however, do not seem to be based on a coherent or consistent 
approach to concepts of the model of pregnancy and therefore may lead to confusion and 
inconsistency.  That said, the Guidelines may simply be reflecting the underlying lack of 
consensus as described in Chapter 4, but nonetheless, this lack of consensus poses 
problems for those drafting and interpreting regulation. 
As discussed in Chapter 6.4, pregnant women have a variety of reasons, possibly 
sometimes misguided (therapeutic misconception), for participating in clinical trials.  
Regardless of their reasons, their participation enables the generation of information which 
will guide the future treatment of millions of pregnant women, and in the process increase 
the safety of treatment for both pregnant women and their foetuses, and so is highly 
valuable.  Given both the clear medical need for clinical trials in pregnant women and the 
requests for such information from the Agencies, any occurrence which would deter 
participation would be unfortunate: it would result in not only the continuation of the 
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present level of risk for existing treatments, but an unknowable level of risk relating to 
future treatments.  An essential aspect of clinical research is the trust which participants, 
and potential participants, have in the Investigator, the ethics and regulatory processes 
(despite, generally, knowing relatively little about them) and the pharmaceutical company 
whose drug they are being invited to take.
660
  An event which damages confidence in any 
of these relationships is likely to be detrimental to trial participation.  In the event of harm 
to the foetus or the birth of an injured child, the labyrinthine routes to compensation 
summarised in Chapter 7.10 seem likely to undermine that trust, as these are likely to result 
in significant delays to settlements.  This seems likely to affect not only past trial 
participants, but - particularly with the rapid expansion of social media - also to deter 
future participants.  
This concluding chapter will describe modifications to the current business processes 
which would potentially increase the safety of the foetus from a preventative aspect, and a 
range of relatively minor legislative revisions which would increase the prospects for 
recovery of compensation should injury arise.  More importantly, two major changes to the 
legislative framework for recovery of compensation will be explored: the introduction of a 
broader no-fault compensation system that the one which currently exists within the ABPI 
guidelines, and the development of a ‘no-causation’ system intended to address the major 
issue regarding compensation for teratogenic iatrogenic injury - that of establishing 
causation.  The development of the latter system is to an extent predicated upon the value 
brought by the participation of pregnant women in clinical trials of investigational drugs, 
and so that behaviour will be considered as a preliminary issue.   
8.2 Is Trial Participation Supererogatory? 
The reasons that people have, or give in response to questioning, for participating in 
clinical trials were examined previously.
661
  Some will consider any trial participation as 
supererogatory.  Participation would satisfy Mellema’s condition662 that a supererogatory 
act fulfills no duty or obligation (although it does not incorporate intention or beneficence 
on the part of the performer of the supererogatory act), as participation in clinical trials is 
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entirely voluntary.  It would also fit Heyd’s definition663 that the performance is good by 
virtue of its intended consequences, and that the action is done voluntarily for someone 
else’s good. A pregnant woman volunteering to participate in a Phase I trial of an 
investigational drug would seem amply to satisfy these criteria.  The ‘special expertise’ 
requirement within Regulation 536
664
 should ensure that such participation is not reckless, 
and so forms another layer of protection for the foetus. 
The supererogation argument applies equally to all Phase I trial subject populations, in that 
these volunteers who ‘go first’ assume a risk on behalf of society, and from which they 
expect to receive no clinical benefit, assuming they have been properly informed within the 
consent process.  Some, probably many, of these individuals will have relationships and 
possible dependents; they reach their decision regarding the risks of participating based on 
a holistic assessment of the information they have been provided, and consideration of the 
possible impacts on themselves and others.  This seems no different to the situation which 
obtains when a pregnant woman contemplates participation in a clinical trial; the foetus 
becomes one such consideration.  In the UK, the law does not seek to control the acts or 
behaviours of pregnant women to protect the foetus, whether these are legal or otherwise, 
with the exception of attempting to procure an abortion,
665
 so why would voluntary 
participation in a clinical trial which had followed the defined approval procedures be seen 
differently from a moral perspective? 
The special expertise requirement in Regulation 536 described in Chapter 6.3 may go some 
way towards reassuring those who retain doubts regarding the morality of such trials.  
Others might consider this requirement imposes a greater limitation on a pregnant 
woman’s freedom of choice.  If the special expertise is intended to provide additional 
protection to the foetus, then that is similar to the additional protection afforded to minors 
(in addition to parental rights’ considerations) and the incapax (in addition to family 
considerations), with the key difference that those who are asked to give consent for these 
groups are not the trial subjects, and is again consistent with a ‘two-patient’ model.  If the 
construction suggested in Chapter 6.3.1 is valid, i.e., that the foetus is a trial participant, 
and that the pregnant woman in consenting to participate in a trial is, in effect, giving 
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proxy consent for the foetus, then she may be limited in what she can consent to, as is the 
case for those giving proxy consent for minors and the incapax.  On this basis, it would be 
consistent that the REC may decline to approve trials on the basis of potential risk to the 
foetus, just as would be the case for minors and the incapax.  If the effect of the new 
Regulation is to create such a construction, then, just as the consent of the proxy does not 
preclude minors and the incapax seeking damages for injury, then the same would be true 
of the child injured in utero, although this may not be borne out by our present approaches. 
The moral position is perhaps less clear for Phase II and III studies, in which the prospect 
exists of benefit to the pregnant woman.  An improvement in the pregnant woman’s health 
may result in foetal benefit.  Thus, the possibility of indirect benefit to the foetus may be 
seen as an additional pressure on a pregnant woman to agree to participate in a clinical 
trial.  Yet the management of depression,
666
 epilepsy
667
 and hypertension
668
 all demonstrate 
that medicines which often benefit the pregnant woman clinically can, in some cases, have 
adverse consequences for the foetus, and the child it will become.  The same is likely to be 
true for investigational drugs, with the added issue that adverse consequences may be more 
difficult to identify and predict.  However, analogous to the discussion above, potential 
trial participants will be expected to reach a balanced judgement regarding their 
participation based upon the information provided, and for a pregnant woman, the foetus 
is, arguably, another consideration of which she must take account when reaching her 
decision.  If true clinical equipoise exists regarding benefit, then there is neither advantage 
nor disadvantage to participating in the trial. 
The teratogenic risk associated with treatment is not affected by the phase of the trial, 
although, as a generality, Phase II and III trials will probably entail substantially longer 
dosing periods than Phase I trials, and thus result in greater foetal exposure to potential 
hazard.  The incidence of teratogenic effects of almost all drugs is extremely low, and the 
tenor of the guidance from the Agencies is that their desire is to gather data on the 
pharmacokinetics of drugs in pregnant subjects and the implications of that for dosing and 
efficacy, rather than detection of teratogenic effect.  From this, it follows that the primary 
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purpose of such studies is not to assess teratogenic potential, and equipoise clearly exists in 
that regard, as these studies are neither designed nor statistically-powered to answer that 
question.  Thus, the foetus could be placed at greater risk, regardless of the trial phase, by 
the pregnant woman’s participation. 
Harris
669
 has advanced a number of arguments that a duty exists to participate in medical 
research: we all benefit from the existence of the social practice of medical research, many 
of us would not be here had infant mortality not been brought under control, and most of us 
will continue to benefit from medical advances.  Since we accept these benefits, he argues, 
we have an obligation in justice to contribute to the social practice which produces them.  
His contention is that it is unfair to accept the benefits of research without contributing 
something back by participating in research, and that we have a social duty to maintain 
those practices and institutions that sustain us, including those which contribute to medical 
knowledge.  They are consistent with Singer’s formulation of same the principle (emphasis 
added): ‘‘If it is in our power to prevent something very bad happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it’’.670  Others, 
more recently, have taken a stronger position, that a prima facie obligation exists to 
participate in biomedical research because such research produces the public good of 
biomedical knowledge, to which everyone has access.
671
 
Rennie, whilst broadly following the same approach regarding the ‘duty’ view, raises two 
caveats.
672
  The first is that should participation be positioned as a moral duty, then it 
compromises the freedom associated with consent; potential subjects may enter clinical 
trials to avoid being seen as blameworthy, although such a situation might alleviate the 
current injustice that the majority of research participants tend to come from socially-
disadvantaged groups.
673
  The second is a series of conditions that the relative worth or 
value (not in financial terms) of the study must be sufficient to justify the inherent risk of 
participation. 
Provided patient autonomy is respected, and trials are executed competently, these might 
appear to be reasonable moral arguments, but are they still valid when the trial subject is a 
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pregnant woman?  None of those positing a moral ‘duty’ to participate in research appear 
to have considered research involving pregnant women.  Given the caveats raised by 
Rennie, perhaps positioning participation as a duty is setting the standard too high for 
populations unable to represent their own interests, such as the incapacitated, minors and, 
particularly, the foetus; how can an entity which has not been born shoulder a ‘duty’ to 
anyone?  Nevertheless, it is surely open to all of us to choose to behave in a supererogatory 
manner, and given the arguments set out in Chapters 2 and 3, there appears to be neither 
legal nor moral impediment to pregnant women electing to do so.  In other words, legally-
competent pregnant women can choose to participate in trials on the same basis as anyone 
else, and in doing so effectively become proxy decision-makers for the foetus. 
Presumably, no REC or regulatory body would approve a clinical trial which held a known 
risk of miscarriage or congenital abnormality.  Having elected to continue the pregnancy, 
the pregnant woman has accorded a degree of moral significance to the foetus (see Chapter 
4), and thus there is no intent to ‘sacrifice’ something of moral significance.  Given the 
lack of knowledge regarding the potential for teratogenicity, the reality may be that we do 
not know whether we are, in fact, risking a ‘sacrifice’, and we may not know until long 
after the conclusion of the trial.  Accordingly, the participation of pregnant women in 
clinical trials probably violates Singer’s formulation and may go beyond the scope of the 
‘duty’ Harris, Rennie and others propose. 
Based on the above, the participation of pregnant women in clinical trials, assuming the 
absence of therapeutic misconception, may be considered as supererogatory.  Given the 
restrictions regarding participation in multiple trials, the protection for the foetus in that 
regard seems reasonable; the only route to greater protection for the individual foetus 
would be a return to the previous embargo. 
Supererogatory behaviour surely merits praise.  There is normally no incentive for an 
individual to contribute to a public good even if the benefit of doing so to the individual is 
greater than the cost of contribution,
674
 but what of our response to injury suffered by those 
who behave in this way?  The risk of harm to the foetus is engaged by participation in a 
single trial.  We may be unable to further reduce the prospect of injury, but as a society, do 
we provide sufficient protection of the future prospects of those who take such risks on our 
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behalf?  The discussions in the previous chapter led to the conclusion that the provision of 
protection of the future interests of foetal trial participants was inadequate, and so when 
considering options for future legislative change, the supererogatory behaviour of pregnant 
trial participants must come into that consideration. 
8.3 Amending Current Business Processes, Legislation and Guidelines 
Some of the shortcomings identified above relate to business processes, and could be 
addressed without requiring the creation of new legislation, but would require changes to 
current legislation, and to the ABPI Guidelines.  Chapters 2 to 7 have described the current 
level of recognition and protection of the foetus outwith a clinical trial setting, the 
relationship between the investigator, the pregnant woman and the foetus, the clinical trial 
review and approval process, including potential shortcomings therein, and current 
mechanisms for recovery in the event that harm to the foetus does arise, again with the 
identification of apparent inadequacies.  Based on these analyses, the next sections will 
address possible changes to current business processes and propose changes to legislation 
which, together, would significantly increase the level of protection for the foetus in a 
clinical trial setting, and the future interests of a child born injured as a result of a clinical 
trial. 
8.3.1 MHRA-Related Changes 
There appears to be no legal impediment to the MHRA requiring sponsors to complete all 
ICH-defined pre-clinical studies prior to embarking upon clinical studies, or documenting 
their reasons for not doing so; this is essentially a business process change.  However, 
unless the same approach was taken by most other countries, such a requirement may place 
the UK at a disadvantage in terms of attracting commercial clinical research.  
Similarly, there appears to be no legal impediment to the MHRA undertaking an analysis 
of pre-clinical reproductive toxicology reports and identifying suspect moieties, although 
no legislative requirement currently exists for such analyses be carried out either, so, again, 
this could be a business process change.  The effort, and thus costs, required to do this 
would be substantial, and some of the expertise required may not exist within the MHRA.  
However, the MHRA is one of over 20 regulatory authorities within the European Union, 
and an analysis of this type would probably be better undertaken by the EMA, as suggested 
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in Chapter 6.2.1, which would have access to a wider range of expertise than any single 
national agency. 
Following the TeGenero incident, the MHRA established a register for all Phase I trial 
participants,
675
 so there would appear to be no barrier to a similar register being established 
for pregnant trial participants; again, this is a business process change. 
8.3.2 REC- and NHS-Related Changes 
RECs already have the authority to require changes to the format and content of 
Information Sheets and Consent Documents, yet these documents continue to be reviewed 
critically in the academic press.
676
  Since the RECs are part of the NHS,
677
 there is no 
obvious obstacle to the NHS instructing all RECs to require some form of assessment of 
the comprehension of these documents.  However, if this approach was applied 
retrospectively to studies already underway, the implications should the results indicate 
that significant numbers of subjects had not understood the process, and therefore may not 
have given valid consent, would be substantial, both in terms of the subjects’ legal rights 
and the admissibility of the data by the regulatory authorities.  Prospective application 
might significantly impair commercial clinical research in the UK, and so, as a minimum, 
this approach would need to be pan-European.  The relevance of the judgment in 
Montgomery
678
 also needs to be considered in a clinical trial setting regarding the level of 
information provided to prospective trial subjects. 
Regarding the retention of records, practically all of the clinical research conducted in the 
UK takes place within NHS premises, and although the individual facilities may be private, 
trial subjects’ medical notes are accessed as part of trial conduct, and relevant observations 
entered into the medical notes.  That means the fact of a subject’s participation in the trial 
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and other key information exists within the patient’s medical file.  Since children’s files are 
retained for 25 years, there seems no reason that the NHS could not mandate that trial 
subjects’ records would also be retained for that period following trial participation.  With 
the gradual progression towards the use of electronic medical records within the NHS, the 
issue of storage of records for a longer period of time perhaps becomes less problematical 
than would be the case for paper records. 
8.3.3 The Relationship: Doctor-Patient or Investigator-Subject? 
The legal nature of the Investigator-Subject relationship, and the differences between an 
Investigator and a medical practitioner, need to be clarified; without this, the application of 
the CDCLA 1976, and particularly section 1.5, to a clinical trial setting is uncertain, but it 
is not clear how this might be effected.  The Doctor-Patient relationship was defined - 
perhaps undefined - in the common law,
679
 and it may be that we need to await a relevant 
research case before we have a similar clarification of the Investigator-Subject relationship.  
There does not appear to be an item of legislation to which this definition could readily be 
attached.  As this relationship would apply to all clinical trials, the CDCLA 1976 seems 
inappropriate.  The Medical Act 1983 governs the regulation and credentials of the medical 
profession, and defines offences in respect of false claims of fitness to practice medicine; it 
makes no mention of research.  The Medicines Act 1968 mentions clinical trials, but 
largely from an administrative perspective. 
The tortious requirements of the CDCLA 1976 would not be easy to change for a clinical 
trial and yet retain as a single legislative instrument.  The challenge of applying the 
CDCLA 1976 to a clinical trial setting seems substantial (Chapter 7.8.1); negligence needs 
to be established, and in addition the ‘but-for’ test needs to be satisfied.  Although untested 
in court, this seems to be setting the barrier to recovery of compensation for harm inflicted 
in utero during a clinical trial rather high.  Making changes to the other legislation cited in 
Chapter 7.8 would also be difficult, as those Acts were intended to cover a wide range of 
situations. 
8.4 The Introduction of a No-Fault Scheme 
The tortious requirements of the CDCLA 1976 would not be easy to change for a clinical 
trial and yet retain as a single legislative instrument.  The challenge of applying the 
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CDCLA 1976 to a clinical trial setting seems substantial (Chapter 7.8.1); negligence needs 
to be established, and in addition the ‘but-for’ test needs to be satisfied.  Although untested 
in court, this seems to be setting the barrier to recovery of compensation for harm inflicted 
in utero during a clinical trial rather high.  Making changes to the other legislation cited in 
Chapter 7.8 would also be difficult, as those Acts were intended to cover a wide range of 
situations.  The ABPI Compensation Guidelines also contain a tortious requirement in the 
event of injury sustained by trial subjects allocated to a comparator agent or to placebo. 
As discussed in Chapter 7.10, perhaps the time has arrived for the legal issues regarding 
the conduct of clinical trials involving pregnant women to be brought together in a single 
item of legislation, including provision for compensation for injury.  Although the MHU 
Regulations 2004 and the GCP Directive attempt this in many respects and Regulation 536 
will do so too for trials in general, a range of issues remain unresolved for this population.  
Regulation 536 specifically does not address liability issues, deferring to national 
procedures.
680
   
The introduction of legislation specifically applicable to pre-registration clinical trials in 
pregnant women stipulating that no-fault liability will apply to injuries sustained by the 
foetus during clinical trials which manifest as injury in the live-born child should be 
considered.  This would avoid the tortious requirements within the CDCLA 1976, and 
which are likely to be particularly difficult to satisfy in a research setting.  Injured research 
participants may have more difficulty than non-trial patients showing that a duty owed to 
them was breached, due to the different nature of the relationship, that the intervention 
many months or years earlier caused the injury, and that they did not, through the pregnant 
woman’s consent, ‘assume the risk’.681  The application of a no-fault approach to the foetus 
would continue the policy approach introduced by the CDCLA 1976, and avoid the need to 
resolve the recurring issue of the duty of care owed to an entity which lacks legal status.  
However, as described in Chapter 7.9, the challenge of causation remains as a significant 
obstacle to the recovery of damages, and will be addressed in the next section. 
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8.5 The Introduction of a ‘No-Causation’ Scheme 
Two premises underly this proposal.  The first is that of attempting to promote 
acknowledgement and reward of supererogatory behaviour which will generate the 
information to guide the future treatment of pregnant women, improve the legal 
recognition for the foetus, and the compensation of children in the event of teratogenic 
injury for which they bore no responsibility whatsoever, and notwithstanding any acts or 
omissions by the pregnant woman which may have contributed to such injury.  The second 
is try try to find an approach to avoid the burden of establishing causation for those who 
have ‘gone first’ and been born injured, which is the major impediment to compensation. 
8.5.1 The Relevance of Vaccine Damage to Clinical Trials in Pregnant 
Women 
One of the aims of vaccination is to generate a form of protection for the rest of society; 
those who are vaccinated do not have the condition the vaccine is intended to prevent.  The 
conduct of clinical trials in pregnant women will often have a similar aim, albeit indirectly, 
by generating information which will help ensure pregnant women receive drugs at 
appropriate dose regimens to attain the effect desired with minimal risk (see Chapter 1); 
often that information will be generated in Phase I trials, involving pregnant women who 
do not have the condition the drug is intended to treat.  The results of such trials will 
hopefully provide better guidance on the prevention and management of a range of 
conditions from which can affect women whilst - but not necessarily because - they are 
pregnant.  Better prevention and management in that setting should reduce the significant 
costs of pregnancy-related morbidity (see Chapter 1.1) and the extent of human suffering - 
much the same as is the case for vaccination programmes.  They should also result in 
greater protection for the foetus, by defining dose regimens which can manage conditions 
in pregnant women without endangering the foetus, by keeping the concentrations of 
medicines circulating in the pregnant woman’s system within therapeutic limits. 
Vaccination is encouraged but not legally required by Government.  The recent requests by 
the Agencies for pre-registration data relating to investigational drugs in pregnant women 
(see Chapter 1.6) effectively encourage, but again do not legally require, the conduct of 
such studies in that population.  In the late 1990s, the Agencies issued similar requests for 
pre-registration data in the paediatric population; now, the provision of such information is 
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mandatory unless the Agencies grant a specific waiver to the requirement.
682
  Accordingly, 
it is not impossible that the current request relating to pregnant women will, in time, evolve 
into a pre-approval requirement.  That said, pregnant women cannot be compelled to 
participate in clinical trials, just as, with certain exceptions, mothers cannot be compelled 
to have their children vaccinated.  Of course, during the pre-registration phase such studies 
will involve far fewer exposures than population-level vaccination programmes, but once 
drugs are approved, the number of foetal exposures will certainly increase. 
If the rest of the drug (and vaccine) development process is conducted thoroughly, injuries 
should occur rarely, which certainly appears to be the case for vaccines, although under-
reporting is frequently cited as a concern.
683
  As a consequence, however, the first few 
cases of drug- or vaccine-related injury may be dismissed as reflecting the underlying, 
natural rate of occurrence of the abnormality or the condition the drug or vaccine was 
intended to treat.
684
 
Thus, a number of similarities exist between the situations relating to vaccine damage and 
teratogenic injury.  One might also infer that the recommendations of the Pearson 
Committee which led to the creation of the CDCLA 1976 and the VPDA 1979 reflected 
the foreseeable challenges if tort was the only route by which to seek compensation for 
injuries in such settings.  If we are to contemplate some system to provide ‘compensation’ 
for the latter in a clinical trial setting, the process used for alleged vaccine damage, which 
has now been in place for nearly 40 years, might seem to be a reasonable place to start.  
However, as the data relating to payments from the Vaccine Damage Tribunal testify 
(Chapter 7.8.4), the burden of establishing causation remains the most significant obstacle 
to the recovery of compensation. 
There is, of course, one major difference between vaccination of children and the 
participation of pregnant women in clinical trials: equipoise.  Children are vaccinated in 
the expectation that the vaccination will both reduce the probability of their developing the 
condition against which they were vaccinated, and in turn reduce the prospect of that 
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condition being transferred to others.  In contrast, the requirement for equipoise in the 
clinical trial setting means that pregnant women do not enjoy the same beneficial prospect, 
which makes their participation all the more praiseworthy. 
8.5.2 A ‘No-Causation’ Scheme 
“Since the 1960s, individual commentators and national commissions have agreed that the 
ethical principles of justice and virtue support, if not require, compensating research 
subjects who are harmed as a result of participating in research.”685 
Given the difficulties of proving that an injury to a child was the result of a drug given as 
part of a clinical trial in which the child’s mother participated whilst she was pregnant (see 
Chapter 7.9), perhaps consideration should be given to reversing the presumption, such 
that unless certain conditions were satisfied, the injury would be considered to be the result 
of the pregnant woman’s participation in the trial but only for the purposes of providing 
compensation, and not for establishing causation in a legal or regulatory sense.  This would 
be consistent with the way in which no-fault compensation was first envisaged.
686
 Its 
application specifically to clinical trials of investigative drugs in pregnant women could be 
construed as a policy-based response to the difficulties trial participants will have in 
establishing that the injury to the child was related to the trial treatment, similarly to the 
Fairchild exception. 
Such trials will rely upon pregnant women volunteering to participate.  Many of these are 
likely to be pharmacokinetic trials, and therefore of no foreseeable benefit to participants.  
Trials of this type are considered as ‘Phase I’ trials, and so participants will be paid for 
participating, and will (probably) come within the ABPI Compensation Guidelines.  As 
matters stand at present, pregnant women will not be considered differently to male and 
non-pregnant female participants – yet they are taking a greater risk.  The risk to the 
pregnant woman is increased as a consequence of pregnancy-related physiological and 
biochemical changes, but she assumes these risks knowingly.  The acute risk to the foetus 
is increased over the risk of the pregnant woman not participating, and the foetus does not 
assume these risks knowingly, but the pregnant woman bears the responsibility for 
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participating.  Accordingly, the participation of pregnant women in such trials is 
supererogatory in nature, a behaviour which merits recognition and - arguably - reward.    
Addressing the greater risk by increasing payments to participants seems inappropriate; it 
engages the notion of employing a financial incentive to encourage trial participation, 
contrary to every ethical code under which clinical research is conducted.  It would also 
mean that a flat rate of payment was given to all participants, whether the potential risk 
was realised or not.  For most, the risk will not be realised, but for the very small number 
of cases in which it is, or it may have been, an increased participant payment is unlikely to 
meet the resultant costs, leaving the mother and injured child is the same position they are 
at present regarding the recovery of compensation. 
If the pregnant woman sustains an iatrogenic injury herself, and the foetus in unharmed, 
she can engage the, admittedly imperfect, systems to gain compensation for herself, just 
like any other trial volunteer.  The route to compensation for a child born injured is both 
less clear and less certain, and, leaving aside the causation issue, the injury may have 
resulted from the pregnant woman’s supererogatory behaviour of participating in a clinical 
trial.  A child born injured through no fault of its own should not be disadvantaged if the 
injury is the result of the pregnant woman’s supererogatory act - an act which will generate 
information which will be of use to many others.   Establishing causation for teratogenic 
injury is fraught with difficulty, as described in Chapters 7.8.4 and 7.9; as a result, the 
prospects for recovery of compensation by the injured are not good.  If the issue of 
compensation for injury in such trials is not addressed, participation will almost certainly 
be adversely affected when the first few possible cases occur, in which case the advantages 
from such trials will not be realised.  The option of suppressing the challenges regarding 
the prospects for compensation in the event of injury during the consent process is not an 
appropriate or defensible approach.  A change of approach to the payment of compensation 
for foetal injury in such trials offers the advantage that compensation is paid only should a 
foetal injury arise.  The moral basis for a different approach to compensation for foetal 
injury in such trials is that the injury was the result of a supererogatory act by the pregnant 
woman.  Harris’s and others’ ‘duty to participate’ arguments and the payments to other 
Phase I participants differentiate male and non-pregnant female participants from pregnant 
participants. 
There are a number of arguments which support consideration of such a system.  A simple 
consequentialist case would be that this would remove a potential impediment to pregnant 
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women participating in such trials, with a consequent increase of knowledge which would 
be to the benefit of the pregnant population in particular.  Children who are born with 
congenital abnormalities often require significantly more care than their ‘normal’ 
counterparts, which can impact on the quality of life and earning capacity of the family 
unit, which in turn may lead to additional financial support requirements from central 
funds. 
From a non-consequentialist perspective, it may be argued that where society conducts, 
supports or sponsors research, it voluntarily assumes an obligation to compensate those 
who are injured in its enterprise.  The Clinical Trials Directive, Regulation 536, and the 
review and approval systems for the RECs and the MHRA all constitute evidence that the 
UK and the European Union, i.e., one definition of the society in which we live, support 
research of this type.  A ‘no-causation’ approach may be considered reasonable on the 
basis of fairness to those who voluntarily risk personal harm, and that of their foetuses, for 
the benefit of the community, or by a social desire to reward behaviour that is perceived as 
virtuous; as discussed earlier in this chapter, the participation of pregnant women in 
clinical trials is supererogatory, and such behaviour surely merits recognition.  A strong 
version of this argument would postulate that a community which benefits from an 
individual’s altruistic act has a moral obligation to provide restitution to the individual; a 
weaker version would simply assert that although compensation may not be morally 
required, it is morally desirable as a charitable act. 
Many countries have implemented compensation schemes for vaccine injuries as an 
expression of solidarity.
687
 In some countries, the schemes reflect a broader social 
judgment that all medical risks should be shared.  In others, vaccine injuries were viewed 
as special due to their severity, complexity, and propensity to befall children and others 
who would not qualify for benefits under processes.
688
  Given the extent of similarities 
between vaccine damage and teratogenic injury arising in clinical trials in pregnant 
women, particularly the fact that the party most likely to be injured is the one least able to 
look after his or her own interests, there seems merit in extending the rationale from 
vaccines to clinical trials in pregnant women. 
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Under the current regulations, one of the definitions of a serious adverse event is a 
congenital abnormality or birth defect occurring after exposure to an investigational 
medicinal product.
689
  Thus, the occurrence of such events, if detected during or after a 
clinical trial involving an investigative drug, must be reported to the relevant authorities, 
and becomes part of the corpus of information relating to that drug.  This currently does 
not connote an admission of liability by the sponsor, nor would it do so under this ‘no-
causation’ proposal.  However, such a report would be sufficient to trigger a payment to 
the (now) mother; payment would be a response to occurrence rather than causation.  The 
trial sponsor would not be responsible for making the payment; it would be made from the 
national insurance scheme described previously and specified within Regulation 5.3.6.  
Accordingly, the sponsor would not be liable for costs which may not have arisen as a 
result of any error or wrongdoing on the part of the sponsor.  The member state would 
meet the cost on the basis that, analogous to one of the justifications put forward in the 
Pearson Report for vaccine damage compensation,
690
 this is the very occasional price that 
society pays for the benefit of defeating disease in this patient group. 
One of the criticisms of the ABPI Compensation Scheme is that it does not make payment 
in the event the trial subject is randomised to comparator or placebo (Chapter 7.5.3); 
children born injured or who are subsequently found to be impaired need to bring a claim 
in negligence.  Under this proposal, payment from the insurance fund would be made 
regardless of the treatment group to which the pregnant woman was randomised.  In this 
way, all subjects entering a clinical trial would be managed in the same way regarding 
recompense for teratogenic injury.  This also seems fair, as the Governmemnt’s 
representative, the MHRA, may have specified the trial design, or at least approved it. 
A pre-requisite would, of course, be that the injury was not present prior to the clinical 
trial, and specifically the administration of trial treatment, and was present subsequently.  
Akin to the process which preceded the VDPA 1979, an appropriate Expert Group would 
need to be established to define the pre-trial information to be assembled to provide a 
baseline against which assessments could be made of whether an injury had, in fact, 
occurred, in the process almost defining a set of ‘exclusion criteria’ - factors which, if 
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present, would exclude a child from ‘automatic’ recompense, but would not necessarily 
exclude the pregnant woman from the clinical trial.  As of the consent process, the 
pregnant woman would be informed regarding the antenatal finding, and its implication 
regarding payment in the event the child is subsequently born injured.  Those providing the 
‘special expertise’ to the RECs required under Regulation 536 may be credible candidates 
for such a Group, although the Group would also require particular legal expertise.  The 
criteria could be formally reviewed and updated on a regular basis as new evidence 
emerges. 
The pre-trial information requirement would lessen the risk of exploitation of pregnant 
women and reduce the prospect of a mother with an already-damaged foetus participating 
in a clinical trial.  A system such as this would avoid the accusation of bribery which 
would inevitably follow any suggestion of paying trial participants; under this option, 
payments would be made only to children born injured.  Thus trial participants are not 
being ‘compensated’ for being exposed to the risk of a teratogenic effect, but for such 
effect should it arise, given the challenges of establishing causation, especially in the ‘first 
case’.  This would result in a degree of selection bias, but such a bias is inherent in the 
selection criteria for any clinical trial; the point of these criteria is to define a reasonably 
homogeneous study sample which will generate transportable information to the 
population of which it is representative, with an ethically-acceptable risk:benefit ratio. 
On the premises that the appropriately-informed autonomous pregnant woman may make 
whatever decisions she pleases regarding trial participation (Chapter 6.4), and the overall 
ethical issues have been considered prior to the approval of the trial (Chapter 6.3), the 
restrictions regarding an automatic entitlement to recompense in the event of a possible 
teratogenic injury should be made known within the consent process.  If the pre-trial 
information indicates that the child is highly likely to be born with some form of 
congenital abnormality, then it seems reasonable to exclude such an abnormality from the 
‘no-causation’ process.  Such pre-trial information might include, inter alia, the results of 
scans, blood and genetic tests, the current medical history of the pregnant woman, e.g., is 
she taking anything which is associated with teratogenic injury in humans, and family 
history.  Given that payments would be made from the national insurance scheme, it would 
seem not unreasonable for the Government to protect its interests by specifying as 
condition of protocol approval by the MHRA that particular information was generated 
within the pre-trial process, always provided the generation of the information did not pose 
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a risk in itself, e.g., amniocentesis, or was excessive, i.e., going significantly beyond the 
usual level of baseline data collection in a clinical trial. 
The threshold for exclusion would need to be set high, or the threshold for causation set 
low, to avoid the types of arguments which have proven so difficult in vaccine-damage 
cases.  For the same reason, the level of disability would need to be set low; the prospect of 
a mother being denied recompense in respect of a child whose disabilities had been 
assessed at, say, 58% is unattractive, and will do little to reassure other pregnant trial 
participants.  As part of this structure, criteria would need to be defined by the Expert 
Group regarding the age at which injury becomes apparent in order to qualify; visual 
impairment may not become noticeable until the child is many months old, and 
developmental abnormalities, such as speech and learning, may take considerably longer to 
become obvious.  Provision would also need to be made for consideration of novus actus 
interveniens, the most likely of which is, ironically, vaccination.  Nonetheless, starting 
from a rebuttable presumption that the injury was the result of the pregnant woman’s 
participation in the trial, an approach such as this should do much to accelerate the 
payments to and reduce the distress and potential financial hardship of mothers who find 
themselves in this situation. 
Rather than the fixed sums which exist under the Vaccine Damage Compensation Scheme, 
a sliding scale of disability would avoid the issues posed by pre-defined thresholds.  Such a 
scale should, ideally, reflect the type of injury commonly found in congenital injuries, and 
reference might usefully be made to Vaccine Injuries Compensation Programme in the 
USA or the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme in the UK.  
Capturing all such cases in the proposed registry of pregnant women participating in such 
studies will enable more complete tracking of potential teratogenic injury, and support the 
MHRA and EMA in the conduct of analyses which may move the balance of probabilities 
away from favouring congenital abnormalities as being spontaneous towards being 
causally-related to a particular drug, a structural moiety within the drug, or an excipient.  In 
the event that the collection and analysis of such information identified such a link, this 
would be notified to all drug manufacturers and trial sponsors, and the appropriate steps 
would then be taken, including the addition of relevant warnings on patient information 
leaflets and package inserts, consent documents for clinical trials, and so on, relating to the 
suspect entity. 
Chapter 8  Final Conclusions 
209 
 
If that entity was an investigative drug, then the manufacturer would already have all of the 
relevant information, and may be called to explain the reasons that an Agency, rather than 
the manufacturer, identified the link.  If the entity identified as being teratogenic was a 
comparator drug in a clinical trial, it is possible that the drug was produced by multiple 
manufacturers, and so all of the relevant information may not have been available to any of 
them, but it would be available to the Agencies.  However, under the requirements of Good 
Manufacturing Practice,
691
 the source of all materials employed in clinical trials must be 
documented, and so the identifies of the manufacturers which made the drug can be 
discovered.  Should the entity be a moiety within a molecular structure, or an excipient, 
then the number of drugs and formulations which could be implicated would be 
substantial; none of the manufacturers would have had access to all of the information 
which would have enables them to come to such an assessment, and resolving issues of 
liability would be a prolonged process.  However, under this proposed ‘no-causation’ 
scheme, any party who suffered suspected teratogenic injury after participating in a clinical 
trial would already have been recompensed, regardless of the cause of the injury. 
As noted previously, far fewer pregnant subjects will be enrolled into clinical trials 
annually than the twelve million children vaccinated every year.  Assuming that the 
numbers of clinical trials in pregnant women would be relatively low, and the size of many 
of these trials, assuming they were intended to generate pharmacokinetic data, would be 
relatively small, then the number of children born with congenital disabilities would also 
be low, and although the costs per child could be significant, the overall costs would be 
relatively modest, particularly if a sliding scale was employed.  Certainly, the costs would 
be low when compared to the costs of managing medical conditions in pregnant women 
cited in Chapter 1.1,
692
 an unknown proportion of which may be attributable to the 
mismanagement of these conditions by under- or over-dosing pregnant patients. 
If the UK adopted such an approach unilaterally, that might constitute an incentive for 
sponsors to bring such trials preferentially to the UK; the potential risks to the sponsor of 
becoming embroiled in protracted litigation with families seeking recompense would be 
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much-reduced.  However, the potential costs to the national insurance scheme of such a 
‘no-causation’ could be met or at least offset by increased trial fees to all sponsors to meet 
costs, or a higher fee for studies of this nature. 
It would seem reasonable that potential liability under a conventional system would be 
prospective from the point at which the link was identified, always accepting that such a 
link does not satisfy the legal test of causation.  Capturing an appropriate level of 
information on such cases in a pre-approval setting, which should not prejudice approval 
per se, would, however, provide information against which any later cases might be 
compared, and may serve to provide evidence of a causative relationship.  
8.5.3 A Fair Solution? 
This ‘no-causation’ approach would prevent victims’ claims being thwarted through no 
fault of their own by the lack of scientific knowledge regarding the cause of an injury.  Of 
course, (almost) any congenital injury could arise spontaneously, and there may appear to 
be an inherent unfairness if one child with such an injury received compensation because 
the mother had participated in a clinical trial, whilst another child with an identical 
congenital injury did not, because the mother did not participate in a trial - the same 
argument as arose when the Vaccine Damage Payment Act was under discussion.  As 
suggested earlier, perhaps as a society we need to find ways in which to reward those who 
‘go first’ - without them, there will be no progress in this, as in many other areas, of 
medical research.  
Children born with a congenital injury and whose mothers did not participate in a clinical 
trial would be no worse off than they would otherwise have been.  The wider issues 
regarding the causes of and compensation for congenital injury certainly merit 
investigation, but are beyond the scope of this thesis.  For those born with a congenital 
injury after their mothers had taken part in a clinical trial, a causation-based approach 
entails the risk of reaching a decision not to pay compensation, or delaying payment for a 
significant period of time - witness the thalidomide example - which in hindsight is proven 
to have been erroneous.  Such children would be worse off than they would otherwise have 
been - their interests have clearly been ‘set back’ both by incurring the injury and by being 
denied compensation to which they were entitled.  Providing compensation in such 
circumstances positively reinforces the pregnant woman’s supererogatory behaviour, and 
seems likely to alleviate one of the concerns of others who might contemplate trial 
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participation, but without creating an exploitative situation: participants are not being paid 
for participation per se - the futures of their children are being protected in the event of 
injury, which may not, of course, arise. 
The principle of corrective justice requires that an individual or an organisation should be 
liable only for harm that he/she has wrongfully caused.  The inability to establish that a 
particular harm is caused by a particular drug means that an organisation can avoid liability 
for harm which its drug has, in fact, caused.  However, the failure to establish the case 
means that the victims are denied recompense.  The ‘no-causation’ approach proposed 
would mean that organisations were not found liable in the absence of evidence, and 
victims were not denied recompense. 
This approach would do much to address the restorative issues noted in the introduction to 
this chapter, and it would bring the regulatory authority, the REC and the NHS more 
clearly into the preventative aspects.  The approach does not require any further resolution 
of foetal status than currently exists, nor does it require rationalisation of the appropriate 
model of the relationship between the pregnant woman and her foetus; the REC will 
already have considered the particular risk to the foetus when approving the trial, and so 
the pregnant woman’s consent is all that is then required.  Finally, such an approach would 
require extensive revision of the ABPI Guidelines, or the development of a Guideline for 
use with pregnant women, removing the lack of clarity described in Chapter 7.5. 
8.6 Additional Legislative Reforms 
In addition to the major changes proposed in the preceding two sections.a number of other 
changes could contribute to an increased level of protection for the foetus and the interest 
of the child the foetus will become. 
8.6.1 Defining the Investigator-Subject Relationship 
The introduction of legislation to clarify the legal nature of the relationship between 
Investigator and Subject would be helpful.  This would also define the Investigator’s 
responsibilities, in terms of adherence to the protocol, thereby recognising that, in effect, 
the Investigator may not be ‘treating’ the subject; the responsibility has become one of 
minimising harm.  Whilst it is tempting to suggest that the opportunity might be taken to 
define the relationship between the pregnant woman and the foetus (see Chapter 4.4), or 
the status of the foetus as a trial participant (see Chapter 6.3.1), given the long list of UK 
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and European cases in which that opportunity has not been taken, such a suggestion may 
be overly-ambitious. 
8.6.2 Removal of Contributory Negligence 
Under the proposals in the sections above, the contributory negligence provision in the 
CDCLA 1976 would also be removed specifically for clinical trials in pregnant women, for 
three reasons.  The first is that this provision has, apparently, been so rarely used for 40 
years that its need must now be considered as questionable in any setting.  Secondly, since 
the injured child cannot sue the (now) mother, the child may be left with no recourse, 
which effectively denies justice to the child.  The third reason is that the philosophy behind 
the maternal exemption, described in Chapter 3.5, was that if a child could sue the mother 
for damage suffered in utero, this would disrupt family harmony and create an adversarial 
atmosphere between the two; it seems difficult to conclude that a child whose 
compensation was abated due to the mother’s negligence during the course of a clinical 
trial would not feel similarly aggrieved. 
8.6.3 Application to Comparators and Placebo 
The same non-differentiated approach would be taken for injuries sustained following 
randomisation to an active comparator or placebo in a clinical trial under the proposals 
above.  Pregnant women may not know, do not choose, and cannot control, the treatment 
to which they are assigned, other than by declining participation in the trial, although they 
will be aware of the options and, if properly informed, the risks.  The trial sponsor chose - 
or the regulatory agency specified - the comparator treatment, and the dose, when 
designing the trial, and both are better-placed than the trial subject to understand the 
potential risks associated with the comparator.  If the comparator damages, or may have 
damaged, the foetus, why should the trial subject or the injured child need to instigate an 
action in negligence with all its attendant challenges to seek compensation from the 
manufacturer of the comparator?  Arguably, whoever selected the comparator should be 
responsible for the consequences of their actions.  A similar argument arises in respect of 
placebo.  Although placebo treatment will not precipitate teratogenic injury (although 
constituent excipients are not subject to the same testing as investigational drugs, so the 
possibility exists that any of these has undiscovered teratogenic potential), allocation to 
placebo treatment engages the risk that the subject will not receive treatment which is 
medically-indicated; as a result, the untreated condition may result in teratogenic injury.  
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Of course, the REC should not approve trials with such inherent risks, but as discussed in 
the previous chapter, there is not an obvious method by which to hold the REC accountable 
for its decisions.  This probably represents a greater challenge for the recovery of 
compensation, as the complainant needs to establish that something would have been better 
than nothing. 
8.6.4 Relevant Degree of Proximity 
Should trial subjects reasonably be in the contemplation of the regulatory authorities and 
the sponsors when designing the trial?  Precedent appears to indicate that the regulatory 
authority is considered as being too far removed from the subjects to owe a duty of care, 
although the possibility has not been excluded (see Chapter 7.7.2).  If the MHRA stipulates 
the use of a particular comparator in a clinical trial, and that comparator then expresses 
teratogenic effect, it would seem difficult to hold the MHRA to a different standard to that 
of the sponsor.  Precedent indicates that sponsors are considered as having a sufficient 
relationship with trial participants to enable them to answer in negligence, so if the cause 
of the injury is a comparator agent required by the MHRA, this would seem not to fall 
easily within the categories of discretionary or policy decisions. 
8.6.5 Insurance coverage 
The requirement in Regulation 536 for member states to establish some form of insurance 
for trial participants fits well with these proposals.  As stated in the previous chapter, 
countries would be expected to be better-placed to meet the potentially substantial costs 
associated with congenital injuries than sponsors, although sponsors might reasonably be 
expected to contribute to the funding of such a scheme by a system of user fees.  In 
conjunction with a no-fault construction, children born injured would be able to seek 
appropriate compensation from the national system.  By linking the two in this way, the 
compensatory damages paid in a specific country would be appropriate and proportional 
for that country, rather than, for example, a subject born injured in the UK seeking to bring 
an action in the USA.  Should the injury be related to the investigational drug, to the 
comparator specified by the regulatory authority, or to the inclusion of placebo at the 
behest of the regulatory authority, then the sponsor and the authority can subsequently 
negotiate or litigate regarding some apportionment of these costs, but they can do so in 
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their own time, and avoid forcing the injured party to wait many years for compensation, 
as mentioned by Howells and Weatherill (Chapter 7.8.3).
693
  
Obviously, this approach would bring the MHRA, the regulatory authority in the UK, into 
the compensation process.  Although possibly not directly answerable to trial subjects, 
involving the regulatory authority in this way would create a chain of indirect liability.  If a 
number of cases of teratogenic injury were found to be the result of comparators included 
at the insistence of the regulatory authority, presumably, the Governmental provision for 
such payment would come under pressure, and the regulatory authority may then be 
prevailed upon to reconsider the basis upon which such decisions were made.  In this way, 
the regulatory authority would face greater accountability than is currently the case for the 
decisions it made, and the greater scrutiny seems likely to result in the authority providing 
a more detailed rationale for its decision.  If this were to be the case, then, potentially, it 
would increase the preventative protection for the foetus.  Such an approach would provide 
a framework within which all cases of teratogenic injury could be considered and which 
may set precedent for future cases; this would seem preferable to the current case-by-case 
arbitration scheme described within the ABPI Compensation Guidelines. 
8.6.6 Creating a National Registry 
The introduction by Regulation 536 of an obligation upon member states of the European 
Union to provide insurance for trial participants provides a foundation for an integrated 
process which could resolve many of the issues identified with the current processes.  One 
might assume that, like any other insurance undertaking, the provider of the insurance 
would wish to know who is being insured, and so it would not seem unreasonable for the 
identities of those participating in clinical trials to be collated, perhaps by the MHRA.  
This could provide the basis for a national Registry for pregnant women enrolling to 
clinical trials. 
Once women had agreed to participate in a trial, details which would enable their 
information to be recovered at a future date, such as name, N.I. Number, and NHS Number 
could be captured in the Registry.  This would enable the same type of process to be 
followed which prevents volunteers from participating in an excessive number of trials, as 
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described in Chapter 8.1.1,
694
 and so provide preventative protection for the foetus.  
Requiring the capture within the Registry of the identity of the drug to which the pregnant 
subject was randomised, and recording the outcome of the pregnancy, would provide a 
longitudinal database which the MHRA could monitor to detect associations between 
particular drugs, or specific moieties, and suspected teratogenic effect.  This would provide 
an additional preventative protection for future foetuses, allowing the MHRA to advise 
companies of any emerging patterns related to particular moieties which might guide future 
drug designs.  In the event that an investigational drug was approved, and subsequently 
suspected of being teratogenic, the pre-approval information would be available for 
examination, which may enable a level of restorative justice for any subjects who 
participated in clinical trials, gave birth to an injured child, but were denied compensation 
at the time due to uncertainty regarding an association between the injury and any of the 
drugs in the trial. 
8.7 Conclusions 
For the first time ever we are about to undertake the intentional, ethical, systematic 
administration of investigational drugs to pregnant women in a research rather than 
therapeutic setting.  The practice of ‘avoiding’ the associated risks by excluding or 
withdrawing pregnant women from clinical trials will become progressively less 
acceptable, just as has happened with paediatric research.  Few of those involved in any 
aspect of the clinical trial process will not be aware of thalidomide, and all will be 
determined that such a situation will not recur.  As described in Chapter 2 and 4, for moral 
reasons, the foetus is considered to ‘deserve’ protection, and as described in Chapter 3, the 
law has given effect to that in various ways.  However, as our processes stand at present, 
that protection seems to be significantly lacking in three distinct areas regarding clinical 
trials: consent, causation and compensation. 
The lacunae in the protective network start before the consideration of specific trials by the 
relevant authorities.  The ICH Guidelines, with the exception of ICH-E6, have no legal 
authority, and so sponsors are free to decide not to conduct preclinical assessments defined 
in these Guidelines.  The MHRA is apparently empowered to approve the conduct of 
clinical trials despite the absence of the information which those assessments would 
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provide.  The MHRA, and the EMA, have the authority to specify the agents to which an 
investigational drug must be approved, as a condition of eventual approval of the drug.  
Yet the MHRA appears to bear no liability for the consequences of its decisions.  
Similarly, the RECs appear to be immune to suit, but could do much to improve the 
content and wording of consent documents and require that periodic re-assessment of the 
level of understanding of trial subjects was conducted.  Moreover, the RECs could take a 
position on the ABPI Compensation Guidelines, requiring that a clearer explanation be 
given regarding the scope for payment in the event of injury; whilst the RECs are not in a 
position to require changes to these Guidelines, they are in a position to stipulate the way 
in which they are described in documents shown to prospective trial subjects.  Finally, the 
NHS document retention schedules are such that key documents can be destroyed within 
the limitation period for a personal injury claim; although the number of potential claims 
which could be frustrated in this way is probably small, this seems an unnecessary 
situation, with present day document-retention technology. Thus, one must question 
whether, when patients give their consent, they have all the information they need upon 
which to base that, and, in some, possibly many, cases, patients will simply be unaware of 
the information which might - or ought - to be available. 
In the UK, in contrast to the USA, the consent process is confounded because many of our 
legal approaches to clinical trials remain founded on a ‘Doctor-Patient’ rather than 
‘Investigator-Subject’ relationship.  This seems particularly marked in the area of 
obstetrics, where, as in many other areas, it seems likely that physicians will recruit their 
own patients into clinical trials.  The physicians’ conflict of interest seems obvious, but 
many patients will probably not consider the consequences of the physician becoming an 
investigator, and the duty changing from that of doing the best for the patient to one of 
minimising harm.  This, when compounded by therapeutic misconception, must raise 
questions regarding the validity of the consent process. 
Of course, many, if not all, of these criticisms could be levelled against any clinical trial, 
involving any target population.  However, additional complexities arise in clinical trials 
involving pregnant women because of the inconsistent approaches regarding the status of 
the foetus and the unique relationship between women and foetus, highlighted in particular 
in Chapter 4.  The implications of the pregnant woman’s consent ‘for’ the foetus and 
whether that precludes a child born injured seeking compensation if the pregnant woman is 
adjudged to have assumed the risk, need to be clarified.  Compensation is currently 
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predicated upon causation, which is uniquely difficult in this population, as injuries may 
not become apparent for many months or years after the clinical trial, by which time the 
relevant records may no longer exist. 
The challenge of establishing whether a teratogenic injury in a particular child can be 
linked to a drug the child’s mother took while she was pregnant is significant.  The 
requirement to establish causation is implicit within the ABPI Compensation Guidelines, 
and explicit within tort, where the balance of probabilities approach will always work 
against the first few children who sustain injury in utero, unless the injury has distinctive 
characteristics, as was the case with thalidomide.  Given the background rate of 
spontaneous congenital abnormalities, a drug-related teratogenic effect in a very low 
proportion of children, particularly if, like thalidomide, a small ’window of opportunity’ 
exists for it to do so, may never be proven.  Returning to the issue of consent, how many 
pregnant women are made aware of these difficulties when being asked to consider 
participation in a clinical trial? 
Pregnant women constitute a unique - and necessary - population in which to conduct 
clinical trials of new drugs, and a population which was never in contemplation when the 
current processes for consent, trial conduct, assessment of causation and mechanisms for 
seeking compensation were being developed.  Until we find ways in which to eradicate the 
diseases we currently treat using drugs, the protection of future generation of pregnant 
women and their foetuses from iatrogenic, teratogenic injury is best-served by the proper 
conduct of research in that population.  We must ensure that these benefits are not gained 
at the expense of the people and future people they are intended to protect.  Regulation 
536, the successor to the Clinical Trials Directive, is the first legislative instrument 
applicable to the UK which specifically addresses clinical trials in this population, but it 
focuses, appropriately, on a small number of general principles.  It does not address the 
issues identified in this thesis related to consent, causation or compensation; these issues 
are under the purview of national Governments, rather than the European Union and its 
Agencies.  Therefore, the changes need to be driven from within the UK.  Nearly 40 years 
have passed since the CDCLA 1976 and the VPDA 1979 came into effect.  During that 
time medical research and clinical trials have changed in ways inconceivable when these 
laws were enacted, and particularly the intent to conduct clinical trials of investigational 
drugs in women who are pregnant.  The time has now come to consider the introduction of 
legislation to increase the protection of the foetus whose mother enrols into a clinical trial. 
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